From: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
To: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
linux-security@vger.kernel.org,
LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Linux API <linux-api@vger.kernel.org>,
David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
Alexei Starovoitov <alexei.starovoitov@gmail.com>,
Network Development <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
Chun-Yi Lee <jlee@suse.com>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Subject: Re: [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2019 13:05:44 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <CACdnJuv2sePuGBtTM6UL4S2k1UATcAk517o6vPx2EWF0Uxt8iw@mail.gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CALCETrVUwQP7roLnW6kFG80Cc5U6X_T6AW+BTAftLccYGp8+Ow@mail.gmail.com>
On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 10:22 PM Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> wrote:
> On Thu, Jun 20, 2019 at 6:21 PM Matthew Garrett
> <matthewgarrett@google.com> wrote:
> > --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> > +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c
> > @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = {
> > [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity",
> > [LOCKDOWN_KCORE] = "/proc/kcore access",
> > [LOCKDOWN_KPROBES] = "use of kprobes",
> > + [LOCKDOWN_BPF] = "use of bpf",
> > [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality",
>
> The text here says "use of bpf", but what this patch is *really* doing
> is locking down use of BPF to read kernel memory. If the details
> change, then every LSM needs to get updated, and we risk breaking user
> policies that are based on LSMs that offer excessively fine
> granularity.
The text is descriptive rather than normative, and no changes should
be made that alter the semantics of a reason - it makes more sense to
just add another reason.
> I'd be more comfortable if the LSM only got to see "confidentiality"
> or "integrity".
If LSM authors can be trusted to do the right thing here, then I see
no problem in providing additional data. I'm happy to defer to James
on that.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-06-21 20:05 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 13+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20190621011941.186255-1-matthewgarrett@google.com>
2019-06-21 1:19 ` [PATCH V33 24/30] bpf: Restrict bpf when kernel lockdown is in confidentiality mode Matthew Garrett
2019-06-21 5:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-21 20:05 ` Matthew Garrett [this message]
2019-06-26 20:22 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 0:57 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 18:06 ` James Morris
2019-06-27 20:16 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-06-27 23:16 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-27 23:23 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-27 23:27 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-06-28 18:47 ` Matthew Garrett
2019-06-29 23:47 ` Andy Lutomirski
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