From: Julien Grall <julien@xen.org>
To: Oleksandr <olekstysh@gmail.com>
Cc: Stefano Stabellini <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org,
Oleksandr Tyshchenko <oleksandr_tyshchenko@epam.com>,
Ian Jackson <ian.jackson@eu.citrix.com>, Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>,
Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
George Dunlap <george.dunlap@citrix.com>,
Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>,
Volodymyr Babchuk <Volodymyr_Babchuk@epam.com>,
Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>,
Julien Grall <julien.grall@arm.com>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V1 04/12] xen/arm: Introduce arch specific bits for IOREQ/DM features
Date: Thu, 13 Aug 2020 21:36:35 +0100 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <35c657d0-a0a9-0188-5f0c-9bd7047bca02@xen.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <b5497b00-2ee9-e6d8-ea4d-583a14b54522@gmail.com>
On 13/08/2020 19:41, Oleksandr wrote:
> Rebooting domain 2
> root@generic-armv8-xt-dom0:~# (XEN) Xen BUG at
> ...tAUTOINC+bb71237a55-r0/git/xen/include/xen/mm.h:683
> (XEN) ----[ Xen-4.14.0 arm64 debug=y Not tainted ]----
> (XEN) CPU: 3
> (XEN) PC: 0000000000246f28 ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x68/0x6c
> (XEN) LR: 0000000000246ef0
> (XEN) SP: 0000800725eafd80
> (XEN) CPSR: 60000249 MODE:64-bit EL2h (Hypervisor, handler)
> (XEN) X0: 0000000000000001 X1: 403fffffffffffff X2: 000000000000001f
> (XEN) X3: 0000000080000000 X4: 0000000000000000 X5: 0000000000400000
> (XEN) X6: 0000800725eafe24 X7: 0000ffffd1ef3e08 X8: 0000000000000020
> (XEN) X9: 0000000000000000 X10: 00e800008ecebf53 X11: 0400000000000000
> (XEN) X12: ffff7e00013b3ac0 X13: 0000000000000002 X14: 0000000000000001
> (XEN) X15: 0000000000000001 X16: 0000000000000029 X17: 0000ffff9badb3d0
> (XEN) X18: 000000000000010f X19: 0000000810e60e38 X20: 0000800725e68ec0
> (XEN) X21: 0000000000000000 X22: 00008004dc0404a0 X23: 000000005a000ea1
> (XEN) X24: ffff8000460ec280 X25: 0000000000000124 X26: 000000000000001d
> (XEN) X27: ffff000008ad1000 X28: ffff800052e65100 FP: ffff0000223dbd20
> (XEN)
> (XEN) VTCR_EL2: 80023558
> (XEN) VTTBR_EL2: 0002000765f04000
> (XEN)
> (XEN) SCTLR_EL2: 30cd183d
> (XEN) HCR_EL2: 000000008078663f
> (XEN) TTBR0_EL2: 00000000781c5000
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ESR_EL2: f2000001
> (XEN) HPFAR_EL2: 0000000000030010
> (XEN) FAR_EL2: ffff000008005f00
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Xen stack trace from sp=0000800725eafd80:
> (XEN) 0000800725e68ec0 0000000000247078 00008004dc040000
> 00000000002477c8
> (XEN) ffffffffffffffea 0000000000000001 ffff8000460ec500
> 0000000000000002
> (XEN) 000000000024645c 00000000002462dc 0000800725eafeb0
> 0000800725eafeb0
> (XEN) 0000800725eaff30 0000000060000145 000000000027882c
> 0000800725eafeb0
> (XEN) 0000800725eafeb0 01ff00000935de80 00008004dc040000
> 0000000000000006
> (XEN) ffff800000000000 0000000000000002 000000005a000ea1
> 000000019bc60002
> (XEN) 0000ffffd1ef3e08 0000000000000020 0000000000000004
> 000000000027c7d8
> (XEN) 000000005a000ea1 0000800725eafeb0 000000005a000ea1
> 0000000000279f98
> (XEN) 0000000000000000 ffff8000460ec200 0000800725eaffb8
> 0000000000262c58
> (XEN) 0000000000262c4c 07e0000160000249 0000000000000002
> 0000000000000001
> (XEN) ffff8000460ec500 ffff8000460ec508 ffff8000460ec208
> ffff800052e65100
> (XEN) 000000005060b478 0000ffffd20f3000 ffff7e00013c77e0
> 0000000000000000
> (XEN) 00e800008ecebf53 0400000000000000 ffff7e00013b3ac0
> 0000000000000002
> (XEN) 0000000000000001 0000000000000001 0000000000000029
> 0000ffff9badb3d0
> (XEN) 000000000000010f ffff8000460ec210 ffff8000460ec200
> ffff8000460ec210
> (XEN) 0000000000000001 ffff8000460ec500 ffff8000460ec280
> 0000000000000124
> (XEN) 000000000000001d ffff000008ad1000 ffff800052e65100
> ffff0000223dbd20
> (XEN) ffff000008537004 ffffffffffffffff ffff0000080c17e4
> 5a000ea160000145
> (XEN) 0000000060000000 0000000000000000 0000000000000000
> ffff800052e65100
> (XEN) ffff0000223dbd20 0000ffff9badb3dc 0000000000000000
> 0000000000000000
> (XEN) Xen call trace:
> (XEN) [<0000000000246f28>] ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x68/0x6c (PC)
> (XEN) [<0000000000246ef0>] ioreq.c#hvm_free_ioreq_mfn+0x30/0x6c (LR)
> (XEN)
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 3:
> (XEN) Xen BUG at ...tAUTOINC+bb71237a55-r0/git/xen/include/xen/mm.h:683
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Reboot in five seconds...
> (XEN)
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN) Panic on CPU 0:
> (XEN) PSCI cpu off failed for CPU0 err=-3
> (XEN) ****************************************
> (XEN)
> (XEN) Reboot in five seconds...
>
>
>
> Either I did something wrong (most likely) or there is an issue with
> page ref-counting in the IOREQ code. I am still trying to understand
> what is going on.
At a first glance, the implement of set_foreign_p2m_entry() looks fine
to me.
> Some notes on that:
> 1. I checked that put_page() was called for these pages in
> p2m_put_l3_page() when destroying domain. This happened before
> hvm_free_ioreq_mfn() execution.
> 2. There was no BUG detected if I passed "p2m_ram_rw" instead of
> "p2m_map_foreign_rw" in guest_physmap_add_entry(), but the DomU couldn't
> be fully destroyed because of the reference taken.
This definitely looks like a page reference issue. Would it be possible
to print where the page reference are dropped? A WARN() in put_page()
would help.
To avoid a lot of message, I tend to use a global variable that store
the page I want to watch.
Cheers,
--
Julien Grall
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-08-13 20:37 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 140+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-08-03 18:21 [RFC PATCH V1 00/12] IOREQ feature (+ virtio-mmio) on Arm Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 01/12] hvm/ioreq: Make x86's IOREQ feature common Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 7:45 ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 11:10 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 11:23 ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 11:51 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 13:18 ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 13:52 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-04 15:41 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-04 19:11 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 7:01 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 0:37 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06 6:59 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 20:32 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07 13:19 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-07 16:45 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-07 21:50 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07 22:19 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 13:41 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 23:34 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11 9:19 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 10:10 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 22:47 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-12 14:35 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-12 23:08 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-13 20:16 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-07 23:45 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 23:34 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 8:33 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 0:37 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06 9:45 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 23:48 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-10 19:20 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 23:34 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11 11:28 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 22:48 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-12 8:19 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-20 19:14 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-21 0:53 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-21 18:54 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 13:30 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:37 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 16:29 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 17:28 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 16:15 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-08-06 8:20 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-15 17:30 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-16 19:37 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 02/12] hvm/dm: Make x86's DM " Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 03/12] xen/mm: Make x86's XENMEM_resource_ioreq_server handling common Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 04/12] xen/arm: Introduce arch specific bits for IOREQ/DM features Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 7:49 ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-04 14:01 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-04 23:22 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-15 17:56 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-17 14:36 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-04 23:22 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 7:05 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:41 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 19:45 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 9:32 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 15:41 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 10:19 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 18:09 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 18:21 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 19:00 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 20:29 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 22:37 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 6:13 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-12 15:08 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 17:09 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-11 17:50 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-13 18:41 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-13 20:36 ` Julien Grall [this message]
2020-08-13 21:49 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-13 20:39 ` Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-13 22:14 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-14 12:08 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 14:12 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-05 14:45 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 19:30 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 11:08 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:29 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-20 18:30 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-21 6:16 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-21 11:13 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 13:27 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-10 18:25 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 19:58 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-05 16:13 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 19:47 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 05/12] hvm/dm: Introduce xendevicemodel_set_irq_level DM op Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:22 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 9:39 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 0:37 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-06 11:32 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 23:49 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-07 8:43 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-07 21:50 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-08 9:27 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-08 9:28 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-10 23:34 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-11 13:04 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-11 22:48 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-18 9:31 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-21 0:53 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-17 15:23 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-17 22:56 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-18 8:03 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:15 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 22:12 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 06/12] libxl: Introduce basic virtio-mmio support on Arm Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 07/12] A collection of tweaks to be able to run emulator in driver domain Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-05 16:19 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-05 16:40 ` Paul Durrant
2020-08-06 9:22 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 9:27 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-14 16:30 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-16 15:36 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-17 15:07 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 08/12] xen/arm: Invalidate qemu mapcache on XENMEM_decrease_reservation Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-05 16:21 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 11:35 ` Julien Grall
2020-08-06 11:50 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 14:28 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 16:33 ` Jan Beulich
2020-08-06 16:57 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 09/12] libxl: Handle virtio-mmio irq in more correct way Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:22 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 20:51 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 10/12] libxl: Add support for virtio-disk configuration Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:23 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 21:12 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-06 0:37 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 11/12] libxl: Insert "dma-coherent" property into virtio-mmio device node Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-04 23:23 ` Stefano Stabellini
2020-08-05 20:35 ` Oleksandr
2020-08-03 18:21 ` [RFC PATCH V1 12/12] libxl: Fix duplicate memory node in DT Oleksandr Tyshchenko
2020-08-15 17:24 ` [RFC PATCH V1 00/12] IOREQ feature (+ virtio-mmio) on Arm Julien Grall
2020-08-16 19:34 ` Oleksandr
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