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From: Seth Forshee <seth.forshee@canonical.com>
To: Octavian Purdila <octavian.purdila@intel.com>
Cc: Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at>,
	Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	"Eric W. Biederman" <ebiederm@xmission.com>,
	linux-bcache@vger.kernel.org,
	device-mapper development <dm-devel@redhat.com>,
	"linux-raid@vger.kernel.org" <linux-raid@vger.kernel.org>,
	"linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org" <linux-mtd@lists.infradead.org>,
	linux-fsdevel <linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	selinux@tycho.nsa.gov, Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@amacapital.net>,
	LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
	Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates
Date: Thu, 19 Nov 2015 09:23:47 -0600	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20151119152347.GA45540@ubuntu-hedt> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <CAE1zotJRp3=G2Vdud7kVbkToKe2YsTF3gXUnLCNzKV6F0oumdg@mail.gmail.com>

On Wed, Nov 18, 2015 at 12:00:17AM +0200, Octavian Purdila wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 10:12 PM, Richard Weinberger <richard@nod.at> wrote:
> > Am 17.11.2015 um 20:25 schrieb Octavian Purdila:
> >> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 9:21 PM, Seth Forshee
> >> <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>
> >>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 08:12:31PM +0100, Richard Weinberger wrote:
> >>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 7:34 PM, Seth Forshee
> >>>> <seth.forshee@canonical.com> wrote:
> >>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 05:55:06PM +0000, Al Viro wrote:
> >>>>>> On Tue, Nov 17, 2015 at 11:25:51AM -0600, Seth Forshee wrote:
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>>> Shortly after that I plan to follow with support for ext4. I've been
> >>>>>>> fuzzing ext4 for a while now and it has held up well, and I'm currently
> >>>>>>> working on hand-crafted attacks. Ted has commented privately (to others,
> >>>>>>> not to me personally) that he will fix bugs for such attacks, though I
> >>>>>>> haven't seen any public comments to that effect.
> >>>>>>
> >>>>>> _Static_ attacks, or change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks?
> >>>>>
> >>>>> Right now only static attacks, change-image-under-mounted-fs attacks
> >>>>> will be next.
> >>>>
> >>>> Do we *really* need to enable unprivileged mounting of kernel filesystems?
> >>>> What about just enabling fuse and implement ext4 and friends as fuse
> >>>> filesystems?
> >>>> Using the approaching Linux Kernel Libary[1] this is easy.
> >>>
> >>> I haven't looked at this project, but I'm guessing that programs must be
> >>> written specifically to make use of it? I.e. you can't just use the
> >>> mount syscall, and thus all existing software still doesn't work?
> >>>
> >>
> >> The projects includes a lklfuse program that uses fuse to mount a
> >> fileystem image.
> >
> > Cool. I gave it a try.
> > It seems to work fine, but only if I run it in foreground (using -d)
> > otherwise fuse blocks every filesystem request.
> >
> 
> Now it should work in the background as well, thanks for reporting the issue.

I'm playing with lklfuse now, it's surprisingly easy to get up and
running. I did have a few problems though that I thought you'd like to
know about.

Unfortunately I still can't run it in background mode, I get a segfault.

It's working fine on light workloads, but I'm having issues when I start
trying to stress it. In a couple runs of the stress-ng filesystem
stressors I saw both stress-ng and lklfuse get stuck in uninterruptible
sleep during the first run, and during the second I got some OOM errors
in lklfuse followed by I/O errors and eventually a journal error that
cause the filesystem to go read-only.

The command I used for the first run was:

 stress-ng --class filesystem --all 0

And for the second:

 stress-ng --class filesystem --seq 0 -v -t 60

There really wasn't anything interesting in the lklfuse output for the
first run, but for the second run I pasted the output here:
http://paste.ubuntu.com/13346993/

I still need to compare this to other fuse filesystems since I haven't
tried this kind of stress test on any others.

  reply	other threads:[~2015-11-19 15:23 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 66+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2015-11-17 16:39 [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 1/7] block_dev: Support checking inode permissions in lookup_bdev() Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 2/7] block_dev: Check permissions towards block device inode when mounting Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 3/7] mtd: Check permissions towards mtd " Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 4/7] fs: Treat foreign mounts as nosuid Seth Forshee
2015-11-18  0:00   ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 5/7] selinux: Add support for unprivileged mounts from user namespaces Seth Forshee
2015-11-18  0:02   ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 6/7] userns: Replace in_userns with current_in_userns Seth Forshee
2015-11-18  0:03   ` James Morris
2015-11-17 16:39 ` [PATCH v3 7/7] Smack: Handle labels consistently in untrusted mounts Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 18:24   ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-17 18:24     ` Casey Schaufler
2015-11-18  0:12   ` James Morris
2015-11-18  0:50     ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:05 ` [PATCH v3 0/7] User namespace mount updates Al Viro
2015-11-17 17:25   ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 17:45     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 17:55     ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 18:34       ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:12         ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 19:21           ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:25             ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-17 20:12               ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-17 22:00                 ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 15:23                   ` Seth Forshee [this message]
2015-11-19 16:19                     ` Octavian Purdila
2015-11-19 16:31                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-20 17:33                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:26             ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-18 19:10         ` Theodore Ts'o
2015-11-18 19:28           ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 19:32           ` Serge Hallyn
2015-11-17 19:02       ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 19:16         ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 19:16           ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-17 20:54           ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:32             ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:23               ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:22                 ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 14:58                   ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:05                     ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:05                       ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:13                       ` Al Viro
2015-11-18 15:19                         ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19  7:47                           ` James Morris
2015-11-19  7:53                             ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:21                               ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-19 15:04                                 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 14:37                               ` Colin Walters
2015-11-19 14:49                                 ` Richard Weinberger
2015-11-19 15:17                                   ` Richard W.M. Jones
2015-11-19 14:58                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2015-11-18 15:34                     ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 15:36                     ` Nikolay Borisov
2015-11-17 19:30         ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 20:39           ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-17 21:05             ` Al Viro
2015-11-17 22:01               ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 12:46                 ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
2015-11-18 14:30                   ` Seth Forshee
2015-11-18 15:38                     ` Austin S Hemmelgarn
     [not found]                       ` <564C9B92.5080107-Re5JQEeQqe8AvxtiuMwx3w@public.gmane.org>
2015-11-18 18:33                         ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:33                           ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:33                           ` Daniel J Walsh
2015-11-18 18:44           ` J. Bruce Fields

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