From: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
To: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
Alexandre Chartre <alexandre.chartre@oracle.com>,
Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>, Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>, Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
James Bottomley <James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com>,
Jonathan Adams <jwadams@google.com>,
Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>, Paul Turner <pjt@google.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
x86@kernel.org
Subject: Re: [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation
Date: Fri, 26 Apr 2019 09:49:56 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190426074956.GZ4038@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <1556228754-12996-3-git-send-email-rppt@linux.ibm.com>
On Fri, Apr 26, 2019 at 12:45:49AM +0300, Mike Rapoport wrote:
> The initial SCI implementation allows access to any kernel data, but it
> limits access to the code in the following way:
> * calls and jumps to known code symbols without offset are allowed
> * calls and jumps into a known symbol with offset are allowed only if that
> symbol was already accessed and the offset is in the next page
> * all other code access are blocked
So if you have a large function and an in-function jump skips a page
you're toast.
Why not employ the instruction decoder we have and unconditionally allow
all direct JMP/CALL but verify indirect JMP/CALL and RET ?
Anyway, I'm fearing the overhead of this one, this cannot be fast.
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2019-04-26 7:50 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 52+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-04-25 21:45 [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 1/7] x86/cpufeatures: add X86_FEATURE_SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 2/7] x86/sci: add core implementation for system call isolation Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 7:49 ` Peter Zijlstra [this message]
2019-04-28 5:45 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 8:31 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26 9:58 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-26 21:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 21:26 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-27 8:47 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-27 10:46 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-29 18:26 ` James Morris
2019-04-29 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 18:43 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-29 18:46 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30 5:03 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-04-30 9:38 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-30 11:05 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 11:35 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-05-02 11:35 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-05-02 15:20 ` Ingo Molnar
2019-05-02 21:07 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-05-02 21:07 ` Robert O'Callahan
2019-04-26 14:44 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 14:44 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 14:46 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-26 14:57 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 14:57 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 15:07 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 15:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 15:19 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 17:40 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 18:49 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 18:49 ` James Bottomley
2019-04-26 19:22 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 3/7] x86/entry/64: add infrastructure for switching to isolated syscall context Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 4/7] x86/sci: hook up isolated system call entry and exit Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 5/7] x86/mm/fault: hook up SCI verification Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 7:42 ` Peter Zijlstra
2019-04-28 5:47 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-30 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-30 16:44 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-05-01 5:39 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 6/7] security: enable system call isolation in kernel config Mike Rapoport
2019-04-25 21:45 ` [RFC PATCH 7/7] sci: add example system calls to exercse SCI Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 0:30 ` [RFC PATCH 0/7] x86: introduce system calls addess space isolation Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 0:30 ` Andy Lutomirski
2019-04-26 8:07 ` Jiri Kosina
2019-04-28 6:01 ` Mike Rapoport
2019-04-26 14:41 ` Dave Hansen
2019-04-28 6:08 ` Mike Rapoport
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