From: Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>
To: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org, linux-sgx@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>,
akpm@linux-foundation.org, andriy.shevchenko@linux.intel.com,
asapek@google.com, bp@alien8.de, cedric.xing@intel.com,
chenalexchen@google.com, conradparker@google.com,
cyhanish@google.com, dave.hansen@intel.com,
haitao.huang@intel.com, josh@joshtriplett.org,
kai.huang@intel.com, kai.svahn@intel.com, kmoy@google.com,
ludloff@google.com, luto@kernel.org, nhorman@redhat.com,
npmccallum@redhat.com, puiterwijk@redhat.com,
rientjes@google.com, tglx@linutronix.de, yaozhangx@google.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v36 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals
Date: Tue, 28 Jul 2020 23:35:11 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200728213511.GB13081@duo.ucw.cz> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200716135303.276442-24-jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
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Hi!
> +CPUs starting from Icelake use Total Memory Encryption (TME) in the place of
> +MEE. TME throws away the Merkle tree, which means losing integrity and
> +anti-replay protection but also enables variable size memory pools for EPC.
> +Using this attack for benefit would require an interposer on the system bus.
It is not exactly clear what "this attack" means.
(And it would be cool to explain against what SGX is protecting. I
thought it was malicious RAM, but apparently not on Icelake+).
> +Backing storage
> +===============
> +
> +Backing storage is shared and not accounted. It is implemented as a private
> +shmem file. Providing a backing storage in some form from user space is not
> +possible - accounting would go to invalid state as reclaimed pages would get
> +accounted to the processes of which behalf the kernel happened to be acting on.
"of which behalf" -- I can't parse that?
> +Access control
> +==============
> +
> +`mmap()` permissions are capped by the enclave permissions. A direct
> +consequence of this is that all the pages for an address range must be added
> +before `mmap()` can be applied. Effectively an enclave page with minimum
> +permission in the address range sets the permission cap for the mapping
~~~~~~~~~~
permissions?
Pavel
--
(english) http://www.livejournal.com/~pavelmachek
(cesky, pictures) http://atrey.karlin.mff.cuni.cz/~pavel/picture/horses/blog.html
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-07-28 21:35 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 80+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-07-16 13:52 [PATCH v36 00/24] Intel SGX foundations Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 01/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX hardware bits Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:13 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 02/24] x86/cpufeatures: x86/msr: Add Intel SGX Launch Control " Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:14 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 03/24] x86/mm: x86/sgx: Signal SIGSEGV with PF_SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:16 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-20 15:31 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-21 17:35 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 04/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX microarchitectural data structures Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:14 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 05/24] x86/sgx: Add wrappers for ENCLS leaf functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-07 9:37 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 06/24] x86/cpu/intel: Detect SGX support Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:17 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 07/24] x86/cpu/intel: Add nosgx kernel parameter Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:18 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 08/24] x86/sgx: Initialize metadata for Enclave Page Cache (EPC) sections Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:27 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 09/24] x86/sgx: Add __sgx_alloc_epc_page() and sgx_free_epc_page() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:29 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 10/24] mm: Add vm_ops->mprotect() Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:35 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 11/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX enclave driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 13:59 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-25 16:44 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-26 13:46 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 12/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_CREATE Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 15:40 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-26 14:52 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-27 13:24 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-27 16:15 ` Borislav Petkov
2020-08-28 23:39 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-29 0:21 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-09-01 16:41 ` Haitao Huang
2020-09-04 11:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 13/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_ADD_PAGES Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 16:29 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 14/24] x86/sgx: Add SGX_IOC_ENCLAVE_INIT Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 16:40 ` Darren Kenny
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 15/24] x86/sgx: Allow a limited use of ATTRIBUTE.PROVISIONKEY for attestation Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 17:00 ` Darren Kenny
2020-08-18 13:30 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 16/24] x86/sgx: Add a page reclaimer Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 17/24] x86/sgx: ptrace() support for the SGX driver Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 18/24] x86/vdso: Add support for exception fixup in vDSO functions Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 19/24] x86/fault: Add helper function to sanitize error code Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:52 ` [PATCH v36 20/24] x86/traps: Attempt to fixup exceptions in vDSO before signaling Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 21/24] x86/vdso: Implement a vDSO for Intel SGX enclave call Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-06 14:55 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-10 22:23 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-11 7:16 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-08-11 14:54 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-18 14:52 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-18 15:06 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-18 15:15 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-18 16:43 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-19 13:33 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-19 14:00 ` Jethro Beekman
2020-08-19 21:23 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-10 23:08 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-10 23:48 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-11 0:52 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-11 15:16 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-13 19:38 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-17 13:12 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-17 15:01 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-18 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-20 0:19 ` Andy Lutomirski
2020-08-18 14:26 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 22/24] selftests/x86: Add a selftest for SGX Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-08-27 4:47 ` Nathaniel McCallum
2020-08-27 15:20 ` Sean Christopherson
2020-08-28 23:27 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 23/24] docs: x86/sgx: Document SGX micro architecture and kernel internals Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-28 21:35 ` Pavel Machek [this message]
2020-08-06 10:21 ` Dr. Greg
2020-08-08 22:18 ` Pavel Machek
2020-08-19 20:55 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2020-07-16 13:53 ` [PATCH v36 24/24] x86/sgx: Update MAINTAINERS Jarkko Sakkinen
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