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From: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
To: jeffv@google.com
Cc: netdev@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 1/2] rtnetlink: gate MAC address with an LSM hook
Date: Thu, 22 Aug 2019 16:19:13 -0700 (PDT)	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20190822.161913.326746900077543343.davem@davemloft.net> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190821134547.96929-1-jeffv@google.com>

From: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>
Date: Wed, 21 Aug 2019 15:45:47 +0200

> MAC addresses are often considered sensitive because they are
> usually unique and can be used to identify/track a device or
> user [1].
> 
> The MAC address is accessible via the RTM_NEWLINK message type of a
> netlink route socket[2]. Ideally we could grant/deny access to the
> MAC address on a case-by-case basis without blocking the entire
> RTM_NEWLINK message type which contains a lot of other useful
> information. This can be achieved using a new LSM hook on the netlink
> message receive path. Using this new hook, individual LSMs can select
> which processes are allowed access to the real MAC, otherwise a
> default value of zeros is returned. Offloading access control
> decisions like this to an LSM is convenient because it preserves the
> status quo for most Linux users while giving the various LSMs
> flexibility to make finer grained decisions on access to sensitive
> data based on policy.
> 
> [1] https://adamdrake.com/mac-addresses-udids-and-privacy.html
> [2] Other access vectors like ioctl(SIOCGIFHWADDR) are already covered
> by existing LSM hooks.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Jeff Vander Stoep <jeffv@google.com>

I'm sure the MAC address will escape into userspace via other means,
dumping pieces of networking config in other contexts, etc.  I mean,
if I can get a link dump, I can dump the neighbor table as well.

I kinda think this is all very silly whack-a-mole kind of stuff, to
be quite honest.

And like others have said, tomorrow you'll be like "oh crap, we should
block X too" and we'll get another hook, another config knob, another
rulset update, etc.

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-08-22 23:19 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-08-21 13:45 [PATCH 1/2] rtnetlink: gate MAC address with an LSM hook Jeff Vander Stoep
2019-08-21 13:55 ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2019-08-21 14:34 ` Casey Schaufler
2019-08-21 14:52   ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2019-08-22 23:19 ` David Miller [this message]
2019-08-23 11:41   ` Jeffrey Vander Stoep
2019-08-23 21:41     ` David Miller
2019-08-27 20:47     ` Paul Moore
2019-08-29  7:45       ` Michal Kubecek
2019-08-30 21:46         ` Paul Moore
2019-08-23  4:24 ` kbuild test robot

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