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From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
	Tetsuo Handa <penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <sds@tycho.nsa.gov>,
	"Schaufler, Casey" <casey.schaufler@intel.com>,
	LSM <linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	linux-doc@vger.kernel.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH security-next v4 27/32] LoadPin: Initialize as ordered LSM
Date: Mon,  1 Oct 2018 17:55:00 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20181002005505.6112-28-keescook@chromium.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20181002005505.6112-1-keescook@chromium.org>

This converts LoadPin from being a direct "minor" LSM into an ordered LSM.

Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
 include/linux/lsm_hooks.h  | 5 -----
 security/Kconfig           | 2 +-
 security/loadpin/loadpin.c | 8 +++++++-
 security/security.c        | 1 -
 4 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b026ea93ff01..098ccf2caa0e 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -2091,10 +2091,5 @@ extern void __init yama_add_hooks(void);
 #else
 static inline void __init yama_add_hooks(void) { }
 #endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN
-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void);
-#else
-static inline void loadpin_add_hooks(void) { };
-#endif
 
 #endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig
index c68520d97fd7..e59cb9296316 100644
--- a/security/Kconfig
+++ b/security/Kconfig
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ config LSM_ENABLE
 
 config LSM_ORDER
 	string "Default initialization order of builtin LSMs"
-	default "integrity"
+	default "loadpin,integrity"
 	help
 	  A comma-separated list of LSMs, in initialization order.
 	  Any LSMs left off this list will be link-order initialized
diff --git a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
index d8a68a6f6fef..dab42bfa1e4a 100644
--- a/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
+++ b/security/loadpin/loadpin.c
@@ -184,13 +184,19 @@ static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data),
 };
 
-void __init loadpin_add_hooks(void)
+static int __init loadpin_init(void)
 {
 	pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n",
 		enforcing ? "" : "not ");
 	security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin");
+	return 0;
 }
 
+DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = {
+	.name = "loadpin",
+	.init = loadpin_init,
+};
+
 /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */
 module_param(enforcing, int, 0);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforcing, "Enforce module/firmware pinning");
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 6fafad44b85e..6957f5f50483 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -297,7 +297,6 @@ int __init security_init(void)
 	 */
 	capability_add_hooks();
 	yama_add_hooks();
-	loadpin_add_hooks();
 
 	/* Load LSMs in specified order. */
 	prepare_lsm_order();
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2018-10-02  1:05 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 92+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2018-10-02  0:54 [PATCH security-next v4 00/32] LSM: Explict LSM ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 01/32] LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 02/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 03/32] LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 04/32] LSM: Remove initcall tracing Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:14   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 05/32] LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 06/32] vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:15   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 07/32] LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM() Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:16   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 08/32] LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 09/32] LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:17   ` James Morris
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 10/32] LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:20   ` James Morris
2018-10-02 21:38     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 11/32] LSM: Introduce LSM_FLAG_LEGACY_MAJOR Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 12/32] LSM: Provide separate ordered initialization Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 13/32] LoadPin: Rename "enable" to "enforce" Kees Cook
2018-10-02  1:06   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02  4:47     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 14/32] LSM: Plumb visibility into optional "enabled" state Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 15/32] LSM: Lift LSM selection out of individual LSMs Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 16/32] LSM: Prepare for arbitrary LSM enabling Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 17/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ENABLE Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 18/32] LSM: Introduce lsm.enable= and lsm.disable= Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 19/32] LSM: Prepare for reorganizing "security=" logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 20/32] LSM: Refactor "security=" in terms of enable/disable Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 21/32] LSM: Finalize centralized LSM enabling logic Kees Cook
2018-10-02  1:18   ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-02  4:49     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 22/32] apparmor: Remove boot parameter Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 23/32] selinux: " Kees Cook
2018-10-02 12:12   ` Paul Moore
2018-10-02 13:42     ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 14:44       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 14:58         ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 16:33           ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-02 16:54             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:33               ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-02 19:02                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 18:57               ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 19:17                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 19:47                   ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 20:29                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 21:11                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 22:06                   ` James Morris
2018-10-02 23:06                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:46                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 23:54                         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03  0:05                           ` John Johansen
2018-10-03  0:12                             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 13:15                               ` John Johansen
2018-10-03 13:39                           ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-03 17:26                             ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 19:43                               ` Stephen Smalley
2018-10-04  5:38                               ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:02                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-08 14:25                                 ` Paul Moore
2018-10-03 18:17                         ` James Morris
2018-10-03 18:20                           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 18:28                             ` James Morris
2018-10-03 20:10                               ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 20:36                                 ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:19                                   ` James Morris
2018-10-04  5:56                                   ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 16:18                                     ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04 17:40                                       ` Jordan Glover
2018-10-04 17:42                                         ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 21:34                                 ` James Morris
2018-10-03 23:55                                   ` Kees Cook
2018-10-03 23:59                                     ` Randy Dunlap
2018-10-04  0:03                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-04  6:22                                       ` John Johansen
2018-10-04  6:18                                     ` John Johansen
2018-10-04 17:49                                     ` James Morris
2018-10-05  0:05                                       ` Kees Cook
2018-10-05  4:58                                         ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:29                                           ` James Morris
2018-10-05 16:35                                           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02 23:28                     ` John Johansen
2018-10-02 16:34           ` Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 24/32] LSM: Build ordered list of ordered LSMs for init Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 25/32] LSM: Introduce CONFIG_LSM_ORDER Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:54 ` [PATCH security-next v4 26/32] LSM: Introduce "lsm.order=" for boottime ordering Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 28/32] Yama: Initialize as ordered LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 29/32] LSM: Introduce enum lsm_order Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 30/32] capability: Initialize as LSM_ORDER_FIRST Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 31/32] LSM: Separate idea of "major" LSM from "exclusive" LSM Kees Cook
2018-10-02  0:55 ` [PATCH security-next v4 32/32] LSM: Add all exclusive LSMs to ordered initialization Kees Cook

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