From: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>, Ian Jackson <iwj@xenproject.org>,
Wei Liu <wl@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] tools/xenstore: drop creation of read-only socket in xenstored
Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 17:41:41 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20201002154141.11677-6-jgross@suse.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20201002154141.11677-1-jgross@suse.com>
With xs_daemon_open_readonly() now no longer using the read-only socket
the creation of that socket can be dropped.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Gross <jgross@suse.com>
---
tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c | 55 +++++++------------------------
tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h | 3 --
tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c | 4 +--
tools/xenstore/xs_lib.c | 8 +----
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 56 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
index 9700772d40..b4be374d3f 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.c
@@ -71,7 +71,6 @@ static unsigned int current_array_size;
static unsigned int nr_fds;
static int sock = -1;
-static int ro_sock = -1;
static bool verbose = false;
LIST_HEAD(connections);
@@ -311,8 +310,7 @@ fail:
return -1;
}
-static void initialize_fds(int *p_sock_pollfd_idx, int *p_ro_sock_pollfd_idx,
- int *ptimeout)
+static void initialize_fds(int *p_sock_pollfd_idx, int *ptimeout)
{
struct connection *conn;
struct wrl_timestampt now;
@@ -325,8 +323,6 @@ static void initialize_fds(int *p_sock_pollfd_idx, int *p_ro_sock_pollfd_idx,
if (sock != -1)
*p_sock_pollfd_idx = set_fd(sock, POLLIN|POLLPRI);
- if (ro_sock != -1)
- *p_ro_sock_pollfd_idx = set_fd(ro_sock, POLLIN|POLLPRI);
if (reopen_log_pipe[0] != -1)
reopen_log_pipe0_pollfd_idx =
set_fd(reopen_log_pipe[0], POLLIN|POLLPRI);
@@ -472,9 +468,6 @@ static enum xs_perm_type perm_for_conn(struct connection *conn,
unsigned int i;
enum xs_perm_type mask = XS_PERM_READ|XS_PERM_WRITE|XS_PERM_OWNER;
- if (!conn->can_write)
- mask &= ~XS_PERM_WRITE;
-
/* Owners and tools get it all... */
if (!domain_is_unprivileged(conn) || perms[0].id == conn->id
|| (conn->target && perms[0].id == conn->target->id))
@@ -1422,7 +1415,6 @@ struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read)
new->pollfd_idx = -1;
new->write = write;
new->read = read;
- new->can_write = true;
new->transaction_started = 0;
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->out_list);
INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new->watches);
@@ -1435,7 +1427,7 @@ struct connection *new_connection(connwritefn_t *write, connreadfn_t *read)
}
#ifdef NO_SOCKETS
-static void accept_connection(int sock, bool canwrite)
+static void accept_connection(int sock)
{
}
#else
@@ -1477,7 +1469,7 @@ static int readfd(struct connection *conn, void *data, unsigned int len)
return rc;
}
-static void accept_connection(int sock, bool canwrite)
+static void accept_connection(int sock)
{
int fd;
struct connection *conn;
@@ -1487,10 +1479,9 @@ static void accept_connection(int sock, bool canwrite)
return;
conn = new_connection(writefd, readfd);
- if (conn) {
+ if (conn)
conn->fd = fd;
- conn->can_write = canwrite;
- } else
+ else
close(fd);
}
#endif
@@ -1794,28 +1785,21 @@ static void destroy_fds(void)
{
if (sock >= 0)
close(sock);
- if (ro_sock >= 0)
- close(ro_sock);
}
static void init_sockets(void)
{
struct sockaddr_un addr;
const char *soc_str = xs_daemon_socket();
- const char *soc_str_ro = xs_daemon_socket_ro();
/* Create sockets for them to listen to. */
atexit(destroy_fds);
sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
if (sock < 0)
barf_perror("Could not create socket");
- ro_sock = socket(PF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (ro_sock < 0)
- barf_perror("Could not create socket");
/* FIXME: Be more sophisticated, don't mug running daemon. */
unlink(soc_str);
- unlink(soc_str_ro);
addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
@@ -1825,17 +1809,10 @@ static void init_sockets(void)
if (bind(sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
barf_perror("Could not bind socket to %s", soc_str);
- if(strlen(soc_str_ro) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
- barf_perror("socket string '%s' too long", soc_str_ro);
- strcpy(addr.sun_path, soc_str_ro);
- if (bind(ro_sock, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, sizeof(addr)) != 0)
- barf_perror("Could not bind socket to %s", soc_str_ro);
-
- if (chmod(soc_str, 0600) != 0
- || chmod(soc_str_ro, 0660) != 0)
+ if (chmod(soc_str, 0600) != 0)
barf_perror("Could not chmod sockets");
- if (listen(sock, 1) != 0 || listen(ro_sock, 1) != 0)
+ if (listen(sock, 1) != 0)
barf_perror("Could not listen on sockets");
}
#endif
@@ -1893,7 +1870,7 @@ int priv_domid = 0;
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
int opt;
- int sock_pollfd_idx = -1, ro_sock_pollfd_idx = -1;
+ int sock_pollfd_idx = -1;
bool dofork = true;
bool outputpid = false;
bool no_domain_init = false;
@@ -2010,7 +1987,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
tracefile = talloc_strdup(NULL, tracefile);
/* Get ready to listen to the tools. */
- initialize_fds(&sock_pollfd_idx, &ro_sock_pollfd_idx, &timeout);
+ initialize_fds(&sock_pollfd_idx, &timeout);
/* Tell the kernel we're up and running. */
xenbus_notify_running();
@@ -2051,21 +2028,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
barf_perror("sock poll failed");
break;
} else if (fds[sock_pollfd_idx].revents & POLLIN) {
- accept_connection(sock, true);
+ accept_connection(sock);
sock_pollfd_idx = -1;
}
}
- if (ro_sock_pollfd_idx != -1) {
- if (fds[ro_sock_pollfd_idx].revents & ~POLLIN) {
- barf_perror("ro sock poll failed");
- break;
- } else if (fds[ro_sock_pollfd_idx].revents & POLLIN) {
- accept_connection(ro_sock, false);
- ro_sock_pollfd_idx = -1;
- }
- }
-
if (xce_pollfd_idx != -1) {
if (fds[xce_pollfd_idx].revents & ~POLLIN) {
barf_perror("xce_handle poll failed");
@@ -2128,7 +2095,7 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
}
}
- initialize_fds(&sock_pollfd_idx, &ro_sock_pollfd_idx, &timeout);
+ initialize_fds(&sock_pollfd_idx, &timeout);
}
}
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
index c4c32bc88f..1df6ad94ab 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_core.h
@@ -77,9 +77,6 @@ struct connection
/* Who am I? 0 for socket connections. */
unsigned int id;
- /* Is this a read-only connection? */
- bool can_write;
-
/* Buffered incoming data. */
struct buffered_data *in;
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
index 0d5495745b..a2f144f6dd 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xenstored_domain.c
@@ -372,7 +372,7 @@ int do_introduce(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) < ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
return EINVAL;
- if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn) || !conn->can_write)
+ if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn))
return EACCES;
domid = atoi(vec[0]);
@@ -438,7 +438,7 @@ int do_set_target(struct connection *conn, struct buffered_data *in)
if (get_strings(in, vec, ARRAY_SIZE(vec)) < ARRAY_SIZE(vec))
return EINVAL;
- if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn) || !conn->can_write)
+ if (domain_is_unprivileged(conn))
return EACCES;
domid = atoi(vec[0]);
diff --git a/tools/xenstore/xs_lib.c b/tools/xenstore/xs_lib.c
index 3e43f8809d..9f1dc6d559 100644
--- a/tools/xenstore/xs_lib.c
+++ b/tools/xenstore/xs_lib.c
@@ -63,13 +63,7 @@ const char *xs_daemon_socket(void)
const char *xs_daemon_socket_ro(void)
{
- static char buf[PATH_MAX];
- const char *s = xs_daemon_path();
- if (s == NULL)
- return NULL;
- if (snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s_ro", s) >= PATH_MAX)
- return NULL;
- return buf;
+ return xs_daemon_path();
}
const char *xs_domain_dev(void)
--
2.26.2
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2020-10-02 15:42 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 12+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2020-10-02 15:41 [PATCH 0/5] tools/xenstore: remove read-only socket Juergen Gross
2020-10-02 15:41 ` [PATCH 1/5] tools/xenstore: remove socket-only option from xenstore client Juergen Gross
2020-10-02 15:41 ` [PATCH 2/5] tools/libs/store: ignore XS_OPEN_SOCKETONLY flag Juergen Gross
2020-10-02 15:41 ` [PATCH 3/5] tools/libs/store: drop read-only functionality Juergen Gross
2020-10-07 10:54 ` Wei Liu
2020-10-07 10:57 ` Jürgen Groß
2020-10-07 11:50 ` Andrew Cooper
2020-10-07 12:45 ` Jürgen Groß
2020-10-07 13:54 ` Wei Liu
2020-10-02 15:41 ` [PATCH 4/5] tools: drop all deprecated usages of xs_*_open() and friends in tools Juergen Gross
2020-10-02 15:41 ` Juergen Gross [this message]
2020-10-08 12:54 ` [PATCH 0/5] tools/xenstore: remove read-only socket Wei Liu
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=20201002154141.11677-6-jgross@suse.com \
--to=jgross@suse.com \
--cc=iwj@xenproject.org \
--cc=wl@xen.org \
--cc=xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.