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From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xen.org>
Cc: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 03/26] xen/x86: Collect more cpuid feature leaves
Date: Wed, 23 Mar 2016 16:36:06 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1458750989-28967-4-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1458750989-28967-1-git-send-email-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

New words are:
 * 0x80000007.edx - Contains Invarient TSC
 * 0x80000008.ebx - Newly used for AMD Zen processors

In addition, replace some open-coded ITSC and EFRO manipulation.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Acked-by: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
---
v2:
 * Rely on ordering of generic_identify() to simplify init_amd()
 * Remove opencoded EFRO manipulation as well
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c    | 21 +++------------------
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c |  6 ++++++
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c  |  2 +-
 xen/arch/x86/domain.c     |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
index a4bef21..47a38c6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/amd.c
@@ -294,21 +294,6 @@ int cpu_has_amd_erratum(const struct cpuinfo_x86 *cpu, int osvw_id, ...)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-/* Can this system suffer from TSC drift due to C1 clock ramping? */
-static int c1_ramping_may_cause_clock_drift(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c) 
-{ 
-	if (cpuid_edx(0x80000007) & (1<<8)) {
-		/*
-		 * CPUID.AdvPowerMgmtInfo.TscInvariant
-		 * EDX bit 8, 8000_0007
-		 * Invariant TSC on 8th Gen or newer, use it
-		 * (assume all cores have invariant TSC)
-		 */
-		return 0;
-	}
-	return 1;
-}
-
 /*
  * Disable C1-Clock ramping if enabled in PMM7.CpuLowPwrEnh on 8th-generation
  * cores only. Assume BIOS has setup all Northbridges equivalently.
@@ -475,7 +460,7 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	}
 
 	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007) {
-		if (cpuid_edx(0x80000007) & (1<<8)) {
+		if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC)) {
 			__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC, c->x86_capability);
 			__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, c->x86_capability);
 			if (c->x86 != 0x11)
@@ -600,14 +585,14 @@ static void init_amd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 		wrmsrl(MSR_K7_PERFCTR3, 0);
 	}
 
-	if (cpuid_edx(0x80000007) & (1 << 10)) {
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_EFRO)) {
 		rdmsr(MSR_K7_HWCR, l, h);
 		l |= (1 << 27); /* Enable read-only APERF/MPERF bit */
 		wrmsr(MSR_K7_HWCR, l, h);
 	}
 
 	/* Prevent TSC drift in non single-processor, single-core platforms. */
-	if ((smp_processor_id() == 1) && c1_ramping_may_cause_clock_drift(c))
+	if ((smp_processor_id() == 1) && !cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC))
 		disable_c1_ramping();
 
 	set_cpuidmask(c);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
index 8b94c1b..1a278b1 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/common.c
@@ -269,6 +269,12 @@ static void generic_identify(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 
 	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000004)
 		get_model_name(c); /* Default name */
+	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000007)
+		c->x86_capability[cpufeat_word(X86_FEATURE_ITSC)]
+			= cpuid_edx(0x80000007);
+	if (c->extended_cpuid_level >= 0x80000008)
+		c->x86_capability[cpufeat_word(X86_FEATURE_CLZERO)]
+			= cpuid_ebx(0x80000008);
 
 	/* Intel-defined flags: level 0x00000007 */
 	if ( c->cpuid_level >= 0x00000007 )
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
index d4f574b..bdf89f6 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/intel.c
@@ -281,7 +281,7 @@ static void init_intel(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
 	if ((c->x86 == 0xf && c->x86_model >= 0x03) ||
 		(c->x86 == 0x6 && c->x86_model >= 0x0e))
 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC, c->x86_capability);
-	if (cpuid_edx(0x80000007) & (1u<<8)) {
+	if (cpu_has(c, X86_FEATURE_ITSC)) {
 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_CONSTANT_TSC, c->x86_capability);
 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_NONSTOP_TSC, c->x86_capability);
 		__set_bit(X86_FEATURE_TSC_RELIABLE, c->x86_capability);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
index a33f975..6ec7554 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/domain.c
@@ -2614,7 +2614,7 @@ void domain_cpuid(
              */
             if ( (input == 0x80000007) && /* Advanced Power Management */
                  !d->disable_migrate && !d->arch.vtsc )
-                *edx &= ~(1u<<8); /* TSC Invariant */
+                *edx &= ~cpufeat_mask(X86_FEATURE_ITSC);
 
             return;
         }
-- 
2.1.4


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  parent reply	other threads:[~2016-03-23 16:36 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 72+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2016-03-23 16:36 [PATCH v4 00/26] x86: Improvements to cpuid handling for guests Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 01/26] xen/public: Export cpu featureset information in the public API Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 14:08   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-24 14:12     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 14:16       ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 02/26] xen/x86: Script to automatically process featureset information Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 04/26] xen/x86: Mask out unknown features from Xen's capabilities Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 05/26] xen/x86: Annotate special features Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 06/26] xen/x86: Annotate VM applicability in featureset Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 07/26] xen/x86: Calculate maximum host and guest featuresets Andrew Cooper
2016-03-29  8:57   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 08/26] xen/x86: Generate deep dependencies of features Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 16:16   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 09/26] xen/x86: Clear dependent features when clearing a cpu cap Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 10/26] xen/x86: Improve disabling of features which have dependencies Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 15:18   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 11/26] xen/x86: Improvements to in-hypervisor cpuid sanity checks Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 15:38   ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 16:47   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-24 17:01     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 17:11       ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-24 17:12         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 15:29   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 15:25     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 12/26] x86/cpu: Move set_cpumask() calls into c_early_init() Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 15:55   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 16:19     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 13/26] x86/cpu: Sysctl and common infrastructure for levelling context switching Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 16:58   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-28 16:12   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 16:33     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 17:37   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 14/26] x86/cpu: Rework AMD masking MSR setup Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 18:55   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 16:44     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 15/26] x86/cpu: Rework Intel masking/faulting setup Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 19:14   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 16:45     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 16/26] x86/cpu: Context switch cpuid masks and faulting state in context_switch() Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 19:27   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 18:34     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 17/26] x86/pv: Provide custom cpumasks for PV domains Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 19:40   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-04-05 16:55     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 18/26] x86/domctl: Update PV domain cpumasks when setting cpuid policy Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 17:04   ` Jan Beulich
2016-03-24 17:05     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 19:51   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 19/26] xen+tools: Export maximum host and guest cpu featuresets via SYSCTL Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 19:59   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 20/26] tools/libxc: Modify bitmap operations to take void pointers Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 20:05   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 21/26] tools/libxc: Use public/featureset.h for cpuid policy generation Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 20:07   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 22/26] tools/libxc: Expose the automatically generated cpu featuremask information Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 20:08   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 23/26] tools: Utility for dealing with featuresets Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 20:26   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 24/26] tools/libxc: Wire a featureset through to cpuid policy logic Andrew Cooper
2016-03-28 20:39   ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 25/26] tools/libxc: Use featuresets rather than guesswork Andrew Cooper
2016-03-23 16:36 ` [PATCH v4 26/26] tools/libxc: Calculate xstate cpuid leaf from guest information Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 17:20   ` Wei Liu
2016-03-31  7:48   ` Jan Beulich
2016-04-05 17:48     ` Andrew Cooper
2016-04-07  0:16       ` Jan Beulich
2016-04-07  0:40         ` Andrew Cooper
2016-04-07  0:56           ` Jan Beulich
2016-04-07 11:34             ` Andrew Cooper
2016-03-24 10:27 ` [PATCH v4 00/26] x86: Improvements to cpuid handling for guests Jan Beulich
2016-03-24 10:28   ` Andrew Cooper

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