Re: [RFC PATCH V2 5/5] vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address

From: Jerome Glisse <jglisse@redhat.com>
To: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
Cc: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, virtualization@lists.linux-foundation.org,
	netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	peterx@redhat.com, linux-mm@kvack.org, aarcange@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH V2 5/5] vhost: access vq metadata through kernel virtual address
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 22:45:40 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190308034540.GC5562@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190307224143-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org>

On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:43:12PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:40:53PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 10:16:00PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:55:39PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 09:21:03PM -0500, Michael S. Tsirkin wrote:
> > > > > On Thu, Mar 07, 2019 at 02:17:20PM -0500, Jerome Glisse wrote:
> > > > > > > It's because of all these issues that I preferred just accessing
> > > > > > > userspace memory and handling faults. Unfortunately there does not
> > > > > > > appear to exist an API that whitelists a specific driver along the lines
> > > > > > > of "I checked this code for speculative info leaks, don't add barriers
> > > > > > > on data path please".
> > > > > > 
> > > > > > Maybe it would be better to explore adding such helper then remapping
> > > > > > page into kernel address space ?
> > > > > 
> > > > > I explored it a bit (see e.g. thread around: "__get_user slower than
> > > > > get_user") and I can tell you it's not trivial given the issue is around
> > > > > security.  So in practice it does not seem fair to keep a significant
> > > > > optimization out of kernel because *maybe* we can do it differently even
> > > > > better :)
> > > > 
> > > > Maybe a slightly different approach between this patchset and other
> > > > copy user API would work here. What you want really is something like
> > > > a temporary mlock on a range of memory so that it is safe for the
> > > > kernel to access range of userspace virtual address ie page are
> > > > present and with proper permission hence there can be no page fault
> > > > while you are accessing thing from kernel context.
> > > > 
> > > > So you can have like a range structure and mmu notifier. When you
> > > > lock the range you block mmu notifier to allow your code to work on
> > > > the userspace VA safely. Once you are done you unlock and let the
> > > > mmu notifier go on. It is pretty much exactly this patchset except
> > > > that you remove all the kernel vmap code. A nice thing about that
> > > > is that you do not need to worry about calling set page dirty it
> > > > will already be handle by the userspace VA pte. It also use less
> > > > memory than when you have kernel vmap.
> > > > 
> > > > This idea might be defeated by security feature where the kernel is
> > > > running in its own address space without the userspace address
> > > > space present.
> > > 
> > > Like smap?
> > 
> > Yes like smap but also other newer changes, with similar effect, since
> > the spectre drama.
> > 
> > Cheers,
> > Jérôme
> 
> Sorry do you mean meltdown and kpti?

Yes all that and similar thing. I do not have the full list in my head.

Cheers,
Jérôme