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From: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
	stable@vger.kernel.org, Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
Subject: [PATCH 4.19 01/11] KVM: SVM: Fix off-by-one indexing when nullifying last used SEV VMCB
Date: Fri, 13 Aug 2021 17:07:08 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210813150520.119905151@linuxfoundation.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210813150520.072304554@linuxfoundation.org>

From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

[ Upstream commit 179c6c27bf487273652efc99acd3ba512a23c137 ]

Use the raw ASID, not ASID-1, when nullifying the last used VMCB when
freeing an SEV ASID.  The consumer, pre_sev_run(), indexes the array by
the raw ASID, thus KVM could get a false negative when checking for a
different VMCB if KVM manages to reallocate the same ASID+VMCB combo for
a new VM.

Note, this cannot cause a functional issue _in the current code_, as
pre_sev_run() also checks which pCPU last did VMRUN for the vCPU, and
last_vmentry_cpu is initialized to -1 during vCPU creation, i.e. is
guaranteed to mismatch on the first VMRUN.  However, prior to commit
8a14fe4f0c54 ("kvm: x86: Move last_cpu into kvm_vcpu_arch as
last_vmentry_cpu"), SVM tracked pCPU on its own and zero-initialized the
last_cpu variable.  Thus it's theoretically possible that older versions
of KVM could miss a TLB flush if the first VMRUN is on pCPU0 and the ASID
and VMCB exactly match those of a prior VM.

Fixes: 70cd94e60c73 ("KVM: SVM: VMRUN should use associated ASID when SEV is enabled")
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index bd463d684237..72d729f34437 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -1780,7 +1780,7 @@ static void __sev_asid_free(int asid)
 
 	for_each_possible_cpu(cpu) {
 		sd = per_cpu(svm_data, cpu);
-		sd->sev_vmcbs[pos] = NULL;
+		sd->sev_vmcbs[asid] = NULL;
 	}
 }
 
-- 
2.30.2




  reply	other threads:[~2021-08-13 15:15 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 18+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-13 15:07 [PATCH 4.19 00/11] 4.19.204-rc1 review Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman [this message]
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 02/11] tracing: Reject string operand in the histogram expression Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 03/11] bpf: Inherit expanded/patched seen count from old aux data Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 04/11] bpf: Do not mark insn as seen under speculative path verification Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 05/11] bpf: Fix leakage under speculation on mispredicted branches Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 06/11] bpf, selftests: Adjust few selftest outcomes wrt unreachable code Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 07/11] KVM: X86: MMU: Use the correct inherited permissions to get shadow page Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 08/11] USB:ehci:fix Kunpeng920 ehci hardware problem Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 09/11] ppp: Fix generating ppp unit id when ifname is not specified Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 10/11] ovl: prevent private clone if bind mount is not allowed Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 15:07 ` [PATCH 4.19 11/11] net: xilinx_emaclite: Do not print real IOMEM pointer Greg Kroah-Hartman
2021-08-13 23:25 ` [PATCH 4.19 00/11] 4.19.204-rc1 review Shuah Khan
2021-08-14 11:09 ` Sudip Mukherjee
2021-08-14 11:42 ` Naresh Kamboju
2021-08-14 18:15 ` Guenter Roeck
2021-08-15 19:50 ` Pavel Machek
2021-08-16  3:09 ` Samuel Zou

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