From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
Michael Leibowitz <michael.leibowitz@intel.com>
Subject: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 11/18] scsi: qedi,qedf: Use designated initializers
Date: Thu, 6 Apr 2017 14:18:26 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1491513513-84351-12-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1491513513-84351-1-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org>
Prepare to mark sensitive kernel structures for randomization by making
sure they're using designated initializers. These were identified during
allyesconfig builds of x86, arm, and arm64, with most initializer fixes
extracted from grsecurity.
For these cases, terminate the list with { }, which will be zero-filled,
instead of undesignated NULLs.
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c | 2 +-
drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_debugfs.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c b/drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c
index cb08b625c594..00a1d6405ebe 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qedf/qedf_debugfs.c
@@ -449,7 +449,7 @@ const struct file_operations qedf_dbg_fops[] = {
qedf_dbg_fileops(qedf, clear_stats),
qedf_dbg_fileops_seq(qedf, offload_stats),
/* This must be last */
- { NULL, NULL },
+ { },
};
#else /* CONFIG_DEBUG_FS */
diff --git a/drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_debugfs.c b/drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_debugfs.c
index 59417199bf36..39d77818a677 100644
--- a/drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_debugfs.c
+++ b/drivers/scsi/qedi/qedi_debugfs.c
@@ -240,5 +240,5 @@ const struct file_operations qedi_dbg_fops[] = {
qedi_dbg_fileops_seq(qedi, gbl_ctx),
qedi_dbg_fileops(qedi, do_not_recover),
qedi_dbg_fileops_seq(qedi, io_trace),
- { NULL, NULL },
+ { },
};
--
2.7.4
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2017-04-06 21:18 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-04-06 21:18 [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/18] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 01/18] gcc-plugins: Add the randstruct plugin Kees Cook
2017-04-12 22:12 ` [kernel-hardening] " Kees Cook
2017-04-17 5:30 ` Jessica Yu
2017-04-17 15:23 ` Kees Cook
2017-05-12 6:37 ` Loganaden Velvindron
2017-05-12 19:36 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 02/18] compiler: Add __designated_init annotation Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 03/18] randstruct: Set designated_init attribute Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 04/18] randstruct: Differentiate bad cast warnings Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 05/18] af_unix: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 06/18] NFS: Avoid cross-structure casting Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 07/18] randstruct: Whitelist struct security_hook_heads cast Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 08/18] randstruct: Whitelist UNIXCB cast Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 09/18] randstruct: Mark various structs for randomization Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 10/18] scsi/bfa: use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 12/18] ovl: Use " Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 13/18] randstruct: opt-out externally exposed function pointer structs Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 14/18] randstruct: Disable randomization of ACPICA structs Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 15/18] randstruct: Enable function pointer struct detection Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 16/18] task_struct: Allow randomized layout Kees Cook
2017-04-07 16:25 ` Rik van Riel
2017-04-07 20:43 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 17/18] sgi-xp: Use designated initializers Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:18 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 18/18] ACPICA: " Kees Cook
2017-04-06 21:54 ` [kernel-hardening] [PATCH 00/18] Introduce struct layout randomization plugin James Morris
2017-04-06 22:32 ` Rik van Riel
2017-04-06 22:51 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-13 23:39 ` Laura Abbott
2017-04-15 18:50 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 17:15 ` Laura Abbott
2017-04-18 17:20 ` Kees Cook
2017-04-18 16:54 ` Laura Abbott
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