selinux.vger.kernel.org archive mirror
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Leon Romanovsky <leon@kernel.org>
To: Doug Ledford <dledford@redhat.com>, Jason Gunthorpe <jgg@mellanox.com>
Cc: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>,
	RDMA mailing list <linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org>,
	Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>,
	Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com, ddutile@redhat.com
Subject: [PATCH rdma-rc v1 3/4] IB/core: Eliminate a hole in MAD agent struct
Date: Sat,  2 Feb 2019 11:09:44 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190202090945.4106-4-leon@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190202090945.4106-1-leon@kernel.org>

From: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>

Move the security related fields above the u8s to eliminate a hole in
the struct.

pahole before:
struct ib_mad_agent {
...
u32                        hi_tid;               /*    48     4 */
u32                        flags;                /*    52     4 */
u8                         port_num;             /*    56     1 */
u8                         rmpp_version;         /*    57     1 */

/* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */

/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
void *                     security;             /*    64     8 */
bool                       smp_allowed;          /*    72     1 */
bool                       lsm_nb_reg;           /*    73     1 */

/* XXX 6 bytes hole, try to pack */

struct notifier_block      lsm_nb;               /*    80    24 */

/* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */

/* size: 104, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */
...
};

pahole after:
struct ib_mad_agent {
...
u32                        hi_tid;               /*    48     4 */
u32                        flags;                /*    52     4 */
void *                     security;             /*    56     8 */
/* --- cacheline 1 boundary (64 bytes) --- */
struct notifier_block      lsm_nb;               /*    64    24 */

/* XXX last struct has 4 bytes of padding */

u8                         port_num;             /*    88     1 */
u8                         rmpp_version;         /*    89     1 */
bool                       smp_allowed;          /*    90     1 */
bool                       lsm_nb_reg;           /*    91     1 */

/* size: 96, cachelines: 2, members: 14 */
...
};

Signed-off-by: Daniel Jurgens <danielj@mellanox.com>
Reviewed-by: Parav Pandit <parav@mellanox.com>
Signed-off-by: Leon Romanovsky <leonro@mellanox.com>
---
 include/rdma/ib_mad.h | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
index fdef558e3a2d..1c0b914f199d 100644
--- a/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
+++ b/include/rdma/ib_mad.h
@@ -616,12 +616,12 @@ struct ib_mad_agent {
 	void			*context;
 	u32			hi_tid;
 	u32			flags;
+	void			*security;
+	struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
 	u8			port_num;
 	u8			rmpp_version;
-	void			*security;
 	bool			smp_allowed;
 	bool			lsm_nb_reg;
-	struct notifier_block   lsm_nb;
 };

 /**
--
2.19.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-02-02  9:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-02-02  9:09 [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 1/4] IB/core: Unregister notifier before freeing MAD security Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 2/4] IB/core: Fix potential memory leak while creating MAD agents Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-02  9:09 ` Leon Romanovsky [this message]
2019-02-02  9:09 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 4/4] IB/core: Don't register each MAD agent for LSM notifier Leon Romanovsky
2019-02-06 21:52   ` Paul Moore
2019-02-08 23:49 ` [PATCH rdma-rc v1 0/4] IB selinux related fixes Jason Gunthorpe

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20190202090945.4106-4-leon@kernel.org \
    --to=leon@kernel.org \
    --cc=danielj@mellanox.com \
    --cc=ddutile@redhat.com \
    --cc=dledford@redhat.com \
    --cc=jgg@mellanox.com \
    --cc=leonro@mellanox.com \
    --cc=linux-rdma@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=parav@mellanox.com \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox;
as well as URLs for NNTP newsgroup(s).