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From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>
To: bpf@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
	Stanislav Fomichev <sdf@google.com>, Hao Luo <haoluo@google.com>,
	Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
	Brendan Jackman <jackmanb@chromium.org>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Khadija Kamran <kamrankhadijadj@gmail.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Lukas Bulwahn <lukas.bulwahn@gmail.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Shung-Hsi Yu <shung-hsi.yu@suse.com>
Subject: [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/11] bpf: Fix a false rejection caused by AND operation
Date: Thu, 11 Apr 2024 20:27:48 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240411122752.2873562-8-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20240411122752.2873562-1-xukuohai@huaweicloud.com>

From: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>

With lsm return value check, the no-alu32 version test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts
is rejected by the verifier, and the log says:

  0: R1=ctx() R10=fp0
  ; int BPF_PROG(check_access, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:27
  0: (b7) r0 = 0                        ; R0_w=0
  1: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0)
  func 'bpf_lsm_bpf_map' arg0 has btf_id 916 type STRUCT 'bpf_map'
  2: R1=ctx() R2_w=trusted_ptr_bpf_map()
  ; if (map != (struct bpf_map *)&data_input) @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:29
  2: (18) r3 = 0xffff9742c0951a00       ; R3_w=map_ptr(map=data_input,ks=4,vs=4)
  4: (5d) if r2 != r3 goto pc+4         ; R2_w=trusted_ptr_bpf_map() R3_w=map_ptr(map=data_input,ks=4,vs=4)
  ; int BPF_PROG(check_access, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:27
  5: (79) r0 = *(u64 *)(r1 +8)          ; R0_w=scalar() R1=ctx()
  ; if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:32
  6: (67) r0 <<= 62                     ; R0_w=scalar(smax=0x4000000000000000,umax=0xc000000000000000,smin32=0,smax32=umax32=0,var_off=(0x0; 0xc000000000000000))
  7: (c7) r0 s>>= 63                    ; R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-1,smax=smax32=0)
  ;  @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:0
  8: (57) r0 &= -13                     ; R0_w=scalar(smax=0x7ffffffffffffff3,umax=0xfffffffffffffff3,smax32=0x7ffffff3,umax32=0xfffffff3,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffff3))
  ; int BPF_PROG(check_access, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) @ test_libbpf_get_fd_by_id_opts.c:27
  9: (95) exit

And here is the C code of the prog.

SEC("lsm/bpf_map")
int BPF_PROG(check_access, struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode)
{
	if (map != (struct bpf_map *)&data_input)
		return 0;

	if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE)
		return -EACCES;

	return 0;
}

It is clear that the prog can only return either 0 or -EACCESS, and both
values are legal.

So why is it rejected by the verifier?

The verifier log shows that the second if and return value setting
statements in the prog is optimized to bitwise operations "r0 s>>= 63"
and "r0 &= -13". The verifier correctly deduces that the the value of
r0 is in the range [-1, 0] after verifing instruction "r0 s>>= 63".
But when the verifier proceeds to verify instruction "r0 &= -13", it
fails to deduce the correct value range of r0.

7: (c7) r0 s>>= 63                    ; R0_w=scalar(smin=smin32=-1,smax=smax32=0)
8: (57) r0 &= -13                     ; R0_w=scalar(smax=0x7ffffffffffffff3,umax=0xfffffffffffffff3,smax32=0x7ffffff3,umax32=0xfffffff3,var_off=(0x0; 0xfffffffffffffff3))

So why the verifier fails to deduce the result of 'r0 &= -13'?

The verifier uses tnum to track values, and the two ranges "[-1, 0]" and
"[0, -1ULL]" are encoded to the same tnum. When verifing instruction
"r0 &= -13", the verifier erroneously deduces the result from
"[0, -1ULL] AND -13", which is out of the expected return range
[-4095, 0].

To fix it, this patch simply adds a special SCALAR32 case for the
verifier. That is, when the source operand of the AND instruction is
a constant and the destination operand changes from negative to
non-negative and falls in range [-256, 256], deduce the result range
by enumerating all possible AND results.

Signed-off-by: Xu Kuohai <xukuohai@huawei.com>
---
 kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+)

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 5393d576c76f..62e259f18f35 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -13369,6 +13369,29 @@ static void scalar32_min_max_and(struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
 		return;
 	}
 
+	if (src_known &&
+		dst_reg->s32_min_value < 0 && dst_reg->s32_min_value >= -256 &&
+		dst_reg->s32_max_value >= 0 && dst_reg->s32_max_value <= 256 &&
+		dst_reg->s32_min_value == dst_reg->smin_value &&
+		dst_reg->s32_max_value == dst_reg->smax_value) {
+		s32 s32_min = S32_MAX;
+		s32 s32_max = S32_MIN;
+		s32 v = dst_reg->s32_min_value;
+		while (v <= dst_reg->s32_max_value) {
+			s32 w = (v & src_reg->s32_min_value);
+			if (w < s32_min)
+				s32_min = w;
+			if (w > s32_max)
+				s32_max = w;
+			v++;
+		}
+		dst_reg->s32_min_value = s32_min;
+		dst_reg->s32_max_value = s32_max;
+		dst_reg->u32_min_value = var32_off.value;
+		dst_reg->u32_max_value = min(dst_reg->u32_max_value, umax_val);
+		return;
+	}
+
 	/* We get our minimum from the var_off, since that's inherently
 	 * bitwise.  Our maximum is the minimum of the operands' maxima.
 	 */
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-04-11 12:24 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-04-11 12:27 [PATCH bpf-next v3 00/11] Add check for bpf lsm return value Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 01/11] bpf, lsm: Annotate lsm hook return value range Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 02/11] bpf, lsm: Add helper to read " Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 03/11] bpf, lsm: Check bpf lsm hook return values in verifier Xu Kuohai
2024-04-13 11:44   ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 04/11] bpf, lsm: Add bpf lsm disabled hook list Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 05/11] bpf: Avoid progs for different hooks calling each other with tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 06/11] bpf: Fix compare error in function retval_range_within Xu Kuohai
2024-04-12  8:53   ` Shung-Hsi Yu
2024-04-25 23:41   ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-26  8:08     ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` Xu Kuohai [this message]
2024-04-19 23:00   ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 07/11] bpf: Fix a false rejection caused by AND operation Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-20  8:33     ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-23 21:55       ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-24  2:25         ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-24 22:06           ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-25  2:42             ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-25 16:28               ` Yonghong Song
2024-04-26  7:43                 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-26 20:36           ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-28 15:15             ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 20:58               ` Andrii Nakryiko
2024-04-29 22:18                 ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-30  3:56                   ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-30  3:54                 ` Xu Kuohai
2024-04-29 21:56               ` Eduard Zingerman
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 08/11] selftests/bpf: Avoid load failure for token_lsm.c Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 09/11] selftests/bpf: Add return value checks for failed tests Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 10/11] selftests/bpf: Add test for lsm tail call Xu Kuohai
2024-04-11 12:27 ` [PATCH bpf-next v3 11/11] selftests/bpf: Add verifier tests for bpf lsm Xu Kuohai

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