From: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
To: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Julien Thierry <Julien.Thierry@arm.com>,
linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <marc.zyngier@arm.com>,
Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>,
Russell King <rmk+kernel@arm.linux.org.uk>,
Vincent Guittot <vincent.guittot@linaro.org>,
mark.brown@arm.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 11/44] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user
Date: Fri, 30 Aug 2019 10:41:26 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190830094126.GK46475@lakrids.cambridge.arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <821430ff13f625eca9e0a9700ddc161cbc7965ff.1567077734.git.viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
On Thu, Aug 29, 2019 at 05:03:56PM +0530, Viresh Kumar wrote:
> From: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
>
> commit f71c2ffcb20dd8626880747557014bb9a61eb90e upstream.
>
> Like we've done for get_user and put_user, ensure that user pointers
> are masked before invoking the underlying __arch_{clear,copy_*}_user
> operations.
>
> Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will.deacon@arm.com>
> Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
> [ v4.4: fixup for v4.4 style uaccess primitives ]
> Signed-off-by: Viresh Kumar <viresh.kumar@linaro.org>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com> [v4.4 backport]
Mark.
> ---
> arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h | 18 ++++++++++--------
> arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c | 4 ++--
> arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S | 6 +++---
> arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S | 4 ++--
> 4 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> index 693a0d784534..f2f5a152f372 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/uaccess.h
> @@ -303,19 +303,18 @@ do { \
>
> extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
> extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n);
> -extern unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
> -extern unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *addr, unsigned long n);
> +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n);
>
> static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> {
> kasan_check_write(to, n);
> - return __arch_copy_from_user(to, from, n);
> + return __arch_copy_from_user(to, __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n);
> }
>
> static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n)
> {
> kasan_check_read(from, n);
> - return __arch_copy_to_user(to, from, n);
> + return __arch_copy_to_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), from, n);
> }
>
> static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> @@ -338,22 +337,25 @@ static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_to_user(void __user *to, const voi
> return n;
> }
>
> -static inline unsigned long __must_check copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> +static inline unsigned long __must_check __copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n)
> {
> if (access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n) && access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
> - n = __copy_in_user(to, from, n);
> + n = __arch_copy_in_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), __uaccess_mask_ptr(from), n);
> return n;
> }
> +#define copy_in_user __copy_in_user
>
> #define __copy_to_user_inatomic __copy_to_user
> #define __copy_from_user_inatomic __copy_from_user
>
> -static inline unsigned long __must_check clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
> +extern unsigned long __must_check __arch_clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n);
> +static inline unsigned long __must_check __clear_user(void __user *to, unsigned long n)
> {
> if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n))
> - n = __clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
> + n = __arch_clear_user(__uaccess_mask_ptr(to), n);
> return n;
> }
> +#define clear_user __clear_user
>
> extern long strncpy_from_user(char *dest, const char __user *src, long count);
>
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
> index c654df05b7d7..abe4e0984dbb 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
> +++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/arm64ksyms.c
> @@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(clear_page);
> /* user mem (segment) */
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_from_user);
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_to_user);
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__clear_user);
> -EXPORT_SYMBOL(__copy_in_user);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_clear_user);
> +EXPORT_SYMBOL(__arch_copy_in_user);
>
> /* physical memory */
> EXPORT_SYMBOL(memstart_addr);
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
> index a9723c71c52b..fc6bb0f83511 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/clear_user.S
> @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
>
> .text
>
> -/* Prototype: int __clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
> +/* Prototype: int __arch_clear_user(void *addr, size_t sz)
> * Purpose : clear some user memory
> * Params : addr - user memory address to clear
> * : sz - number of bytes to clear
> @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
> *
> * Alignment fixed up by hardware.
> */
> -ENTRY(__clear_user)
> +ENTRY(__arch_clear_user)
> ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
> CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
> mov x2, x1 // save the size for fixup return
> @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ USER(9f, strb wzr, [x0] )
> ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
> CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
> ret
> -ENDPROC(__clear_user)
> +ENDPROC(__arch_clear_user)
>
> .section .fixup,"ax"
> .align 2
> diff --git a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
> index 81c8fc93c100..0219aa85b3cc 100644
> --- a/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
> +++ b/arch/arm64/lib/copy_in_user.S
> @@ -67,7 +67,7 @@
> .endm
>
> end .req x5
> -ENTRY(__copy_in_user)
> +ENTRY(__arch_copy_in_user)
> ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(0)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
> CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
> add end, x0, x2
> @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ ALTERNATIVE("nop", __stringify(SET_PSTATE_PAN(1)), ARM64_HAS_PAN, \
> CONFIG_ARM64_PAN)
> mov x0, #0
> ret
> -ENDPROC(__copy_in_user)
> +ENDPROC(__arch_copy_in_user)
>
> .section .fixup,"ax"
> .align 2
> --
> 2.21.0.rc0.269.g1a574e7a288b
>
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-08-30 9:41 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-08-29 11:33 [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 01/44] arm64: barrier: Add CSDB macros to control data-value prediction Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:39 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 02/44] arm64: Implement array_index_mask_nospec() Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 03/44] arm64: move TASK_* definitions to <asm/processor.h> Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 04/44] arm64: Make USER_DS an inclusive limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 05/44] arm64: Use pointer masking to limit uaccess speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 06/44] arm64: entry: Ensure branch through syscall table is bounded under speculation Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 07/44] arm64: uaccess: Prevent speculative use of the current addr_limit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:40 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 08/44] arm64: uaccess: Don't bother eliding access_ok checks in __{get, put}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 09/44] mm/kasan: add API to check memory regions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 10/44] arm64: kasan: instrument user memory access API Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 11/44] arm64: uaccess: Mask __user pointers for __arch_{clear, copy_*}_user Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:41 ` Mark Rutland [this message]
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 12/44] arm64: cpufeature: Test 'matches' pointer to find the end of the list Viresh Kumar
2019-09-02 14:27 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-05 7:45 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-09-06 13:49 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-10 9:35 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-10-11 6:36 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 13/44] arm64: cpufeature: Add scope for capability check Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:33 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 14/44] arm64: Introduce cpu_die_early Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 15/44] arm64: Add a helper for parking CPUs in a loop Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 16/44] arm64: Move cpu_die_early to smp.c Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 17/44] arm64: Verify CPU errata work arounds on hotplugged CPU Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 18/44] arm64: errata: Calling enable functions for CPU errata too Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 19/44] arm64: Rearrange CPU errata workaround checks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 20/44] arm64: Run enable method for errata work arounds on late CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 21/44] arm64: cpufeature: Pass capability structure to ->enable callback Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 22/44] drivers/firmware: Expose psci_get_version through psci_ops structure Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 23/44] arm64: Factor out TTBR0_EL1 post-update workaround into a specific asm macro Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 24/44] arm64: Move post_ttbr_update_workaround to C code Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 25/44] arm64: Add skeleton to harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 26/44] arm64: Move BP hardening to check_and_switch_context Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 27/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for high-priority synchronous exceptions Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 28/44] arm64: entry: Apply BP hardening for suspicious interrupts from EL0 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 29/44] arm64: cputype: Add missing MIDR values for Cortex-A72 and Cortex-A75 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 30/44] arm64: cpu_errata: Allow an erratum to be match for all revisions of a core Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 31/44] arm64: Implement branch predictor hardening for affected Cortex-A CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 32/44] arm64: cputype info for Broadcom Vulcan Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 33/44] arm64: cputype: Add MIDR values for Cavium ThunderX2 CPUs Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 34/44] arm64: Branch predictor hardening for Cavium ThunderX2 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 35/44] ARM: 8478/2: arm/arm64: add arm-smccc Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 36/44] arm/arm64: KVM: Advertise SMCCC v1.1 Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 37/44] arm64: KVM: Report SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 38/44] firmware/psci: Expose PSCI conduit Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 39/44] firmware/psci: Expose SMCCC version through psci_ops Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 40/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Make function identifiers an unsigned quantity Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 41/44] arm/arm64: smccc: Implement SMCCC v1.1 inline primitive Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 42/44] arm64: Add ARM_SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_1 BP hardening support Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 43/44] arm64: Kill PSCI_GET_VERSION as a variant-2 workaround Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 11:34 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 44/44] arm64: futex: Mask __user pointers prior to dereference Viresh Kumar
2019-08-30 9:42 ` Mark Rutland
2019-09-03 5:15 ` Viresh Kumar
2019-08-29 16:18 ` [PATCH ARM64 v4.4 V3 00/44] V4.4 backport of arm64 Spectre patches Mark Rutland
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