From: Daniel De Graaf <dgdegra@tycho.nsa.gov>
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk <konrad.wilk@oracle.com>
Cc: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org, cardoe@cardoe.com, steve@zentific.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/5] flask/policy: split into modules
Date: Tue, 7 Jun 2016 15:39:59 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <cfbc1e39-1856-95c3-ff0f-1c0d999f2abb@tycho.nsa.gov> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20160607192246.GA20716@char.us.oracle.com>
On 06/07/2016 03:22 PM, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
> On Mon, May 23, 2016 at 11:05:29AM -0400, Daniel De Graaf wrote:
>> This makes it easier to enable or disable parts of the XSM policy.
>>
>
> Hey Daniel,
>
> I am no expert on this so please take it with a grain of salt.
That can actually be helpful to spot documentation problems :)
> .. snip..
>> diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..74f870f
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/default_role.te
>> @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
>> +# Allow all domains to use system_r so that systems that are not using the
>> +# user/role separation feature will work properly.
>> +role system_r types domain_type;
>
> In the 'original' code it also had : xen_type :
>
> 266 role system_r types { xen_type domain_type };
>
> Is this change done on purpose? Reading the xen.te it describes the 'system_r' as:
> "The system role is used for utility domains and pseudo-domains "
>
> which is .. confusing. What is an utility domain? Pseudo-domain?
Utility domains would be a domain that is not actually a part of a guest,
such as xenstore, vtpm-manager, and disaggregated components of dom0.
Pseudo-domain is the term used here to refer to DOMID_XEN and DOMID_IO.
Is there a better name for this?
> [Looking in the new xen.te I see that it has the same syntax]
>> +
>> +# The vm role is used as part of user separation. Allow all domain types to use
>> +# this role except dom0.
>> +role vm_r;
>> +role vm_r types { domain_type -dom0_t };
>> diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..dd4d7dd
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/dom0.te
>> @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
>> +################################################################################
>> +#
>> +# Allow dom0 access to all sysctls, devices, and the security server.
>> +#
>> +# While this could be written more briefly using wildcards, the permissions are
>> +# listed out to make removing specific permissions simpler.
>> +#
>> +################################################################################
>> +allow dom0_t xen_t:xen {
>> + settime tbufcontrol readconsole clearconsole perfcontrol mtrr_add
>> + mtrr_del mtrr_read microcode physinfo quirk writeconsole readapic
>> + writeapic privprofile nonprivprofile kexec firmware sleep frequency
>> + getidle debug getcpuinfo heap pm_op mca_op lockprof cpupool_op tmem_op
>> + tmem_control getscheduler setscheduler
>> +};
>> +allow dom0_t xen_t:xen2 {
>> + resource_op psr_cmt_op psr_cat_op pmu_ctrl get_symbol
>> + get_cpu_levelling_caps get_cpu_featureset xsplice_op
>
> Hehe. livepatch_op now :-)
>
I have a corrected series that also has some other pending hypervisor
patches, which I can post whenever the 4.8 merging window is fully
open.
> .. giant snip...
>
>> diff --git a/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te
>> new file mode 100644
>> index 0000000..f374dc5
>> --- /dev/null
>> +++ b/tools/flask/policy/modules/xen.te
> .. snip..
>
>> +################################################################################
>> +#
>> +# Roles
>> +#
>> +################################################################################
>> +
>> +# The object role (object_r) is used for devices, resources, and event channels;
>> +# it does not need to be defined here and should not be used for domains.
>> +
>> +# The system role is used for utility domains and pseudo-domains. If roles are
>> +# not being used for separation, all domains can use the system role.
>> +role system_r;
>> +role system_r types { xen_type dom0_t };
>
> Right here it is back again.
>
> Is the 'default_role' neccessary then?
Specifying some role is necessary to create a valid security label
(which is a user:role:type tuple).
The line in xen.te only allows the pseudo-domains and dom0 to use
system_r; this is a useful minimum, if you are going to place any
actual guests in another role. If you include default_role.te,
then this expands to allowing all domains to use system_r.
I could split the default_role extraction into a separate patch if
you think this explanation belongs in a commit message.
> I've looked at the original xen.te and them splitting out to individual and there were no
> missing copy-n-paste (except the above 'default_role.te' which I am not
> clear about).
>
> Thanks!
>
--
Daniel De Graaf
National Security Agency
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2016-06-07 19:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2016-05-23 15:05 [PATCH 0/5] flask/policy: Updates for Xen 4.8 Daniel De Graaf
2016-05-23 15:05 ` [PATCH 1/5] flask/policy: split into modules Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 19:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-06-07 19:39 ` Daniel De Graaf [this message]
2016-06-07 19:57 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-05-23 15:05 ` [PATCH 2/5] flask/policy: move user definitions and constraints " Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 19:37 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-05-23 15:05 ` [PATCH 3/5] flask/policy: Remove unused support for binary modules Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 19:41 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-05-23 15:05 ` [PATCH 4/5] flask/policy: xenstore stubdom policy Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 19:44 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-06-07 19:48 ` Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 20:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-07-06 15:34 ` default XSM policy for PCI passthrough for unlabeled resources anshul makkar
2016-07-06 15:59 ` Daniel De Graaf
2016-07-06 16:19 ` anshul makkar
2016-07-07 15:36 ` Daniel De Graaf
2016-07-07 16:29 ` anshul makkar
2016-05-23 15:05 ` [PATCH 5/5] flask/policy: comment out unused xenstore example Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 19:45 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-06-07 19:51 ` Daniel De Graaf
2016-06-07 20:02 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2016-06-07 20:04 ` Daniel De Graaf
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