From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org, Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>, Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>,
Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 34/34] KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest
Date: Wed, 16 Dec 2020 10:55:30 -0600 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <d75a9f3e-0f8e-6a2d-b9c3-c4d12933553e@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <e9643245adb809caf3a87c09997926d2f3d6ff41.1607620209.git.thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
On 12/10/20 11:10 AM, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> From: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
>
> An SEV-ES guest is started by invoking a new SEV initialization ioctl,
> KVM_SEV_ES_INIT. This identifies the guest as an SEV-ES guest, which is
> used to drive the appropriate ASID allocation, VMSA encryption, etc.
>
> Before being able to run an SEV-ES vCPU, the vCPU VMSA must be encrypted
> and measured. This is done using the LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA command after all
> calls to LAUNCH_UPDATE_DATA have been performed, but before LAUNCH_MEASURE
> has been performed. In order to establish the encrypted VMSA, the current
> (traditional) VMSA and the GPRs are synced to the page that will hold the
> encrypted VMSA and then LAUNCH_UPDATE_VMSA is invoked. The vCPU is then
> marked as having protected guest state.
>
> Signed-off-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
> ---
> +
> + /* Sync registgers */
> + save->rax = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RAX];
> + save->rbx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBX];
> + save->rcx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RCX];
> + save->rdx = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDX];
> + save->rsp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP];
> + save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
> + save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
> + save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
> + save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
> + save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
> + save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
> + save->r11 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R11];
> + save->r12 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R12];
> + save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
> + save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
> + save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
> + save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
> +
Paolo, I just noticed that a 32-bit build will fail because of R8-R15
references, sorry about that (I'm kind of surprised krobot hasn't
complained). This should take care of it:
---
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 4045de7f8f8b..84b3ee15f4ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -529,6 +529,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->rbp = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RBP];
save->rsi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSI];
save->rdi = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RDI];
+#ifdef X86_64
save->r8 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R8];
save->r9 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R9];
save->r10 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R10];
@@ -537,6 +538,7 @@ static int sev_es_sync_vmsa(struct vcpu_svm *svm)
save->r13 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R13];
save->r14 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R14];
save->r15 = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_R15];
+#endif
save->rip = svm->vcpu.arch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RIP];
/* Sync some non-GPR registers before encrypting */
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-12-16 16:56 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 62+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-12-10 17:09 [PATCH v5 00/34] SEV-ES hypervisor support Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 01/34] x86/cpu: Add VM page flush MSR availablility as a CPUID feature Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 02/34] KVM: SVM: Remove the call to sev_platform_status() during setup Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 12:29 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 16:45 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 03/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES capability in KVM Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 04/34] KVM: SVM: Add GHCB accessor functions for retrieving fields Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 05/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for the SEV-ES VMSA Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 06/34] KVM: x86: Mark GPRs dirty when written Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 07/34] KVM: SVM: Add required changes to support intercepts under SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 15:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:00 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 08/34] KVM: SVM: Prevent debugging " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 15:35 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 15:41 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:10 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 09/34] KVM: SVM: Do not allow instruction emulation " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 10/34] KVM: SVM: Cannot re-initialize the VMCB after shutdown with SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 11/34] KVM: SVM: Prepare for SEV-ES exit handling in the sev.c file Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 12/34] KVM: SVM: Add initial support for a VMGEXIT VMEXIT Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 15:45 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 19:41 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-12-15 10:16 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 13/34] KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT processing Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 14/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x002 Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 15/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x004 Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 16/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for SEV-ES GHCB MSR protocol function 0x100 Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 15:49 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:21 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 17/34] KVM: SVM: Create trace events for VMGEXIT MSR protocol processing Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 18/34] KVM: SVM: Support MMIO for an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 19/34] KVM: SVM: Support string IO operations " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 20/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for EFER write traps " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 21/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR0 " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 22/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR4 " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 23/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for CR8 " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:09 ` [PATCH v5 24/34] KVM: x86: Update __get_sregs() / __set_sregs() to support SEV-ES Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 25/34] KVM: SVM: Do not report support for SMM for an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 26/34] KVM: SVM: Guest FPU state save/restore not needed for " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 27/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs for an " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-14 16:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-15 20:25 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-04 17:38 ` Tom Lendacky
2021-01-04 17:50 ` Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-04 20:20 ` [PATCH v5.1 27/34] KVM: SVM: Add support for booting APs in " Tom Lendacky
2021-01-07 18:13 ` Paolo Bonzini
2021-01-07 19:53 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 28/34] KVM: SVM: Add NMI support for " Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 29/34] KVM: SVM: Set the encryption mask for the SVM host save area Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 30/34] KVM: SVM: Update ASID allocation to support SEV-ES guests Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 31/34] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU creation/loading Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 32/34] KVM: SVM: Provide support for SEV-ES vCPU loading Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 33/34] KVM: SVM: Provide an updated VMRUN invocation for SEV-ES guests Tom Lendacky
2020-12-10 17:10 ` [PATCH v5 34/34] KVM: SVM: Provide support to launch and run an SEV-ES guest Tom Lendacky
2020-12-16 16:55 ` Tom Lendacky [this message]
2020-12-14 18:13 ` [PATCH v5 00/34] SEV-ES hypervisor support Paolo Bonzini
2020-12-14 19:06 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-15 16:46 ` Tom Lendacky
2020-12-15 17:42 ` Paolo Bonzini
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