Re: [Ocfs2-devel] Question about the "EXPERIMENTAL" tag for dax in XFS

[Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>]

On Sun, Feb 28, 2021 at 2:39 PM Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> wrote:
>
> On Sat, Feb 27, 2021 at 03:40:24PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > On Sat, Feb 27, 2021 at 2:36 PM Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> wrote:
> > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 02:41:34PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 1:28 PM Dave Chinner <david@fromorbit.com> wrote:
> > > > > On Fri, Feb 26, 2021 at 12:59:53PM -0800, Dan Williams wrote:
> > > it points to, check if it points to the PMEM that is being removed,
> > > grab the page it points to, map that to the relevant struct page,
> > > run collect_procs() on that page, then kill the user processes that
> > > map that page.
> > >
> > > So why can't we walk the ptescheck the physical pages that they
> > > map to and if they map to a pmem page we go poison that
> > > page and that kills any user process that maps it.
> > >
> > > i.e. I can't see how unexpected pmem device unplug is any different
> > > to an MCE delivering a hwpoison event to a DAX mapped page.
> >
> > I guess the tradeoff is walking a long list of inodes vs walking a
> > large array of pages.
>
> Not really. You're assuming all a filesystem has to do is invalidate
> everything if a device goes away, and that's not true. Finding if an
> inode has a mapping that spans a specific device in a multi-device
> filesystem can be a lot more complex than that. Just walking inodes
> is easy - determining whihc inodes need invalidation is the hard
> part.

That inode-to-device level of specificity is not needed for the same
reason that drop_caches does not need to be specific. If the wrong
page is unmapped a re-fault will bring it back, and re-fault will fail
for the pages that are successfully removed.

> That's where ->corrupt_range() comes in - the filesystem is already
> set up to do reverse mapping from physical range to inode(s)
> offsets...

Sure, but what is the need to get to that level of specificity with
the filesystem for something that should rarely happen in the course
of normal operation outside of a mistake?

>
> > There's likely always more pages than inodes, but perhaps it's more
> > efficient to walk the 'struct page' array than sb->s_inodes?
>
> I really don't see you seem to be telling us that invalidation is an
> either/or choice. There's more ways to convert physical block
> address -> inode file offset and mapping index than brute force
> inode cache walks....

Yes, but I was trying to map it to an existing mechanism and the
internals of drop_pagecache_sb() are, in coarse terms, close to what
needs to happen here.

>
> .....
>
> > > IOWs, what needs to happen at this point is very filesystem
> > > specific. Assuming that "device unplug == filesystem dead" is not
> > > correct, nor is specifying a generic action that assumes the
> > > filesystem is dead because a device it is using went away.
> >
> > Ok, I think I set this discussion in the wrong direction implying any
> > mapping of this action to a "filesystem dead" event. It's just a "zap
> > all ptes" event and upper layers recover from there.
>
> Yes, that's exactly what ->corrupt_range() is intended for. It
> allows the filesystem to lock out access to the bad range
> and then recover the data. Or metadata, if that's where the bad
> range lands. If that recovery fails, it can then report a data
> loss/filesystem shutdown event to userspace and kill user procs that
> span the bad range...
>
> FWIW, is this notification going to occur before or after the device
> has been physically unplugged?

Before. This will be operations that happen in the pmem driver
->remove() callback.

> i.e. what do we do about the
> time-of-unplug-to-time-of-invalidation window where userspace can
> still attempt to access the missing pmem though the
> not-yet-invalidated ptes? It may not be likely that people just yank
> pmem nvdimms out of machines, but with NVMe persistent memory
> spaces, there's every chance that someone pulls the wrong device...

The physical removal aspect is only theoretical today. While the pmem
driver has a ->remove() path that's purely a software unbind
operation. That said the vulnerability window today is if a process
acquires a dax mapping, the pmem device hosting that filesystem goes
through an unbind / bind cycle, and then a new filesystem is created /
mounted. That old pte may be able to access data that is outside its
intended protection domain.

Going forward, for buses like CXL, there will be a managed physical
remove operation via PCIE native hotplug. The flow there is that the
PCIE hotplug driver will notify the OS of a pending removal, trigger
->remove() on the pmem driver, and then notify the technician (slot
status LED) that the card is safe to pull.

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