From: "Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>
To: "Günther Noack" <gnoack@google.com>
Cc: "Konstantin Meskhidze (A)" <konstantin.meskhidze@huawei.com>,
"Günther Noack" <gnoack3000@gmail.com>,
willemdebruijn.kernel@gmail.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org, yusongping@huawei.com,
artem.kuzin@huawei.com, "Jeff Xu" <jeffxu@google.com>,
"Jorge Lucangeli Obes" <jorgelo@chromium.org>,
"Allen Webb" <allenwebb@google.com>,
"Dmitry Torokhov" <dtor@google.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v9 00/12] Network support for Landlock - allowed list of protocols
Date: Wed, 28 Jun 2023 21:07:01 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <618f11b6-7766-95b1-8fef-679de21b1fa2@digikod.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <ZJvy2SViorgc+cZI@google.com>
On 28/06/2023 10:44, Günther Noack wrote:
> Hello!
>
> On Mon, Jun 26, 2023 at 05:29:34PM +0200, Mickaël Salaün wrote:
>> Here is a design to be able to only allow a set of network protocols and
>> deny everything else. This would be complementary to Konstantin's patch
>> series which addresses fine-grained access control.
>>
>> First, I want to remind that Landlock follows an allowed list approach with
>> a set of (growing) supported actions (for compatibility reasons), which is
>> kind of an allow-list-on-a-deny-list. But with this proposal, we want to be
>> able to deny everything, which means: supported, not supported, known and
>> unknown protocols.
>>
>> We could add a new "handled_access_socket" field to the landlock_ruleset
>> struct, which could contain a LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE flag.
>>
>> If this field is set, users could add a new type of rules:
>> struct landlock_socket_attr {
>> __u64 allowed_access;
>> int domain; // see socket(2)
>> int type; // see socket(2)
>> }
>>
>> The allowed_access field would only contain LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE at
>> first, but it could grow with other actions (which cannot be handled with
>> seccomp):
>> - use: walk through all opened FDs and mark them as allowed or denied
>> - receive: hook on received FDs
>> - send: hook on sent FDs
>>
>> We might also use the same approach for non-socket objects that can be
>> identified with some meaningful properties.
>>
>> What do you think?
>
> This sounds like a good plan to me - it would make it possible to restrict new
> socket creation using protocols that were not intended to be used, and I also
> think it would fit the Landlock model nicely.
>
> Small remark on the side: The security_socket_create() hook does not only get
> invoked as a result of socket(2), but also as a part of accept(2) - so this
> approach might already prevent new connections very effectively.
Indeed. We could also differentiate socket(2) from accept(2) with a
dedicated LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_ACCEPT right. This would enable to
create a bind socket, sandbox the process and deny new socket(2) calls,
but still allows to call accept(2) and receive new connections.
BTW, unix socket path opening should be considered too.
>
> Spelling out some scenarios, so that we are sure that we are on the same page:
>
> A)
>
> A program that does not need networking could specify a ruleset where
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE is handled, and simply not permit anything.
This is correct, except if the process receive a socket FD or open a
unix socket path.
>
> B)
>
> A program that runs a TCP server could specify a ruleset where
> LANDLOCK_NET_BIND_TCP, LANDLOCK_NET_CONNECT_TCP and
s/LANDLOCK_NET_CONNECT_TCP/LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_TCP/
> LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE are handled, and where the following rules are added:
>
> /* From Konstantin's patch set */
> struct landlock_net_service_attr bind_attr = {
> .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_NET_BIND_TCP,
> .port = 8080,
> };
>
> /* From Mickaël's proposal */
> struct landlock_socket_attr sock_inet_attr = {
> .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE,
> .domain = AF_INET,
> .type = SOCK_STREAM,
> }
>
> struct landlock_socket_attr sock_inet6_attr = {
> .allowed_access = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_SOCKET_CREATE,
> .domain = AF_INET6,
> .type = SOCK_STREAM,
> }
>
> That should then be enough to bind and listen on ports, whereas outgoing
> connections with TCP and anything using other network protocols would not be
> permitted.
>
> (Alternatively, it could bind() the socket early, *then enable Landlock* and
> leave out the rule for BIND_TCP, only permitting SOCKET_CREATE for IPv4 and
> IPv6, so that listen() and accept() work on the already-bound socket.)
correct
>
> Overall, this sounds like an excellent approach to me. 👍
>
> —Günther
>
prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-06-28 19:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 74+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-16 8:58 [PATCH v9 00/12] Network support for Landlock Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 01/12] landlock: Make ruleset's access masks more generic Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 02/12] landlock: Allow filesystem layout changes for domains without such rule type Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:34 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 8:51 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-14 12:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 12:57 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 03/12] landlock: Refactor landlock_find_rule/insert_rule Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:36 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:15 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-14 12:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 13:28 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 04/12] landlock: Refactor merge/inherit_ruleset functions Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 05/12] landlock: Move and rename umask_layers() and init_layer_masks() Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:37 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:15 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 06/12] landlock: Refactor _unmask_layers() and _init_layer_masks() Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:16 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-21 18:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 7:52 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 07/12] landlock: Refactor landlock_add_rule() syscall Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:38 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:18 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 08/12] landlock: Add network rules and TCP hooks support Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:39 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:19 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-13 9:33 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-14 12:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-14 14:38 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-21 18:04 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 10:18 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 09/12] selftests/landlock: Share enforce_ruleset() Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 10/12] selftests/landlock: Add 10 new test suites dedicated to network Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-02-10 17:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 10:36 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-14 12:13 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-02-14 13:28 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-21 18:05 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 12:03 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-06 16:00 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 18:13 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 11/12] samples/landlock: Add network demo Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-16 8:58 ` [PATCH v9 12/12] landlock: Document Landlock's network support Konstantin Meskhidze
2023-01-21 23:07 ` Günther Noack
2023-01-23 9:38 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-27 18:22 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-01-30 10:03 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-21 16:16 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 13:43 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-06 16:09 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-03-06 17:55 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-01-30 12:26 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-02-23 22:17 ` [PATCH v9 00/12] Network support for Landlock Günther Noack
2023-03-06 7:45 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-13 17:16 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-03-14 13:28 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-06-26 15:29 ` [PATCH v9 00/12] Network support for Landlock - allowed list of protocols Mickaël Salaün
2023-06-28 2:33 ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-28 19:03 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-06-28 21:56 ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-28 8:44 ` Günther Noack
2023-06-28 17:03 ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-28 19:29 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-06-29 3:18 ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-29 11:07 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-06-30 4:18 ` Jeff Xu
2023-06-30 18:23 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-07-05 15:00 ` Jeff Xu
2023-07-12 11:30 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-07-13 13:20 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-07-13 14:52 ` Mickaël Salaün
2023-07-13 11:44 ` Konstantin Meskhidze (A)
2023-06-28 19:07 ` Mickaël Salaün [this message]
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