From: "Radim Krčmář" <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
To: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, dgilbert@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH] KVM: x86: zero IDT limit on entry to SMM
Date: Mon, 10 Aug 2015 17:31:17 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20150810153116.GA5667@potion.brq.redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1438944883-3796-1-git-send-email-pbonzini@redhat.com>
2015-08-07 12:54+0200, Paolo Bonzini:
> The recent BlackHat 2015 presentation "The Memory Sinkhole"
> mentions that the IDT limit is zeroed on entry to SMM.
Slide 64 of
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Domas-The-Memory-Sinkhole-Unleashing-An-x86-Design-Flaw-Allowing-Universal-Privilege-Escalation.pdf
> This is not documented, and must have changed some time after 2010
> (see http://www.ssi.gouv.fr/uploads/IMG/pdf/IT_Defense_2010_final.pdf).
> KVM was not doing it, but the fix is easy.
This patch also clears the IDT base. Fetching original IDT is better
done from SMM saved state (and an anti-exploit based on comparing those
two seems unlikely) so it should be fine,
Reviewed-by: Radim Krčmář <rkrcmar@redhat.com>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
That takes care of Attack 1.
KVM is likely not vulnerable to attack 2 and 3 because of an emergent
security feature. (A simple modification of kvm-unit-tests show that
mapping APIC base on top of real code/data makes the APIC page hidden
and I expect SMM memslot to behave similarly.)
prev parent reply other threads:[~2015-08-10 15:31 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 2+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2015-08-07 10:54 [PATCH] KVM: x86: zero IDT limit on entry to SMM Paolo Bonzini
2015-08-10 15:31 ` Radim Krčmář [this message]
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