From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com, linux-mm@kvack.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Brad Spengler <spender@grsecurity.net>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Christoph Hellwig <hch@infradead.org>,
James Morris <james.l.morris@oracle.com>,
Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>, Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
PaX Team <pageexec@freemail.hu>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection
Date: Sat, 6 Jul 2019 08:38:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <fcbf55e9-78dc-fb1a-e893-4fea8ebdc202@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1562410493-8661-7-git-send-email-s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
On 7/6/19 3:54 AM, Salvatore Mesoraca wrote:
> diff --git a/security/sara/Kconfig b/security/sara/Kconfig
> index b98cf27..54a96e0 100644
> --- a/security/sara/Kconfig
> +++ b/security/sara/Kconfig
> @@ -60,3 +60,77 @@ config SECURITY_SARA_NO_RUNTIME_ENABLE
>
> If unsure, answer Y.
>
> +config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT
> + bool "WX Protection: W^X and W!->X protections"
> + depends on SECURITY_SARA
> + default y
> + help
> + WX Protection aims to improve user-space programs security by applying:
> + - W^X memory restriction
> + - W!->X (once writable never executable) mprotect restriction
> + - Executable MMAP prevention
> + See Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst. for further information.
.rst for further information.
> +
> + If unsure, answer Y.
> +
> +choice
> + prompt "Default action for W^X and W!->X protections"
> + depends on SECURITY_SARA
> + depends on SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT
> + default SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_COMPLAIN_VERBOSE
> +
> + help
Use tab instead of spaces for indentation above.
> + Choose the default behaviour of WX Protection when no config
> + rule matches or no rule is loaded.
> + For further information on available flags and their meaning
> + see Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst.
> +
> + config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_COMPLAIN_VERBOSE
> + bool "Protections enabled but not enforced."
> + help
> + All features enabled except "Executable MMAP prevention",
> + verbose reporting, but no actual enforce: it just complains.
> + Its numeric value is 0x3f, for more information see
> + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst.
> +
> + config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_ENFORCE_VERBOSE
> + bool "Full protection, verbose."
> + help
> + All features enabled except "Executable MMAP prevention".
> + The enabled features will be enforced with verbose reporting.
> + Its numeric value is 0x2f, for more information see
> + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst.
> +
> + config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_ENFORCE
> + bool "Full protection, quiet."
> + help
> + All features enabled except "Executable MMAP prevention".
> + The enabled features will be enforced quietly.
> + Its numeric value is 0xf, for more information see
> + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst.
> +
> + config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_NONE
> + bool "No protection at all."
> + help
> + All features disabled.
> + Its numeric value is 0, for more information see
> + Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/SARA.rst.
> +endchoice
> +
> +config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DISABLED
> + bool "WX protection will be disabled at boot."
> + depends on SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT
> + default n
Omit "default n" please.
> + help
> + If you say Y here WX protection won't be enabled at startup. You can
> + override this option via user-space utilities or at boot time via
> + "sara.wxprot_enabled=[0|1]" kernel parameter.
> +
> + If unsure, answer N.
> +
> +config SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS
> + hex
> + default "0x3f" if SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_COMPLAIN_VERBOSE
> + default "0x2f" if SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_ENFORCE_VERBOSE
> + default "0xf" if SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_ALL_ENFORCE
> + default "0" if SECURITY_SARA_WXPROT_DEFAULT_FLAGS_NONE
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-06 15:39 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 35+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-06 10:54 [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] S.A.R.A.: add documentation Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 17:14 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-06 17:32 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-13 0:14 ` James Morris
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] S.A.R.A.: create framework Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 15:29 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] S.A.R.A.: cred blob management Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-12 23:35 ` James Morris
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] S.A.R.A.: generic DFA for string matching Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 18:32 ` Jann Horn
2019-07-07 16:01 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-08 17:37 ` Jann Horn
2019-10-06 16:49 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-10-07 12:40 ` Jann Horn
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] LSM: creation of "check_vmflags" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 15:38 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2019-07-06 19:28 ` Al Viro
2019-07-07 15:49 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-09 4:51 ` Kees Cook
2019-07-08 12:42 ` David Laight
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] LSM: creation of "pagefault_handler" LSM hook Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] S.A.R.A.: trampoline emulation Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 15:31 ` Randy Dunlap
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] S.A.R.A.: WX protection procattr interface Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] S.A.R.A.: XATTRs support Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] S.A.R.A.: /proc/*/mem write limitation Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 18:20 ` Jann Horn
2019-07-07 16:15 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 10:54 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] MAINTAINERS: take maintainership for S.A.R.A Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-06 14:33 ` [PATCH v5 00/12] S.A.R.A. a new stacked LSM Jordan Glover
2019-07-06 15:02 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
2019-07-07 1:16 ` James Morris
2019-07-07 15:40 ` Salvatore Mesoraca
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