From: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, cgroups@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook
Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 09:40:22 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <f14d46d2-26f3-2c62-963d-7736a82a78b4@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190109091028.24485-3-omosnace@redhat.com>
On 1/9/19 4:10 AM, Ondrej Mosnacek wrote:
> The hook applies the same logic as selinux_determine_inode_label(), with
> the exception of the super_block handling, which will be enforced on the
> actual inodes by other hooks.
>
> Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>
> ---
> security/selinux/hooks.c | 41 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> index 7ce012d9ec51..29c038513504 100644
> --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
> +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
> @@ -3526,6 +3526,45 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name)
> return -EOPNOTSUPP;
> }
>
> +/* file-like object operations */
> +
> +/* Used e.g. for kernfs_node for newly created nodes */
> +static int selinux_object_init_security(void *parent_ctx, u32 parent_ctxlen,
> + const struct qstr *qstr, u16 mode,
> + void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
> +{
> + const struct task_security_struct *tsec = current_security();
> + u32 parent_sid, newsid, clen;
> + int rc;
> + char *context;
> +
> + rc = security_context_to_sid(&selinux_state, parent_ctx, parent_ctxlen,
> + &parent_sid, GFP_KERNEL);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + if (tsec->create_sid) {
> + newsid = tsec->create_sid;
> + } else {
> + u16 secclass = inode_mode_to_security_class(mode);
> +
> + rc = security_transition_sid(&selinux_state, tsec->sid,
> + parent_sid, secclass, qstr,
> + &newsid);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> + }
> +
> + rc = security_sid_to_context_force(&selinux_state, newsid,
> + &context, &clen);
> + if (rc)
> + return rc;
> +
> + *ctx = context;
> + *ctxlen = clen;
> + return 0;
> +}
> +
> /* file security operations */
>
> static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
> @@ -6965,6 +7004,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, selinux_inode_copy_up),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr),
>
> + LSM_HOOK_INIT(object_init_security, selinux_object_init_security),
> +
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
> LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, selinux_file_free_security),
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-01-09 14:38 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 19+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-01-09 9:10 [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 1/3] LSM: Add new hook for generic node initialization Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:35 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-09 16:06 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 2/3] selinux: Implement the object_init_security hook Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 14:40 ` Stephen Smalley [this message]
2019-01-11 1:58 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-09 9:10 ` [PATCH 3/3] kernfs: Initialize security of newly created nodes Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-09 15:44 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-11 2:08 ` Paul Moore
2019-01-11 20:50 ` [PATCH 0/3] Allow initializing the kernfs node's secctx based on its parent Tejun Heo
2019-01-14 9:14 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
2019-01-14 9:29 ` Ondrej Mosnacek
[not found] ` <64977013-e2a5-809d-7a3f-bffbda9276aa@redhat.com>
2019-01-17 16:15 ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-17 16:39 ` Stephen Smalley
2019-01-17 20:30 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-17 20:35 ` Daniel Walsh
2019-01-14 15:50 ` Tejun Heo
2019-01-15 14:36 ` Stephen Smalley
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