From: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
To: casey.schaufler@intel.com, jmorris@namei.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org, selinux@vger.kernel.org
Cc: casey@schaufler-ca.com, keescook@chromium.org,
john.johansen@canonical.com, penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp,
paul@paul-moore.com, sds@tycho.nsa.gov
Subject: [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match
Date: Tue, 9 Apr 2019 12:58:39 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190409195924.1509-15-casey@schaufler-ca.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190409195924.1509-1-casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Convert security_audit_rule_match to use the lsm_export structure
instead of a u32 secid. There is some scaffolding involved that
will be removed when the related data is updated.
Signed-off-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
---
include/linux/security.h | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--
kernel/auditfilter.c | 4 ++-
kernel/auditsc.c | 13 +++++---
security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 7 +++--
security/security.c | 48 ++---------------------------
5 files changed, 63 insertions(+), 55 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index fb19f41d630b..ea2c6c4e88db 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -93,6 +93,45 @@ static inline void lsm_export_init(struct lsm_export *l)
memset(l, 0, sizeof(*l));
}
+/**
+ * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
+ * @data: the containing data structure
+ * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
+ *
+ * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
+ */
+static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
+{
+ switch (data->flags) {
+ case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
+ *secid = data->selinux;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
+ *secid = data->smack;
+ break;
+ case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
+ *secid = data->apparmor;
+ break;
+ default:
+ pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
+ data->flags);
+ *secid = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+}
+
+static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
+{
+ data->selinux = secid;
+ data->smack = secid;
+ data->apparmor = secid;
+ data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
+ LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
+}
+
/* These functions are in security/commoncap.c */
extern int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *ns,
int cap, unsigned int opts);
@@ -1712,7 +1751,8 @@ static inline int security_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY
int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule);
int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule);
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule);
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule);
void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule);
#else
@@ -1728,8 +1768,8 @@ static inline int security_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
return 0;
}
-static inline int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op,
- void *lsmrule)
+static inline int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field,
+ u32 op, void *lsmrule)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/kernel/auditfilter.c b/kernel/auditfilter.c
index 63f8b3f26fab..15771102919d 100644
--- a/kernel/auditfilter.c
+++ b/kernel/auditfilter.c
@@ -1324,6 +1324,7 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i];
pid_t pid;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
switch (f->type) {
case AUDIT_PID:
@@ -1354,7 +1355,8 @@ int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype)
case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR:
if (f->lsm_rule) {
security_task_getsecid(current, &sid);
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule);
}
break;
diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c
index d1eab1d4a930..822ba35e4e64 100644
--- a/kernel/auditsc.c
+++ b/kernel/auditsc.c
@@ -445,6 +445,7 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
const struct cred *cred;
int i, need_sid = 1;
u32 sid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
unsigned int sessionid;
cred = rcu_dereference_check(tsk->cred, tsk == current || task_creation);
@@ -630,7 +631,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
security_task_getsecid(tsk, &sid);
need_sid = 0;
}
- result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, f->type,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, sid);
+ result = security_audit_rule_match(&le, f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
}
@@ -645,15 +647,17 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
if (f->lsm_rule) {
/* Find files that match */
if (name) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, name->osid);
result = security_audit_rule_match(
- name->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule);
} else if (ctx) {
list_for_each_entry(n, &ctx->names_list, list) {
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, n->osid);
if (security_audit_rule_match(
- n->osid,
+ &le,
f->type,
f->op,
f->lsm_rule)) {
@@ -665,7 +669,8 @@ static int audit_filter_rules(struct task_struct *tsk,
/* Find ipc objects that match */
if (!ctx || ctx->type != AUDIT_IPC)
break;
- if (security_audit_rule_match(ctx->ipc.osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, ctx->ipc.osid);
+ if (security_audit_rule_match(&le,
f->type, f->op,
f->lsm_rule))
++result;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index e0cc323f948f..090ef8ceb116 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -327,6 +327,7 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
int rc = 0;
u32 osid;
+ struct lsm_export le;
int retried = 0;
if (!rule->lsm[i].rule)
@@ -337,7 +338,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_OBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_OBJ_TYPE:
security_inode_getsecid(inode, &osid);
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(osid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, osid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
@@ -345,7 +347,8 @@ static bool ima_match_rules(struct ima_rule_entry *rule, struct inode *inode,
case LSM_SUBJ_USER:
case LSM_SUBJ_ROLE:
case LSM_SUBJ_TYPE:
- rc = security_filter_rule_match(secid,
+ lsm_export_to_all(&le, secid);
+ rc = security_filter_rule_match(&le,
rule->lsm[i].type,
Audit_equal,
rule->lsm[i].rule);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 1645ebe06715..1e819ecf26ff 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -712,45 +712,6 @@ int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
RC; \
})
-/**
- * lsm_export_secid - pull the useful secid out of a lsm_export
- * @data: the containing data structure
- * @secid: where to put the one that matters.
- *
- * Shim that will disappear when all lsm_export conversions are done.
- */
-static inline void lsm_export_secid(struct lsm_export *data, u32 *secid)
-{
- switch (data->flags) {
- case LSM_EXPORT_NONE:
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX:
- *secid = data->selinux;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_SMACK:
- *secid = data->smack;
- break;
- case LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR:
- *secid = data->apparmor;
- break;
- default:
- pr_warn("%s flags=0x%u - not a valid set\n", __func__,
- data->flags);
- *secid = 0;
- break;
- }
-}
-
-static inline void lsm_export_to_all(struct lsm_export *data, u32 secid)
-{
- data->selinux = secid;
- data->smack = secid;
- data->apparmor = secid;
- data->flags = LSM_EXPORT_SELINUX | LSM_EXPORT_SMACK |
- LSM_EXPORT_APPARMOR;
-}
-
/* Security operations */
int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
@@ -2482,14 +2443,11 @@ void security_audit_rule_free(void *lsmrule)
call_void_hook(audit_rule_free, lsmrule);
}
-int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule)
+int security_audit_rule_match(struct lsm_export *l, u32 field, u32 op,
+ void *lsmrule)
{
- int rc;
- struct lsm_export data = { .flags = LSM_EXPORT_NONE };
- rc = call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, &data, field, op, lsmrule);
- lsm_export_secid(&data, &secid);
- return rc;
+ return call_int_hook(audit_rule_match, 0, l, field, op, lsmrule);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
--
2.19.1
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-09 20:00 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-09 19:58 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 01/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the superblock Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 02/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the sock security Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 03/59] LSM: Infrastructure management of the key security blob Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 04/59] LSM: Create an lsm_export data structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 05/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the inode_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 06/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the cred_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 07/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the ipc_getsecid and task_getsecid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 08/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the kernel_ask_as hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 09/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the getpeersec_dgram hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 10/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the audit_rule_match hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 11/59] LSM: Fix logical operation in lsm_export checks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 12/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 13/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in the secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` Casey Schaufler [this message]
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 15/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_kernel_act_as Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 16/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_socket_getpeersec_dgram Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 17/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secctx_to_secid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 18/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_secid_to_secctx Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 19/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_ipc_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 20/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_task_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 21/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_inode_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 22/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_cred_getsecid Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 23/59] Audit: Change audit_sig_sid to audit_sig_lsm Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 24/59] Audit: Convert target_sid to an lsm_export structure Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 25/59] Audit: Convert osid " Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 26/59] IMA: Clean out lsm_export scaffolding Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 27/59] NET: Store LSM access information in the socket blob for UDS Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 28/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 29/59] NET: Remove scaffolding on new secmarks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 30/59] NET: Remove netfilter scaffolding for lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 31/59] Netlabel: Replace secids with lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 32/59] LSM: Remove lsm_export scaffolding functions Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 33/59] IMA: FIXUP prototype using lsm_export Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:58 ` [PATCH 34/59] Smack: Restore the release_secctx hook Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 35/59] AppArmor: Remove unnecessary hook stub Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 36/59] LSM: Limit calls to certain module hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 37/59] LSM: Create a data structure for a security context Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 38/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secid_to_secctx hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 39/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in secctx_to_secid hooks Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:59 ` [PATCH 40/59] LSM: Use lsm_context in inode_getsecctx hooks Casey Schaufler
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2019-04-09 21:38 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 21:39 ` [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:17 [PATCH 00/59] LSM: Module stacking for AppArmor Casey Schaufler
2019-04-09 19:18 ` [PATCH 14/59] LSM: Use lsm_export in security_audit_rule_match Casey Schaufler
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20190409195924.1509-15-casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--to=casey@schaufler-ca.com \
--cc=casey.schaufler@intel.com \
--cc=jmorris@namei.org \
--cc=john.johansen@canonical.com \
--cc=keescook@chromium.org \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=paul@paul-moore.com \
--cc=penguin-kernel@i-love.sakura.ne.jp \
--cc=sds@tycho.nsa.gov \
--cc=selinux@vger.kernel.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.