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From: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
To: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 06/20] SECURITY: remove nameidata arg from inode_follow_link.
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 2015 13:37:39 +1100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150323023739.8161.62821.stgit@notabene.brown> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20150323023258.8161.32467.stgit@notabene.brown>

No ->inode_follow_link() methods use the nameidata arg, and
it is about to become private to namei.c.
So remove from all inode_follow_link() functions.

Signed-off-by: NeilBrown <neilb@suse.de>
---
 fs/namei.c               |    2 +-
 include/linux/security.h |    9 +++------
 security/capability.c    |    3 +--
 security/security.c      |    4 ++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c |    2 +-
 5 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/namei.c b/fs/namei.c
index 7ad88ea8c609..32f418f96d9b 100644
--- a/fs/namei.c
+++ b/fs/namei.c
@@ -890,7 +890,7 @@ follow_link(struct path *link, struct nameidata *nd, void **p)
 	touch_atime(link);
 	nd_set_link(nd, NULL);
 
-	error = security_inode_follow_link(link->dentry, nd);
+	error = security_inode_follow_link(link->dentry);
 	if (error)
 		goto out_put_nd_path;
 
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index a1b7dbd127ff..237d22bfc642 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ struct file;
 struct vfsmount;
 struct path;
 struct qstr;
-struct nameidata;
 struct iattr;
 struct fown_struct;
 struct file_operations;
@@ -477,7 +476,6 @@ static inline void security_free_mnt_opts(struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
  * @inode_follow_link:
  *	Check permission to follow a symbolic link when looking up a pathname.
  *	@dentry contains the dentry structure for the link.
- *	@nd contains the nameidata structure for the parent directory.
  *	Return 0 if permission is granted.
  * @inode_permission:
  *	Check permission before accessing an inode.  This hook is called by the
@@ -1553,7 +1551,7 @@ struct security_operations {
 	int (*inode_rename) (struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			     struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry);
 	int (*inode_readlink) (struct dentry *dentry);
-	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
+	int (*inode_follow_link) (struct dentry *dentry);
 	int (*inode_permission) (struct inode *inode, int mask);
 	int (*inode_setattr)	(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 	int (*inode_getattr) (struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -1840,7 +1838,7 @@ int security_inode_rename(struct inode *old_dir, struct dentry *old_dentry,
 			  struct inode *new_dir, struct dentry *new_dentry,
 			  unsigned int flags);
 int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry);
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd);
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry);
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask);
 int security_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr);
 int security_inode_getattr(struct vfsmount *mnt, struct dentry *dentry);
@@ -2242,8 +2240,7 @@ static inline int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
-					      struct nameidata *nd)
+static inline int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 070dd46f62f4..ad8557782e73 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -209,8 +209,7 @@ static int cap_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry,
-				 struct nameidata *nameidata)
+static int cap_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	return 0;
 }
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index e81d5bbe7363..7b4fd199e881 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -581,11 +581,11 @@ int security_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return security_ops->inode_readlink(dentry);
 }
 
-int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nd)
+int security_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(dentry->d_inode)))
 		return 0;
-	return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry, nd);
+	return security_ops->inode_follow_link(dentry);
 }
 
 int security_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 4d1a54190388..a2c29efcacc9 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2862,7 +2862,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_readlink(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return dentry_has_perm(cred, dentry, FILE__READ);
 }
 
-static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry, struct nameidata *nameidata)
+static int selinux_inode_follow_link(struct dentry *dentry)
 {
 	const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
 



  parent reply	other threads:[~2015-03-23  2:38 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-03-23  2:37 [PATCH 00/20] Support follow_link in RCU-walk - V3 NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 02/20] STAGING/lustre: limit follow_link recursion using stack space NeilBrown
2015-04-18  3:01   ` Al Viro
2015-04-19 20:57     ` Andreas Dilger
2015-04-19 21:33       ` Al Viro
2015-04-20  2:29         ` Al Viro
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 03/20] VFS: replace {, total_}link_count in task_struct with pointer to nameidata NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 01/20] Documentation: remove outdated information from automount-support.txt NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 10/20] security: make inode_follow_link RCU-walk aware NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 04/20] ovl: rearrange ovl_follow_link to it doesn't need to call ->put_link NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 07/20] VFS: remove nameidata args from ->follow_link NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` NeilBrown [this message]
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 05/20] VFS: replace nameidata arg to ->put_link with a char* NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 09/20] security/selinux: pass 'flags' arg to avc_audit() and avc_has_perm_flags() NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 11/20] VFS/namei: use terminate_walk when symlink lookup fails NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 08/20] VFS: make all ->follow_link handlers aware for LOOKUP_RCU NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 13/20] VFS/namei: abort RCU-walk on symlink if atime needs updating NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 14/20] VFS/namei: add 'inode' arg to put_link() NeilBrown
2015-04-17 16:25   ` Al Viro
2015-04-17 19:09     ` Al Viro
2015-04-18  8:09       ` Al Viro
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 16/20] VFS/namei: enable RCU-walk when following symlinks NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 19/20] XFS: allow follow_link to often succeed in RCU-walk NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 20/20] NFS: support LOOKUP_RCU in nfs_follow_link NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 18/20] xfs: use RCU to free 'struct xfs_mount' NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 17/20] VFS/namei: handle LOOKUP_RCU in page_follow_link_light NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 12/20] VFS/namei: new flag to support RCU symlinks: LOOKUP_LINK_RCU NeilBrown
2015-03-23  2:37 ` [PATCH 15/20] VFS/namei: enhance follow_link to support RCU-walk NeilBrown
2015-03-25 23:23 ` [PATCH 00/20] Support follow_link in RCU-walk - V3 NeilBrown

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