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From: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com, gleb@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org, Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH V2 3/7] KVM, pkeys: update memeory permission bitmask for pkeys
Date: Mon, 16 Nov 2015 15:51:47 +0800	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1447660311-12003-4-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1447660311-12003-1-git-send-email-huaitong.han@intel.com>

Pkeys define a new status bit in the PFEC. PFEC.PK (bit 5), if some
conditions is true, the fault is considered as a PKU violation.

This patch updates memeory permission bitmask for pkeys.

Signed-off-by: Huaitong Han <huaitong.han@intel.com>

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
index 3bbc1cb..8852b9f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/kvm_host.h
@@ -159,12 +159,14 @@ enum {
 #define PFERR_USER_BIT 2
 #define PFERR_RSVD_BIT 3
 #define PFERR_FETCH_BIT 4
+#define PFERR_PK_BIT 5
 
 #define PFERR_PRESENT_MASK (1U << PFERR_PRESENT_BIT)
 #define PFERR_WRITE_MASK (1U << PFERR_WRITE_BIT)
 #define PFERR_USER_MASK (1U << PFERR_USER_BIT)
 #define PFERR_RSVD_MASK (1U << PFERR_RSVD_BIT)
 #define PFERR_FETCH_MASK (1U << PFERR_FETCH_BIT)
+#define PFERR_PK_MASK (1U << PFERR_PK_BIT)
 
 /* apic attention bits */
 #define KVM_APIC_CHECK_VAPIC	0
@@ -288,10 +290,12 @@ struct kvm_mmu {
 
 	/*
 	 * Bitmap; bit set = permission fault
-	 * Byte index: page fault error code [4:1]
+	 * Byte index: page fault error code [5:1]
 	 * Bit index: pte permissions in ACC_* format
+	 *
+	 * Add PFEC.PK (bit 5) for protection-key violations
 	 */
-	u8 permissions[16];
+	u8 permissions[32];
 
 	u64 *pae_root;
 	u64 *lm_root;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
index 69088a1..0568635 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu.c
@@ -3793,16 +3793,22 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 {
 	unsigned bit, byte, pfec;
 	u8 map;
-	bool fault, x, w, u, wf, uf, ff, smapf, cr4_smap, cr4_smep, smap = 0;
+	bool fault, x, w, u, smap = 0, pku = 0;
+	bool wf, uf, ff, smapf, rsvdf, pkuf;
+	bool cr4_smap, cr4_smep, cr4_pku;
 
 	cr4_smep = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMEP);
 	cr4_smap = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_SMAP);
+	cr4_pku = kvm_read_cr4_bits(vcpu, X86_CR4_PKE);
+
 	for (byte = 0; byte < ARRAY_SIZE(mmu->permissions); ++byte) {
 		pfec = byte << 1;
 		map = 0;
 		wf = pfec & PFERR_WRITE_MASK;
 		uf = pfec & PFERR_USER_MASK;
 		ff = pfec & PFERR_FETCH_MASK;
+		rsvdf = pfec & PFERR_RSVD_MASK;
+		pkuf = pfec & PFERR_PK_MASK;
 		/*
 		 * PFERR_RSVD_MASK bit is set in PFEC if the access is not
 		 * subject to SMAP restrictions, and cleared otherwise. The
@@ -3841,12 +3847,34 @@ static void update_permission_bitmask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
 				 *   clearer.
 				 */
 				smap = cr4_smap && u && !uf && !ff;
+
+				/*
+				* PKU:additional mechanism by which the paging
+				* controls access to user-mode addresses based
+				* on the value in the PKRU register. A fault is
+				* considered as a PKU violation if all of the
+				* following conditions are true:
+				* 1.CR4_PKE=1.
+				* 2.EFER_LMA=1.
+				* 3.page is present with no reserved bit
+				*   violations.
+				* 4.the access is not an instruction fetch.
+				* 5.the access is to a user page.
+				* 6.PKRU.AD=1
+				*	or The access is a data write and
+				*	   PKRU.WD=1 and either CR0.WP=1
+				*	   or it is a user access.
+				*
+				* The 2nd and 6th conditions are computed
+				* dynamically in permission_fault.
+				*/
+				pku = cr4_pku && !rsvdf && !ff && u;
 			} else
 				/* Not really needed: no U/S accesses on ept  */
 				u = 1;
 
 			fault = (ff && !x) || (uf && !u) || (wf && !w) ||
-				(smapf && smap);
+				(smapf && smap) || (pkuf && pku);
 			map |= fault << bit;
 		}
 		mmu->permissions[byte] = map;
-- 
2.4.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-11-16  7:52 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-16  7:51 [PATCH V2 0/7] KVM, pkeys: add memory protection-key support Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 1/7] KVM, pkeys: expose CPUID/CR4 to guest Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 2/7] KVM, pkeys: disable pkeys for guests in non-paging mode Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` Huaitong Han [this message]
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 4/7] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for permission_fault logic Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 5/7] KVM, pkeys: Add pkeys support for gva_to_gpa funcions Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 6/7] KVM, pkeys: add pkeys support for xsave state Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  7:51 ` [PATCH V2 7/7] KVM, pkeys: disable PKU feature without ept Huaitong Han
2015-11-16  9:20   ` Paolo Bonzini

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