From: Qu Wenruo <quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com>
To: <linux-btrfs@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 0/5] raid56: variant bug fixes
Date: Fri, 3 Feb 2017 16:20:18 +0800 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170203082023.3577-1-quwenruo@cn.fujitsu.com> (raw)
This patchset can be fetched from my github repo:
https://github.com/adam900710/linux.git raid56_fixes
It's based on v4.10-rc6 and none of the patch is modified after its first
appearance in mail list.
The patchset fixes the following bugs:
1) False alert or wrong csum error number when scrubbing RAID5/6
The bug itself won't cause any damage to fs, just pure race.
2) Corrupted data stripe rebuild corrupts P/Q
So scrub makes one error into another, not really fixing anything
3) Use-after-free caused by cancelling dev-replace
This is quite a deadly bug, since cancelling dev-replace can easily
cause kernel panic, and thanks to raid bio steal, it makes the race
windows quite large.
Can be triggered by btrfs/069.
After all the fixes applied, no scrub/replace related regression can be
detected.
Qu Wenruo (5):
btrfs: scrub: Introduce full stripe lock for RAID56
btrfs: scrub: Fix RAID56 recovery race condition
btrfs: raid56: Use correct stolen pages to calculate P/Q
btrfs: raid56: Don't keep rbio for later steal
btrfs: replace: Use ref counts to avoid destroying target device when
canceled
fs/btrfs/ctree.h | 4 ++
fs/btrfs/dev-replace.c | 7 +-
fs/btrfs/extent-tree.c | 3 +
fs/btrfs/raid56.c | 80 +++++++++++++++------
fs/btrfs/scrub.c | 192 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/btrfs/volumes.c | 36 +++++++++-
fs/btrfs/volumes.h | 10 +++
7 files changed, 309 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--
2.11.0
next reply other threads:[~2017-02-03 8:21 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 27+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2017-02-03 8:20 Qu Wenruo [this message]
2017-02-03 8:20 ` [PATCH 1/5] btrfs: scrub: Introduce full stripe lock for RAID56 Qu Wenruo
2017-02-03 8:20 ` [PATCH 2/5] btrfs: scrub: Fix RAID56 recovery race condition Qu Wenruo
2017-02-03 8:20 ` [PATCH 3/5] btrfs: raid56: Use correct stolen pages to calculate P/Q Qu Wenruo
2017-03-16 5:36 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-16 8:30 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-17 6:31 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-17 22:19 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-20 4:33 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-02-03 8:20 ` [PATCH 4/5] btrfs: raid56: Don't keep rbio for later steal Qu Wenruo
2017-03-17 4:44 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-17 5:28 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-18 2:03 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-20 6:21 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-20 20:23 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-21 0:44 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-21 2:08 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-21 2:23 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-21 5:45 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-21 7:00 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-02-03 8:20 ` [PATCH 5/5] btrfs: replace: Use ref counts to avoid destroying target device when canceled Qu Wenruo
2017-03-18 2:12 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-20 6:30 ` Qu Wenruo
2017-03-20 19:31 ` Liu Bo
2017-03-07 3:48 ` [PATCH 0/5] raid56: variant bug fixes Qu Wenruo
2017-03-14 13:47 ` David Sterba
2017-03-14 21:30 ` Goffredo Baroncelli
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