From: "Marek Marczykowski-Górecki" <marmarek@invisiblethingslab.com>
To: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-block@vger.kernel.org, netdev@vger.kernel.org,
linuxppc-dev@lists.ozlabs.org,
"Boris Ostrovsky" <boris.ostrovsky@oracle.com>,
"Stefano Stabellini" <sstabellini@kernel.org>,
"Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk" <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>,
"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>,
"Jens Axboe" <axboe@kernel.dk>,
"David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>,
"Jakub Kicinski" <kuba@kernel.org>,
"Greg Kroah-Hartman" <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Jiri Slaby" <jirislaby@kernel.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends
Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 12:43:00 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <YKeOtbXkFz7JTMn0@mail-itl> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210513100302.22027-1-jgross@suse.com>
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On Thu, May 13, 2021 at 12:02:54PM +0200, Juergen Gross wrote:
> Xen backends of para-virtualized devices can live in dom0 kernel, dom0
> user land, or in a driver domain. This means that a backend might
> reside in a less trusted environment than the Xen core components, so
> a backend should not be able to do harm to a Xen guest (it can still
> mess up I/O data, but it shouldn't be able to e.g. crash a guest by
> other means or cause a privilege escalation in the guest).
>
> Unfortunately many frontends in the Linux kernel are fully trusting
> their respective backends. This series is starting to fix the most
> important frontends: console, disk and network.
>
> It was discussed to handle this as a security problem, but the topic
> was discussed in public before, so it isn't a real secret.
Is it based on patches we ship in Qubes[1] and also I've sent here some
years ago[2]? I see a lot of similarities. If not, you may want to
compare them.
[1] https://github.com/QubesOS/qubes-linux-kernel/
[2] https://lists.xenproject.org/archives/html/xen-devel/2018-04/msg02336.html
> Juergen Gross (8):
> xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version
> xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once
> xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page
> xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
> xen/netfront: read response from backend only once
> xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page
> xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly
> xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value
>
> drivers/block/xen-blkfront.c | 118 +++++++++-----
> drivers/net/xen-netfront.c | 184 ++++++++++++++-------
> drivers/tty/hvc/hvc_xen.c | 15 +-
> include/xen/interface/io/ring.h | 278 ++++++++++++++++++--------------
> 4 files changed, 369 insertions(+), 226 deletions(-)
>
> --
> 2.26.2
>
>
--
Best Regards,
Marek Marczykowski-Górecki
Invisible Things Lab
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prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-05-21 10:43 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 31+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-05-13 10:02 [PATCH 0/8] xen: harden frontends against malicious backends Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 1/8] xen: sync include/xen/interface/io/ring.h with Xen's newest version Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 2/8] xen/blkfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 13:50 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 3/8] xen/blkfront: don't take local copy of a request from the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:01 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:11 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 4/8] xen/blkfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:11 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:23 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:12 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 15:22 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:33 ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08 5:47 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 6:37 ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08 6:40 ` Juergen Gross
2021-07-08 6:52 ` Jan Beulich
2021-07-08 6:56 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:02 ` [PATCH 5/8] xen/netfront: read response from backend only once Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 14:20 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-17 14:24 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] xen/netfront: don't read data from request on the ring page Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:08 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:03 ` [PATCH 7/8] xen/netfront: don't trust the backend response data blindly Juergen Gross
2021-05-17 15:31 ` Jan Beulich
2021-05-13 10:03 ` [PATCH 8/8] xen/hvc: replace BUG_ON() with negative return value Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:16 ` Christophe Leroy
2021-05-13 10:20 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-13 10:25 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-05-13 10:35 ` Juergen Gross
2021-05-21 10:43 ` Marek Marczykowski-Górecki [this message]
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