From: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
To: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Cc: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Nicholas Franck <nhfran2@tycho.nsa.gov>,
paul@paul-moore.com, selinux@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, luto@amacapital.net,
keescook@chromium.org, serge@hallyn.com,
john.johansen@canonical.com, mortonm@chromium.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH] security, capability: pass object information to security_capable
Date: Sat, 13 Jul 2019 14:29:59 +1000 (AEST) [thread overview]
Message-ID: <alpine.LRH.2.21.1907131410310.3804@namei.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <16cade37-9467-ca7f-ddea-b8254c501f48@schaufler-ca.com>
On Fri, 12 Jul 2019, Casey Schaufler wrote:
> I'm not disagreeing with that. What I'm saying is that the capability
> check interface is not the right place to pass that information. The
> capability check has no use for the object information. I would much
> rather see a security_pass_object_data() hook that gets called after
> (or before) the security_capable() hook in the places where you want
> the extra information.
Extending existing security models is a core feature of the LSM framework.
The Linux capability code has no use for object metadata by design, but
extending that model to MAC (and other models) via LSM hooks is well
within scope and of course already happening e.g. mediating Linux
capabilities wrt SELinux subject types. Adding object metadata extends the
function of the capability hook along these lines, so that more effective
MAC policies may be implemented by LSMs.
--
James Morris
<jmorris@namei.org>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-07-13 4:30 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-07-12 17:34 [RFC PATCH] security,capability: pass object information to security_capable Nicholas Franck
2019-07-12 17:50 ` James Morris
2019-07-12 18:02 ` [RFC PATCH] security, capability: " Stephen Smalley
2019-07-15 18:42 ` Richard Guy Briggs
2019-07-12 17:58 ` [RFC PATCH] security,capability: " Casey Schaufler
2019-07-12 18:25 ` [RFC PATCH] security, capability: " Stephen Smalley
2019-07-12 19:54 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-12 20:21 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-12 22:37 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-13 4:35 ` James Morris
2019-07-13 18:46 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-13 4:29 ` James Morris [this message]
2019-07-16 14:03 ` Serge E. Hallyn
2019-07-16 14:21 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-07-16 15:03 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-16 15:08 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-07-16 14:43 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-07-24 20:12 ` Paul Moore
2019-07-16 14:16 ` [RFC PATCH] security,capability: " Serge E. Hallyn
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