All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
To: Xen-devel <xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org>
Cc: "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>, "Paul Durrant" <paul@xen.org>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Jan Beulich" <JBeulich@suse.com>,
	"Ian Jackson" <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>
Subject: [PATCH 9/9] x86/spec-ctrl: Hide RDRAND by default on IvyBridge
Date: Mon, 15 Jun 2020 15:15:32 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200615141532.1927-10-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200615141532.1927-1-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>

To combat the absence of mitigating microcode, arrange to hide RDRAND by
default on IvyBridge hardware.

Adjust the default feature derivation to hide RDRAND on IvyBridge client
parts, unless `cpuid=rdrand` is explicitly provided.

Adjust the restore path in xc_cpuid_apply_policy() to not hide RDRAND from VMs
which migrated from pre-4.14.

In all cases, individual guests can continue using RDRAND if explicitly
enabled in their config files.

Signed-off-by: Andrew Cooper <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>
---
CC: Ian Jackson <Ian.Jackson@citrix.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Jan Beulich <JBeulich@suse.com>
CC: Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
CC: Roger Pau Monné <roger.pau@citrix.com>
CC: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
---
 docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc           | 20 +++++++++++++++-----
 tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c                  |  3 +++
 xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c                        | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h |  2 +-
 4 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)

diff --git a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
index fde749c669..c8ebfaf813 100644
--- a/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
+++ b/docs/misc/xen-command-line.pandoc
@@ -512,11 +512,21 @@ The Speculation Control hardware features `srbds-ctrl`, `md-clear`, `ibrsb`,
 `stibp`, `ibpb`, `l1d-flush` and `ssbd` are used by default if available and
 applicable.  They can all be ignored.
 
-`rdrand` and `rdseed` can be ignored, as a mitigation to XSA-320 /
-CVE-2020-0543.  The RDRAND feature is disabled by default on certain AMD
-systems, due to possible malfunctions after ACPI S3 suspend/resume.  `rdrand`
-may be used in its positive form to override Xen's default behaviour on these
-systems, and make the feature fully usable.
+`rdrand` and `rdseed` have multiple interactions.
+
+*   For Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS, XSA-320, CVE-2020-0543),
+    RDRAND and RDSEED can be ignored.
+
+    Due to the absence microcode to address SRBDS on IvyBridge hardware, the
+    RDRAND feature is hidden by default for guests, unless `rdrand` is used in
+    its positive form.  Irrespective of the default setting here, VMs can use
+    RDRAND if explicitly enabled in guest config file, and VMs already using
+    RDRAND can migrate in.
+
+*   The RDRAND feature is disabled by default on AMD Fam15/16 systems, due to
+    possible malfunctions after ACPI S3 suspend/resume.  `rdrand` may be used
+    in its positive form to override Xen's default behaviour on these systems,
+    and make the feature fully usable.
 
 ### cpuid_mask_cpu
 > `= fam_0f_rev_[cdefg] | fam_10_rev_[bc] | fam_11_rev_b`
diff --git a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
index 5649913e69..877a5601f3 100644
--- a/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
+++ b/tools/libxc/xc_cpuid_x86.c
@@ -503,6 +503,9 @@ int xc_cpuid_apply_policy(xc_interface *xch, uint32_t domid, bool restore,
      */
     if ( restore )
     {
+        if ( test_bit(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, host_featureset) && !p->basic.rdrand )
+            p->basic.rdrand = true;
+
         if ( di.hvm )
         {
             p->feat.mpx = test_bit(X86_FEATURE_MPX, host_featureset);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
index f2fc0aa895..6a4a787b68 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpuid.c
@@ -340,6 +340,25 @@ static void __init calculate_host_policy(void)
     }
 }
 
+static void __init guest_common_default_feature_adjustments(uint32_t *fs)
+{
+    /*
+     * IvyBridge client parts suffer from leakage of RDRAND data due to SRBDS
+     * (XSA-320 / CVE-2020-0543), and won't be receiving microcode to
+     * compensate.
+     *
+     * Mitigate by hiding RDRAND from guests by default, unless explicitly
+     * overridden on the Xen command line (cpuid=rdrand).  Irrespective of the
+     * default setting, guests can use RDRAND if explicitly enabled
+     * (cpuid="host,rdrand=1") in the VM's config file, and VMs which were
+     * previously using RDRAND can migrate in.
+     */
+    if ( boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL &&
+         boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6 && boot_cpu_data.x86_model == 0x3a &&
+         cpu_has_rdrand && !is_forced_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND) )
+        __clear_bit(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND, fs);
+}
+
 static void __init guest_common_feature_adjustments(uint32_t *fs)
 {
     /* Unconditionally claim to be able to set the hypervisor bit. */
@@ -403,6 +422,7 @@ static void __init calculate_pv_def_policy(void)
         pv_featureset[i] &= pv_def_featuremask[i];
 
     guest_common_feature_adjustments(pv_featureset);
+    guest_common_default_feature_adjustments(pv_featureset);
 
     sanitise_featureset(pv_featureset);
     cpuid_featureset_to_policy(pv_featureset, p);
@@ -485,6 +505,7 @@ static void __init calculate_hvm_def_policy(void)
         hvm_featureset[i] &= hvm_featuremask[i];
 
     guest_common_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset);
+    guest_common_default_feature_adjustments(hvm_featureset);
 
     sanitise_featureset(hvm_featureset);
     cpuid_featureset_to_policy(hvm_featureset, p);
diff --git a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
index af1b8a96a6..fe7492a225 100644
--- a/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
+++ b/xen/include/public/arch-x86/cpufeatureset.h
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ XEN_CPUFEATURE(XSAVE,         1*32+26) /*A  XSAVE/XRSTOR/XSETBV/XGETBV */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(OSXSAVE,       1*32+27) /*!  OSXSAVE */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(AVX,           1*32+28) /*A  Advanced Vector Extensions */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(F16C,          1*32+29) /*A  Half-precision convert instruction */
-XEN_CPUFEATURE(RDRAND,        1*32+30) /*A  Digital Random Number Generator */
+XEN_CPUFEATURE(RDRAND,        1*32+30) /*!A Digital Random Number Generator */
 XEN_CPUFEATURE(HYPERVISOR,    1*32+31) /*!A Running under some hypervisor */
 
 /* AMD-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x80000001.edx, word 2 */
-- 
2.11.0



  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-06-15 14:16 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 40+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-06-15 14:15 [PATCH for-4.14 0/9] XSA-320 follow for IvyBridge Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 1/9] tools/libx[cl]: Introduce struct xc_xend_cpuid for xc_cpuid_set() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:51   ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 2/9] tests/cpu-policy: Confirm that CPUID serialisation is sorted Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:52   ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 15:00     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 15:34       ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 16:12         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16  6:51           ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16  9:01   ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 3/9] tools/libx[cl]: Move processing loop down into xc_cpuid_set() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:54   ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-16  9:16   ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 15:58     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 4/9] tools/libx[cl]: Merge xc_cpuid_set() into xc_cpuid_apply_policy() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:55   ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 5/9] tools/libx[cl]: Plumb bool restore down " Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:55   ` Ian Jackson
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 6/9] x86/gen-cpuid: Distinguish default vs max in feature annotations Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 7/9] x86/hvm: Disable MPX by default Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16  9:33   ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:15     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 10:32       ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:16         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 11:24           ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:28             ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 11:41               ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:47                 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` [PATCH 8/9] x86/cpuid: Introduce missing feature adjustment in calculate_pv_def_policy() Andrew Cooper
2020-06-16  9:40   ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:17     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 14:15 ` Andrew Cooper [this message]
2020-06-16 10:00   ` [PATCH 9/9] x86/spec-ctrl: Hide RDRAND by default on IvyBridge Jan Beulich
2020-06-16 16:26     ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-17 10:39       ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-17 11:21         ` Andrew Cooper
2020-06-15 17:04 ` [PATCH for-4.14 0/9] XSA-320 follow for IvyBridge Paul Durrant
2020-06-17 12:46   ` Paul Durrant
2020-06-18  7:18 ` Jan Beulich
2020-06-18  9:37   ` Andrew Cooper

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=20200615141532.1927-10-andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --to=andrew.cooper3@citrix.com \
    --cc=Ian.Jackson@citrix.com \
    --cc=JBeulich@suse.com \
    --cc=paul@xen.org \
    --cc=roger.pau@citrix.com \
    --cc=wl@xen.org \
    --cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.