From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH v18 04/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_kernel_act_as
Date: Wed, 8 Jul 2020 17:12:15 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200709001234.9719-5-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200709001234.9719-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Change the security_kernel_act_as interface to use a lsmblob
structure in place of the single u32 secid in support of
module stacking. Change its only caller, set_security_override,
to do the same. Change that one's only caller,
set_security_override_from_ctx, to call it with the new
parameter type.
The security module hook is unchanged, still taking a secid.
The infrastructure passes the correct entry from the lsmblob.
lsmblob_init() is used to fill the lsmblob structure, however
this will be removed later in the series when security_secctx_to_secid()
is undated to provide a lsmblob instead of a secid.
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
Acked-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/cred.h | 3 ++-
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++--
kernel/cred.c | 10 ++++++----
security/security.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
4 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/cred.h b/include/linux/cred.h
index 18639c069263..03ae0182cba6 100644
--- a/include/linux/cred.h
+++ b/include/linux/cred.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
struct cred;
struct inode;
+struct lsmblob;
/*
* COW Supplementary groups list
@@ -165,7 +166,7 @@ extern const struct cred *override_creds(const struct cred *);
extern void revert_creds(const struct cred *);
extern struct cred *prepare_kernel_cred(struct task_struct *);
extern int change_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
-extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, u32);
+extern int set_security_override(struct cred *, struct lsmblob *);
extern int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *, const char *);
extern int set_create_files_as(struct cred *, struct inode *);
extern int cred_fscmp(const struct cred *, const struct cred *);
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 294410533b51..6d403a522918 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -441,7 +441,7 @@ void security_cred_free(struct cred *cred);
int security_prepare_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, gfp_t gfp);
void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old);
void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid);
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob);
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode);
int security_kernel_module_request(char *kmod_name);
int security_kernel_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id);
@@ -1055,7 +1055,8 @@ static inline void security_transfer_creds(struct cred *new,
{
}
-static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred, u32 secid)
+static inline int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *cred,
+ struct lsmblob *blob)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/cred.c b/kernel/cred.c
index 421b1149c651..22e0e7cbefde 100644
--- a/kernel/cred.c
+++ b/kernel/cred.c
@@ -733,14 +733,14 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(prepare_kernel_cred);
/**
* set_security_override - Set the security ID in a set of credentials
* @new: The credentials to alter
- * @secid: The LSM security ID to set
+ * @blob: The LSM security information to set
*
* Set the LSM security ID in a set of credentials so that the subjective
* security is overridden when an alternative set of credentials is used.
*/
-int set_security_override(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int set_security_override(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return security_kernel_act_as(new, secid);
+ return security_kernel_act_as(new, blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
@@ -756,6 +756,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override);
*/
int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
{
+ struct lsmblob blob;
u32 secid;
int ret;
@@ -763,7 +764,8 @@ int set_security_override_from_ctx(struct cred *new, const char *secctx)
if (ret < 0)
return ret;
- return set_security_override(new, secid);
+ lsmblob_init(&blob, secid);
+ return set_security_override(new, &blob);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(set_security_override_from_ctx);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 3bbd01e8192e..f54c6dfd9b89 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1677,9 +1677,19 @@ void security_cred_getsecid(const struct cred *c, u32 *secid)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_cred_getsecid);
-int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+int security_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, struct lsmblob *blob)
{
- return call_int_hook(kernel_act_as, 0, new, secid);
+ struct security_hook_list *hp;
+ int rc;
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry(hp, &security_hook_heads.kernel_act_as, list) {
+ if (WARN_ON(hp->lsmid->slot < 0 || hp->lsmid->slot >= lsm_slot))
+ continue;
+ rc = hp->hook.kernel_act_as(new, blob->secid[hp->lsmid->slot]);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ }
+ return 0;
}
int security_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new, struct inode *inode)
--
2.24.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-09 0:22 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
[not found] <20200709001234.9719-1-casey.ref@schaufler-ca.com>
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 00/23] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 01/23] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 02/23] LSM: Create and manage the lsmblob data structure Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 03/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 05/23] net: Prepare UDS for security module stacking Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 16:11 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-09 16:28 ` John Johansen
2020-07-09 19:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 19:54 ` Stephen Smalley
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 06/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 07/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 08/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 09/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 10/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 11/23] LSM: Use lsmblob in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 12/23] IMA: Change internal interfaces to use lsmblobs Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 13/23] LSM: Specify which LSM to display Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 14/23] LSM: Ensure the correct LSM context releaser Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 15/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 16/23] LSM: Use lsmcontext in security_inode_getsecctx Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 17/23] LSM: security_secid_to_secctx in netlink netfilter Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 18/23] NET: Store LSM netlabel data in a lsmblob Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 19/23] LSM: Verify LSM display sanity in binder Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 20/23] Audit: Add new record for multiple process LSM attributes Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 21/23] Audit: Add a new record for multiple object " Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 22/23] LSM: Add /proc attr entry for full LSM context Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 1:30 ` Jann Horn
2020-07-24 1:08 ` Casey Schaufler
2020-07-09 0:12 ` [PATCH v18 23/23] AppArmor: Remove the exclusive flag Casey Schaufler
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