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From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org, linux-efi@vger.kernel.org,
	platform-driver-x86@vger.kernel.org, linux-coco@lists.linux.dev,
	linux-mm@kvack.org
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>, Joerg Roedel <jroedel@suse.de>,
	Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>,
	Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>,
	Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>,
	Vitaly Kuznetsov <vkuznets@redhat.com>,
	Wanpeng Li <wanpengli@tencent.com>,
	Jim Mattson <jmattson@google.com>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Sergio Lopez <slp@redhat.com>, Peter Gonda <pgonda@google.com>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Srinivas Pandruvada <srinivas.pandruvada@linux.intel.com>,
	David Rientjes <rientjes@google.com>,
	Dov Murik <dovmurik@linux.ibm.com>,
	Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum <tobin@ibm.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Michael Roth <michael.roth@amd.com>,
	Vlastimil Babka <vbabka@suse.cz>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill@shutemov.name>,
	Andi Kleen <ak@linux.intel.com>,
	tony.luck@intel.com, marcorr@google.com,
	sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@linux.intel.com,
	Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH Part1 v5 07/38] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT
Date: Fri, 20 Aug 2021 10:19:02 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210820151933.22401-8-brijesh.singh@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210820151933.22401-1-brijesh.singh@amd.com>

Version 2 of GHCB specification introduced advertisement of a features
that are supported by the hypervisor. Add support to query the HV
features on boot.

Version 2 of GHCB specification adds several new NAEs, most of them are
optional except the hypervisor feature. Now that hypervisor feature NAE
is implemented, so bump the GHCB maximum support protocol version.

Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h |  2 ++
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h  |  3 +++
 arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h         |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h    |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c       | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++++
 5 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
index df14291d65de..fb857f2e72cb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mem_encrypt.h
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ enum sev_feature_type {
 
 extern u64 sme_me_mask;
 extern u64 sev_status;
+extern u64 sev_hv_features;
 
 void sme_encrypt_execute(unsigned long encrypted_kernel_vaddr,
 			 unsigned long decrypted_kernel_vaddr,
@@ -66,6 +67,7 @@ bool sev_feature_enabled(unsigned int feature_type);
 #else	/* !CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT */
 
 #define sme_me_mask	0ULL
+#define sev_hv_features	0ULL
 
 static inline void __init sme_early_encrypt(resource_size_t paddr,
 					    unsigned long size) { }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
index 3278ee578937..891569c07ed7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev-common.h
@@ -60,6 +60,9 @@
 /* GHCB Hypervisor Feature Request/Response */
 #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_REQ		0x080
 #define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP		0x081
+#define GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP_VAL(v)			\
+	/* GHCBData[63:12] */				\
+	(((u64)(v) & GENMASK_ULL(63, 12)) >> 12)
 
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REQ		0x100
 #define GHCB_MSR_TERM_REASON_SET_POS	12
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
index 7ec91b1359df..134a7c9d91b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/sev.h
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 #include <asm/sev-common.h>
 
 #define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MIN	1ULL
-#define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX	1ULL
+#define GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX	2ULL
 #define GHCB_DEFAULT_USAGE	0ULL
 
 #define	VMGEXIT()			{ asm volatile("rep; vmmcall\n\r"); }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
index efa969325ede..b0ad00f4c1e1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/svm.h
@@ -108,6 +108,7 @@
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE		0x80000005
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_SET_AP_JUMP_TABLE		0
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_GET_AP_JUMP_TABLE		1
+#define SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES			0x8000fffd
 #define SVM_VMGEXIT_UNSUPPORTED_EVENT		0x8000ffff
 
 /* Exit code reserved for hypervisor/software use */
@@ -218,6 +219,7 @@
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_NMI_COMPLETE,	"vmgexit_nmi_complete" }, \
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_HLT_LOOP,	"vmgexit_ap_hlt_loop" }, \
 	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_AP_JUMP_TABLE,	"vmgexit_ap_jump_table" }, \
+	{ SVM_VMGEXIT_HV_FEATURES,	"vmgexit_hypervisor_feature" }, \
 	{ SVM_EXIT_ERR,         "invalid_guest_state" }
 
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
index 58a6efb1f327..8bd67087d79e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/sev-shared.c
@@ -23,6 +23,9 @@
  */
 static u16 __ro_after_init ghcb_version;
 
+/* Bitmap of SEV features supported by the hypervisor */
+u64 __ro_after_init sev_hv_features = 0;
+
 static bool __init sev_es_check_cpu_features(void)
 {
 	if (!has_cpuflag(X86_FEATURE_RDRAND)) {
@@ -48,6 +51,22 @@ static void __noreturn sev_es_terminate(unsigned int set, unsigned int reason)
 		asm volatile("hlt\n" : : : "memory");
 }
 
+static bool get_hv_features(void)
+{
+	u64 val;
+
+	sev_es_wr_ghcb_msr(GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_REQ);
+	VMGEXIT();
+
+	val = sev_es_rd_ghcb_msr();
+	if (GHCB_RESP_CODE(val) != GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP)
+		return false;
+
+	sev_hv_features = GHCB_MSR_HV_FT_RESP_VAL(val);
+
+	return true;
+}
+
 static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
 {
 	u64 val;
@@ -66,6 +85,10 @@ static bool sev_es_negotiate_protocol(void)
 
 	ghcb_version = min_t(size_t, GHCB_MSR_PROTO_MAX(val), GHCB_PROTOCOL_MAX);
 
+	/* The hypervisor features are available from version 2 onward. */
+	if (ghcb_version >= 2 && !get_hv_features())
+		return false;
+
 	return true;
 }
 
-- 
2.17.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2021-08-20 15:20 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 126+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-08-20 15:18 [PATCH Part1 v5 00/38] Add AMD Secure Nested Paging (SEV-SNP) Guest Support Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 01/38] x86/mm: Add sev_feature_enabled() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 02/38] x86/sev: Shorten GHCB terminate macro names Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 03/38] x86/sev: Get rid of excessive use of defines Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:18 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 04/38] x86/head64: Carve out the guest encryption postprocessing into a helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 05/38] x86/sev: Define the Linux specific guest termination reasons Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 06/38] x86/sev: Save the negotiated GHCB version Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` Brijesh Singh [this message]
2021-08-23  9:47   ` [PATCH Part1 v5 07/38] x86/sev: Add support for hypervisor feature VMGEXIT Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:25     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 18:34       ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 08/38] x86/sev: Check SEV-SNP features support Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 09/38] x86/sev: Add a helper for the PVALIDATE instruction Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 10/38] x86/sev: Check the vmpl level Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 11/38] x86/compressed: Add helper for validating pages in the decompression stage Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 14:16   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:55     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 12/38] x86/compressed: Register GHCB memory when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 13/38] x86/sev: " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 17:35   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 18:56     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-23 19:45       ` [PATCH] x86/sev: Remove do_early_exception() forward declarations Borislav Petkov
2021-08-23 20:06         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 14/38] x86/sev: Add helper for validating pages in early enc attribute changes Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 15/38] x86/kernel: Make the bss.decrypted section shared in RMP table Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 16/38] x86/kernel: Validate rom memory before accessing when SEV-SNP is active Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 17/38] x86/mm: Add support to validate memory when changing C-bit Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 11:06   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 13:54     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 14:00       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 17:09   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 18/38] KVM: SVM: Define sev_features and vmpl field in the VMSA Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 19/38] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the SEV-ES save area Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 20/38] KVM: SVM: Create a separate mapping for the GHCB " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 21/38] KVM: SVM: Update the SEV-ES save area mapping Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 22/38] x86/sev: Use SEV-SNP AP creation to start secondary CPUs Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 23/38] x86/head/64: set up a startup %gs for stack protector Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 14:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 15:18     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-25 16:29       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 13:38         ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31  8:03           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-31 23:30             ` Michael Roth
2021-08-25 15:07   ` Joerg Roedel
2021-08-25 17:07     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 24/38] x86/sev: move MSR-based VMGEXITs for CPUID to helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 25/38] KVM: x86: move lookup of indexed CPUID leafs " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 26/38] x86/compressed/acpi: move EFI config table access to common code Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-25 17:14     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 27/38] x86/boot: Add Confidential Computing type to setup_data Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 28/38] x86/compressed/64: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handler Brijesh Singh
2021-08-25 19:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 16:46     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31 10:04       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-01  1:03         ` Michael Roth
2021-09-02 10:53           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 29/38] x86/boot: add a pointer to Confidential Computing blob in bootparams Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 13:51   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:48     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 30/38] x86/compressed/64: store Confidential Computing blob address " Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 14:15   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 19:09     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31 10:26       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 31/38] x86/compressed/64: add identity mapping for Confidential Computing blob Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 14:43   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 32/38] x86/sev: enable SEV-SNP-validated CPUID in #VC handlers Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 15:18   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 15:47     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 16:56       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:39       ` Michael Roth
2021-08-27 18:32     ` Michael Roth
2021-08-30 16:03       ` Michael Roth
2021-08-31 16:22       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-01  1:16         ` Michael Roth
2021-09-02 11:05           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 33/38] x86/sev: Provide support for SNP guest request NAEs Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 17:44   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:13       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 18:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:38           ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 19:57       ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-27 20:17         ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-27 20:31           ` Tom Lendacky
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 34/38] x86/sev: Add snp_msg_seqno() helper Brijesh Singh
2021-08-27 18:41   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-30 15:07     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 11:26       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-02 15:27         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 20:46   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:13     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 14:54   ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 14:54     ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 15:26     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 15:43       ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 15:43         ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 16:17         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-09 16:21           ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 16:21             ` Peter Gonda
2021-09-09 19:26             ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 35/38] x86/sev: Register SNP guest request platform device Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 11:37   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 16:03     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-02 16:40   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-02 19:58     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-03  8:15       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-03 12:08         ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 36/38] virt: Add SEV-SNP guest driver Brijesh Singh
2021-09-06 17:38   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-07 13:35     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-08 13:44       ` Borislav Petkov
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 37/38] virt: sevguest: Add support to derive key Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 18:59   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:04     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01  5:33       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-08 14:00   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-08 21:44     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-08-20 15:19 ` [PATCH Part1 v5 38/38] virt: sevguest: Add support to get extended report Brijesh Singh
2021-08-31 20:22   ` Dov Murik
2021-08-31 21:11     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-01  8:32       ` Dov Murik
2021-09-08 17:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2021-09-15 11:46     ` Brijesh Singh
2021-09-15 10:02   ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2021-09-15 11:53     ` Brijesh Singh

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