Re: PostUp/PreUp/PostDown/PreDown Dangerous?

[Jordan Glover <Golden_Miller83@protonmail.ch>]

On June 22, 2018 3:56 AM, Antonio Quartulli <a@unstable.cc> wrote:
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> In case this might be useful: in OpenVPN there is an additional
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> parameter called "--script-security" that requires to be set to a
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> certain level before allowing configured scripts to be executed.
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> Unfortunately there is no real protection against the clueless user, who
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> can and will blindly enable that setting if asked by a $random VPN provid=
er.
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> However, I still believe (and hope) that forcing the user to enable a
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> specific knob may raise the level of attention.
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> Maybe something similar could be added as a command line parameter to
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> wg/wg-quick so that it will execute the various
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> PostUp/PreUp/PostDown/PreDown only if allowed to?
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> Just as a side note: this is not a VPN specific problem, this is
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> something users can end up with everytime they execute some binary with
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> a configuration they have not inspected. So, be careful out there ;-)
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> Cheers,
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Attacker can pass appropriate "--script-security" level with the very same =
config
containing malicious commands so this isn't solving problem of not looking =
at
the content of config files. I think blindly using untrusted files from the=
 web is
indefensible. Sure, we could throw away this functionality completely  but =
then
we will punish people who bother to look at the configs before using them a=
nd
make their life little harder while the others will still find their footgu=
n somewhere
else as this is rather generic issue not limited to wireguard or even netwo=
rking.

Jordan