All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
To: lazytyped <lazytyped@gmail.com>
Cc: Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@gmail.com>,
	keescook@chromium.org, paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov,
	mhocko@kernel.org, corbet@lwn.net, labbott@redhat.com,
	linux-cc=david@fromorbit.com, --cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com,
	--security-module@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com,
	Igor Stoppa <igor.stoppa@huawei.com>,
	Carlos Chinea Perez <carlos.chinea.perez@huawei.com>,
	Remi Denis Courmont <remi.denis.courmont@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools
Date: Tue, 24 Apr 2018 07:44:04 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20180424144404.GF26636@bombadil.infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <eb23fbd9-1b9e-8633-b0eb-241b8ad24d95@gmail.com>

On Tue, Apr 24, 2018 at 02:32:36PM +0200, lazytyped wrote:
> On 4/24/18 1:50 PM, Matthew Wilcox wrote:
> > struct modifiable_data {
> > 	struct immutable_data *d;
> > 	...
> > };
> >
> > Then allocate a new pool, change d and destroy the old pool.
> 
> With the above, you have just shifted the target of the arbitrary write
> from the immutable data itself to the pointer to the immutable data, so
> got no security benefit.

There's always a pointer to the immutable data.  How do you currently
get to the selinux context?  file->f_security.  You can't make 'file'
immutable, so file->f_security is the target of the arbitrary write.
All you can do is make life harder, and reduce the size of the target.

> The goal of the patch is to reduce the window when stuff is writeable,
> so that an arbitrary write is likely to hit the time when data is read-only.

Yes, reducing the size of the target in time as well as bytes.  This patch
gives attackers a great roadmap (maybe even gadget) to unprotecting
a pool.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-04-24 14:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 38+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-04-23 12:54 [RFC PATCH v23 0/6] mm: security: write protection for dynamic data Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 1/9] struct page: add field for vm_struct Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 2/9] vmalloc: rename llist field in vmap_area Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 3/9] Protectable Memory Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 4/9] Documentation for Pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 5/9] Pmalloc selftest Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 6/9] lkdtm: crash on overwriting protected pmalloc var Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 7/9] Pmalloc Rare Write: modify selected pools Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 11:50   ` Matthew Wilcox
2018-04-24 12:32     ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 12:32       ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 12:39       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:39         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 14:44       ` Matthew Wilcox [this message]
2018-04-24 15:03         ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 15:03           ` lazytyped
2018-04-24 15:29           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-25 20:58         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-25 20:58           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:33     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 12:33       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 17:04         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:52     ` Correct way to access the physmap? - Was: " Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:52       ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 21:55       ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 21:55         ` Dave Hansen
2018-05-03 22:52         ` Igor Stoppa
2018-05-03 22:52           ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 8/9] Preliminary self test for pmalloc rare write Igor Stoppa
2018-04-23 12:54 ` [PATCH 9/9] Protect SELinux initialized state with pmalloc Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24  5:58   ` kbuild test robot
2018-04-24  5:58     ` kbuild test robot
2018-04-24 12:49   ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 12:49     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-04-24 14:35     ` Igor Stoppa
2018-04-24 14:35       ` Igor Stoppa

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20180424144404.GF26636@bombadil.infradead.org \
    --to=willy@infradead.org \
    --cc=--cc=rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com \
    --cc=--security-module@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=carlos.chinea.perez@huawei.com \
    --cc=corbet@lwn.net \
    --cc=igor.stoppa@gmail.com \
    --cc=igor.stoppa@huawei.com \
    --cc=keescook@chromium.org \
    --cc=kernel-hardening@lists.openwall.com \
    --cc=labbott@redhat.com \
    --cc=lazytyped@gmail.com \
    --cc=linux-cc=david@fromorbit.com \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-mm@kvack.org \
    --cc=mhocko@kernel.org \
    --cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
    --cc=remi.denis.courmont@huawei.com \
    --cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.