From: Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>
To: linux-arm-kernel@lists.infradead.org
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>,
Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>,
Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>,
Ard Biesheuvel <ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org>,
Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>,
Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>,
Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>, Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Subject: [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/16] arm64: backport SSBS handling to v4.19-stable
Date: Fri, 4 Oct 2019 14:04:14 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20191004120430.11929-1-ard.biesheuvel@linaro.org> (raw)
This is a fairly mechnical backport to v4.19 of the changes needed to support
managing the SSBS state, which controls whether Speculative Store Bypass is
permitted.
I have included Jeremy's sysfs changes as well, since they are equally
suitable for stable and made for a much cleaner backport, so it made
little sense to handle them separately.
These patches are presented for review, and are not being cc'ed to the
-stable maintainers just yet.
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Marc Zyngier <maz@kernel.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Suzuki K Poulose <suzuki.poulose@arm.com>
Cc: Jeremy Linton <jeremy.linton@arm.com>
Cc: Andre Przywara <andre.przywara@arm.com>
Jeremy Linton (6):
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown
arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation
arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection
arm64: Always enable ssb vulnerability detection
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2
arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass
Marc Zyngier (2):
arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof
arm64: Force SSBS on context switch
Mark Rutland (1):
arm64: fix SSBS sanitization
Mian Yousaf Kaukab (2):
arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1
arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support
Will Deacon (5):
arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace
arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3
KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and
!vhe
arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP
arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 8 +-
Documentation/arm64/elf_hwcaps.txt | 4 +
arch/arm64/Kconfig | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpucaps.h | 3 +-
arch/arm64/include/asm/cpufeature.h | 4 -
arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_host.h | 11 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/processor.h | 17 ++
arch/arm64/include/asm/ptrace.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/asm/sysreg.h | 19 +-
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/hwcap.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/include/uapi/asm/ptrace.h | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/cpu_errata.c | 257 +++++++++++++-------
arch/arm64/kernel/cpufeature.c | 122 ++++++++--
arch/arm64/kernel/cpuinfo.c | 1 +
arch/arm64/kernel/process.c | 31 +++
arch/arm64/kernel/ptrace.c | 15 +-
arch/arm64/kernel/ssbd.c | 21 ++
arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/sysreg-sr.c | 11 +
18 files changed, 407 insertions(+), 121 deletions(-)
--
2.20.1
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next reply other threads:[~2019-10-04 12:08 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2019-10-04 12:04 Ard Biesheuvel [this message]
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 01/16] arm64: cpufeature: Detect SSBS and advertise to userspace Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 14:35 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-08 14:39 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 02/16] arm64: ssbd: Add support for PSTATE.SSBS rather than trapping to EL3 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 03/16] KVM: arm64: Set SCTLR_EL2.DSSBS if SSBD is forcefully disabled and !vhe Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 04/16] arm64: docs: Document SSBS HWCAP Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 05/16] arm64: fix SSBS sanitization Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 06/16] arm64: Add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v1 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 07/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for meltdown Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 08/16] arm64: enable generic CPU vulnerabilites support Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 09/16] arm64: Provide a command line to disable spectre_v2 mitigation Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 10/16] arm64: Advertise mitigation of Spectre-v2, or lack thereof Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 11/16] arm64: Always enable spectre-v2 vulnerability detection Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:05 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 12/16] arm64: Always enable ssb " Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 13/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for spectre-v2 Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 14/16] arm64: add sysfs vulnerability show for speculative store bypass Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 15/16] arm64: ssbs: Don't treat CPUs with SSBS as unaffected by SSB Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-04 12:04 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 16/16] arm64: Force SSBS on context switch Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 8:12 ` [RFC/RFT PATCH 00/16] arm64: backport SSBS handling to v4.19-stable Ard Biesheuvel
2019-10-08 15:09 ` Mark Rutland
2019-10-08 15:10 ` Ard Biesheuvel
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