Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access()

From: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>
To: Ingo Molnar <mingo@elte.hu>
Cc: Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>,
	Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>,
	Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 3/3a] ptrace: add _ptrace_may_access()
Date: Thu, 7 May 2009 02:20:09 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20090507092009.GC3036@sequoia.sous-sol.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20090507090459.GE19133@elte.hu>

* Ingo Molnar (mingo@elte.hu) wrote:
> 
> * Chris Wright <chrisw@sous-sol.org> wrote:
> 
> > * Ingo Molnar (mingo@elte.hu) wrote:
> > > * Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com> wrote:
> > > > Agreed, but what about security_operations->ptrace_may_access ?
> > > > It has the same (bad) name, but returns the error code or 0 on 
> > > > success.
> > > 
> > > Bad code should generally be fixed, or in exceptional circumstances 
> > > it can tolerated if it's pre-existing bad code, but it should never 
> > > be propagated. It has not spread _that_ widely yet, and is isolated 
> > > to the security subsystem:
> > 
> > And the security hooks tend to all follow the 0 success -ve ERR on error.
> 
> I just sent a patch (see below) that renames them to 
> ptrace_access_check().
> 
> They have no active connection to the core kernel 
> ptrace_may_access() check in any case:

Not sure what you mean:

ptrace_may_access
 __ptrace_may_access
  security_ptrace_may_access

Looks like your patch won't compile.