From: Jan Beulich <jbeulich@suse.com>
To: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
Cc: "Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>,
"Jun Nakajima" <jun.nakajima@intel.com>,
"Kevin Tian" <kevin.tian@intel.com>,
Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest"
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2023 09:10:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <b771061a-4fc1-8c15-17c5-8696f515d021@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230405215245.2137356-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
On 05.04.2023 23:52, Andrew Cooper wrote:
> At the time of XSA-170, the x86 instruction emulator was genuinely broken. It
> would load arbitrary values into %rip and putting a check here probably was
> the best stopgap security fix. It should have been reverted following c/s
> 81d3a0b26c1 "x86emul: limit-check branch targets" which corrected the emulator
> behaviour.
>
> However, everyone involved in XSA-170, myself included, failed to read the SDM
> correctly. On the subject of %rip consistency checks, the SDM stated:
>
> If the processor supports N < 64 linear-address bits, bits 63:N must be
> identical
>
> A non-canonical %rip (and SSP more recently) is an explicitly legal state in
> x86, and the VMEntry consistency checks are intentionally off-by-one from a
> regular canonical check.
>
> The consequence of this bug is that Xen will currently take a legal x86 state
> which would successfully VMEnter, and corrupt it into having non-architectural
> behaviour.
>
> Furthermore, in the time this bugfix has been pending in public, I
> successfully persuaded Intel to clarify the SDM, adding the following
> clarification:
>
> The guest RIP value is not required to be canonical; the value of bit N-1
> may differ from that of bit N.
>
> Fixes: ffbbfda377 ("x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest")
> Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
I am kind of okay with such a full revert, but I'd consider it quite helpful
if the description made clear why the alternative of instead doing the spec
mandated check isn't necessary / useful. The emulator having gained respective
checking is only part of the reason for this, aiui. Plus bugs may be
introduced into the emulator again, where the checking here could be a guard
against needing to issue an XSA in such a case.
Jan
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-04-06 7:10 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 16+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-04-05 21:52 [PATCH] x86/vmx: Revert "x86/VMX: sanitize rIP before re-entering guest" Andrew Cooper
2023-04-06 7:10 ` Jan Beulich [this message]
2023-08-23 11:15 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-08-23 11:56 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-23 13:31 ` Roger Pau Monné
2023-08-23 14:09 ` Andrew Cooper
2023-08-24 4:26 ` Tian, Kevin
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2020-10-09 15:09 Andrew Cooper
2020-10-13 15:58 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-14 13:57 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-15 8:01 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-16 15:38 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-19 9:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-19 16:12 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-20 8:09 ` Jan Beulich
2020-10-23 6:14 ` Tian, Kevin
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