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From: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
To: qemu-devel@nongnu.org
Cc: berrange@redhat.com, thuth@redhat.com
Subject: [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 6/6] seccomp: adding documentation to new seccomp model
Date: Fri,  1 Sep 2017 12:58:18 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20170901105818.31956-7-otubo@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20170901105818.31956-1-otubo@redhat.com>

Adding new documentation under docs/ to describe every one and each new
option added by the refactoring patchset.

Signed-off-by: Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
---
 docs/seccomp.txt | 31 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 31 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 docs/seccomp.txt

diff --git a/docs/seccomp.txt b/docs/seccomp.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..a5eca85a9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/docs/seccomp.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+QEMU Seccomp system call filter
+===============================
+
+Starting from QEMU version 2.11, the seccomp filter does not work as a
+whitelist but as a blacklist instead. This method allows safer deploys since
+only the strictly forbidden system calls will be black-listed and the
+possibility of breaking any workload is close to zero.
+
+The default option (-sandbox on) has a slightly looser security though and the
+reason is that it shouldn't break any backwards compatibility with previous
+deploys and command lines already running. But if the intent is to have a
+better security from this version on, one should make use of the following
+additional options properly:
+
+* obsolete=allow|deny: It allows Qemu to run safely on old system that still
+  relies on old system calls.
+
+* elevateprivileges=allow|deny|children: It allows or denies Qemu process
+  to elevate its privileges by blacklisting all set*uid|gid system calls. The
+  'children' option sets the PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS to 1 which allows helpers
+  (forks and execs) to run unprivileged.
+
+* spawn=allow|deny: It blacklists fork and execve system calls, avoiding QEMU to
+  spawn new threads or processes.
+
+* resourcecontrol=allow|deny: It blacklists all process affinity and scheduler
+  priority system calls to avoid that the process can increase its amount of
+  allowed resource consumption.
+
+--
+Eduardo Otubo <otubo@redhat.com>
-- 
2.13.5

  parent reply	other threads:[~2017-09-01 10:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 15+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-09-01 10:58 [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 0/6] seccomp: feature refactoring Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-01 10:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 1/6] seccomp: changing from whitelist to blacklist Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-01 11:04   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-01 10:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 2/6] seccomp: add obsolete argument to command line Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-01 11:05   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-07  9:31     ` Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-07  9:59       ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-07  9:57   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-01 10:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 3/6] seccomp: add elevateprivileges " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-07  9:58   ` Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-01 10:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 4/6] seccomp: add spawn " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-01 10:58 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 5/6] seccomp: add resourcecontrol " Eduardo Otubo
2017-09-01 10:58 ` Eduardo Otubo [this message]
2017-09-01 11:03   ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 6/6] seccomp: adding documentation to new seccomp model Daniel P. Berrange
2017-09-01 11:32 ` [Qemu-devel] [PATCHv4 0/6] seccomp: feature refactoring no-reply

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