From: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
To: dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, jarkko@kernel.org,
tglx@linutronix.de, bp@alien8.de, luto@kernel.org,
mingo@redhat.com, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
shuah@kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: seanjc@google.com, kai.huang@intel.com, cathy.zhang@intel.com,
cedric.xing@intel.com, haitao.huang@intel.com,
mark.shanahan@intel.com, vijay.dhanraj@intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH V4 13/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_page_alloc()
Date: Wed, 13 Apr 2022 14:10:13 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <c47163aa933077c916101d5ba413257594160efe.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1649878359.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com>
From: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Move sgx_encl_page_alloc() to encl.c and export it so that it can be
used in the implementation for support of adding pages to initialized
enclaves, which requires to allocate new enclave pages.
Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
---
No changes since V3.
Changes since V2:
- New patch
Originally submitted at:
https://lore.kernel.org/linux-sgx/20220308112833.262805-3-jarkko@kernel.org/
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c | 32 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h | 3 +++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c | 32 --------------------------------
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
index c77a62432862..546423753e4c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.c
@@ -792,6 +792,38 @@ int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
return ret;
}
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags)
+{
+ struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
+ unsigned long prot;
+
+ encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (!encl_page)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
+ encl_page->encl = encl;
+
+ prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
+ _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
+
+ /*
+ * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
+ * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
+ * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
+ */
+ if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
+ prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
+
+ /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
+ encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
+
+ return encl_page;
+}
+
/**
* sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() - remove PTEs mapping the address from enclave
* @encl: the enclave
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
index 9d673d9531f0..253ebdd1c5be 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/encl.h
@@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ int sgx_encl_get_backing(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long page_index,
void sgx_encl_put_backing(struct sgx_backing *backing, bool do_write);
int sgx_encl_test_and_clear_young(struct mm_struct *mm,
struct sgx_encl_page *page);
+struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
+ unsigned long offset,
+ u64 secinfo_flags);
void sgx_zap_enclave_ptes(struct sgx_encl *encl, unsigned long addr);
struct sgx_epc_page *sgx_alloc_va_page(void);
unsigned int sgx_alloc_va_slot(struct sgx_va_page *va_page);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
index 2df27dd8b30d..bb8cdb2ad0d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/sgx/ioctl.c
@@ -169,38 +169,6 @@ static long sgx_ioc_enclave_create(struct sgx_encl *encl, void __user *arg)
return ret;
}
-static struct sgx_encl_page *sgx_encl_page_alloc(struct sgx_encl *encl,
- unsigned long offset,
- u64 secinfo_flags)
-{
- struct sgx_encl_page *encl_page;
- unsigned long prot;
-
- encl_page = kzalloc(sizeof(*encl_page), GFP_KERNEL);
- if (!encl_page)
- return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
-
- encl_page->desc = encl->base + offset;
- encl_page->encl = encl;
-
- prot = _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_R, PROT_READ) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_W, PROT_WRITE) |
- _calc_vm_trans(secinfo_flags, SGX_SECINFO_X, PROT_EXEC);
-
- /*
- * TCS pages must always RW set for CPU access while the SECINFO
- * permissions are *always* zero - the CPU ignores the user provided
- * values and silently overwrites them with zero permissions.
- */
- if ((secinfo_flags & SGX_SECINFO_PAGE_TYPE_MASK) == SGX_SECINFO_TCS)
- prot |= PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE;
-
- /* Calculate maximum of the VM flags for the page. */
- encl_page->vm_max_prot_bits = calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, 0);
-
- return encl_page;
-}
-
static int sgx_validate_secinfo(struct sgx_secinfo *secinfo)
{
u64 perm = secinfo->flags & SGX_SECINFO_PERMISSION_MASK;
--
2.25.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-04-13 21:13 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 60+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-04-13 21:10 [PATCH V4 00/31] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 01/31] x86/sgx: Add short descriptions to ENCLS wrappers Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 02/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODPR function Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 03/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EMODT function Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 04/31] x86/sgx: Add wrapper for SGX2 EAUG function Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 05/31] x86/sgx: Support loading enclave page without VMA permissions check Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 06/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 07/31] x86/sgx: Rename sgx_encl_ewb_cpumask() as sgx_encl_cpumask() Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 08/31] x86/sgx: Move PTE zap code to new sgx_zap_enclave_ptes() Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 09/31] x86/sgx: Make sgx_ipi_cb() available internally Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 10/31] x86/sgx: Create utility to validate user provided offset and length Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 11/31] x86/sgx: Keep record of SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:12 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:27 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 12/31] x86/sgx: Export sgx_encl_{grow,shrink}() Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` Reinette Chatre [this message]
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 14/31] x86/sgx: Support VA page allocation without reclaiming Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:18 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:30 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-15 13:54 ` Haitao Huang
2022-04-15 15:22 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 15/31] x86/sgx: Support restricting of enclave page permissions Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 11:19 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:31 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 16/31] x86/sgx: Support adding of pages to an initialized enclave Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:20 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:31 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 17/31] x86/sgx: Tighten accessible memory range after enclave initialization Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 18/31] x86/sgx: Support modifying SGX page type Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:11 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:32 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 19/31] x86/sgx: Support complete page removal Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 20/31] x86/sgx: Free up EPC pages directly to support large page ranges Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 21/31] Documentation/x86: Introduce enclave runtime management section Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:32 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 22/31] selftests/sgx: Add test for EPCM permission changes Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 23/31] selftests/sgx: Add test for TCS page " Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 24/31] selftests/sgx: Test two different SGX2 EAUG flows Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 25/31] selftests/sgx: Introduce dynamic entry point Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 26/31] selftests/sgx: Introduce TCS initialization enclave operation Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 27/31] selftests/sgx: Test complete changing of page type flow Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 28/31] selftests/sgx: Test faulty enclave behavior Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 29/31] selftests/sgx: Test invalid access to removed enclave page Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 30/31] selftests/sgx: Test reclaiming of untouched page Reinette Chatre
2022-04-13 21:10 ` [PATCH V4 31/31] selftests/sgx: Page removal stress test Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 11:25 ` [PATCH V4 00/31] x86/sgx and selftests/sgx: Support SGX2 Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 16:34 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-14 16:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-14 18:35 ` Dhanraj, Vijay
2022-04-17 14:58 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-21 23:46 ` Dhanraj, Vijay
2022-04-22 3:29 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-22 9:16 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-22 13:17 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-25 20:17 ` Dhanraj, Vijay
2022-04-25 23:56 ` Reinette Chatre
2022-04-26 4:10 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2022-04-22 9:14 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
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