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From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
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	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Vedvyas Shanbhogue <vedvyas.shanbhogue@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v13 16/26] mm: Add guard pages around a shadow stack.
Date: Fri, 25 Sep 2020 07:56:39 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20200925145649.5438-17-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20200925145649.5438-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

INCSSP(Q/D) increments shadow stack pointer and 'pops and discards' the
first and the last elements in the range, effectively touches those memory
areas.

The maximum moving distance by INCSSPQ is 255 * 8 = 2040 bytes and
255 * 4 = 1020 bytes by INCSSPD.  Both ranges are far from PAGE_SIZE.
Thus, putting a gap page on both ends of a shadow stack prevents INCSSP,
CALL, and RET from going beyond.

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
---
v10:
- Define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP.

 arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h | 10 ++++++++++
 include/linux/mm.h               | 24 ++++++++++++++++++++----
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
index 97143d87994c..01acbd63cad8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor.h
@@ -840,6 +840,16 @@ static inline void spin_lock_prefetch(const void *x)
 #define STACK_TOP		TASK_SIZE_LOW
 #define STACK_TOP_MAX		TASK_SIZE_MAX
 
+/*
+ * Shadow stack pointer is moved by CALL, JMP, and INCSSP(Q/D).  INCSSPQ
+ * moves shadow stack pointer up to 255 * 8 = ~2 KB (~1KB for INCSSPD) and
+ * touches the first and the last element in the range, which triggers a
+ * page fault if the range is not in a shadow stack.  Because of this,
+ * creating 4-KB guard pages around a shadow stack prevents these
+ * instructions from going beyond.
+ */
+#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP PAGE_SIZE
+
 #define INIT_THREAD  {						\
 	.addr_limit		= KERNEL_DS,			\
 }
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index db76ced54f9a..e09d13699bbe 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -2615,6 +2615,10 @@ extern vm_fault_t filemap_page_mkwrite(struct vm_fault *vmf);
 int __must_check write_one_page(struct page *page);
 void task_dirty_inc(struct task_struct *tsk);
 
+#ifndef ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP
+#define ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP 0
+#endif
+
 extern unsigned long stack_guard_gap;
 /* Generic expand stack which grows the stack according to GROWS{UP,DOWN} */
 extern int expand_stack(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long address);
@@ -2647,9 +2651,15 @@ static inline struct vm_area_struct * find_vma_intersection(struct mm_struct * m
 static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_start = vma->vm_start;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN) {
-		vm_start -= stack_guard_gap;
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		gap = ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
+
+	if (gap != 0) {
+		vm_start -= gap;
 		if (vm_start > vma->vm_start)
 			vm_start = 0;
 	}
@@ -2659,9 +2669,15 @@ static inline unsigned long vm_start_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 static inline unsigned long vm_end_gap(struct vm_area_struct *vma)
 {
 	unsigned long vm_end = vma->vm_end;
+	unsigned long gap = 0;
+
+	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP)
+		gap = stack_guard_gap;
+	else if (vma->vm_flags & VM_SHSTK)
+		gap = ARCH_SHADOW_STACK_GUARD_GAP;
 
-	if (vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSUP) {
-		vm_end += stack_guard_gap;
+	if (gap != 0) {
+		vm_end += gap;
 		if (vm_end < vma->vm_end)
 			vm_end = -PAGE_SIZE;
 	}
-- 
2.21.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2020-09-25 15:26 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 33+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2020-09-25 14:56 [PATCH v13 00/26] Control-flow Enforcement: Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 01/26] Documentation/x86: Add CET description Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 02/26] x86/cpufeatures: Add CET CPU feature flags for Control-flow Enforcement Technology (CET) Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 03/26] x86/fpu/xstate: Introduce CET MSR XSAVES supervisor states Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 04/26] x86/cet: Add control-protection fault handler Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 05/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add Kconfig option for user-mode Shadow Stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 06/26] x86/mm: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_HW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 07/26] x86/mm: Remove _PAGE_DIRTY_HW from kernel RO pages Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 08/26] x86/mm: Introduce _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 09/26] drm/i915/gvt: Change _PAGE_DIRTY to _PAGE_DIRTY_BITS Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 10/26] x86/mm: Update pte_modify for _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 11/26] x86/mm: Update ptep_set_wrprotect() and pmdp_set_wrprotect() for transition from _PAGE_DIRTY_HW to _PAGE_COW Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 12/26] mm: Introduce VM_SHSTK for shadow stack memory Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 13/26] x86/mm: Shadow Stack page fault error checking Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 14/26] x86/mm: Update maybe_mkwrite() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 15/26] mm: Fixup places that call pte_mkwrite() directly Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` Yu-cheng Yu [this message]
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 17/26] mm/mmap: Add shadow stack pages to memory accounting Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 18/26] mm: Update can_follow_write_pte() for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 19/26] mm: Re-introduce do_mmap_pgoff() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-10-02  2:06   ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02  2:06     ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 15:58     ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-10-02 22:52       ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 22:52         ` Peter Collingbourne
2020-10-02 22:57         ` Yu, Yu-cheng
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 20/26] x86/cet/shstk: User-mode shadow stack support Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 21/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle signals for shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 22/26] binfmt_elf: Define GNU_PROPERTY_X86_FEATURE_1_AND properties Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 23/26] ELF: Introduce arch_setup_elf_property() Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 24/26] x86/cet/shstk: Handle thread shadow stack Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 25/26] x86/cet/shstk: Add arch_prctl functions for " Yu-cheng Yu
2020-09-25 14:56 ` [PATCH v13 26/26] mm: Introduce PROT_SHSTK " Yu-cheng Yu

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