[PATCH v30 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack - Yu-cheng Yu

From: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
To: x86@kernel.org, "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
	Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
	Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-mm@kvack.org, linux-arch@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-api@vger.kernel.org, Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>,
	Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>,
	Balbir Singh <bsingharora@gmail.com>,
	Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>,
	Cyrill Gorcunov <gorcunov@gmail.com>,
	Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
	Eugene Syromiatnikov <esyr@redhat.com>,
	Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"H.J. Lu" <hjl.tools@gmail.com>, Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>,
	Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>,
	Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>,
	Mike Kravetz <mike.kravetz@oracle.com>,
	Nadav Amit <nadav.amit@gmail.com>,
	Oleg Nesterov <oleg@redhat.com>, Pavel Machek <pavel@ucw.cz>,
	Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
	Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>,
	"Ravi V. Shankar" <ravi.v.shankar@intel.com>,
	Dave Martin <Dave.Martin@arm.com>,
	Weijiang Yang <weijiang.yang@intel.com>,
	Pengfei Xu <pengfei.xu@intel.com>,
	Haitao Huang <haitao.huang@intel.com>,
	Rick P Edgecombe <rick.p.edgecombe@intel.com>
Cc: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>,
	"Kirill A . Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Subject: [PATCH v30 32/32] mm: Introduce PROT_SHADOW_STACK for shadow stack
Date: Mon, 30 Aug 2021 11:15:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210830181528.1569-33-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210830181528.1569-1-yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>

There are three possible options to create a shadow stack allocation API:
an arch_prctl, a new syscall, or adding PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap() and
mprotect().  Each has its advantages and compromises.

An arch_prctl() is the least intrusive.  However, the existing x86
arch_prctl() takes only two parameters.  Multiple parameters must be
passed in a memory buffer.  There is a proposal to pass more parameters in
registers [1], but no active discussion on that.

A new syscall minimizes compatibility issues and offers an extensible frame
work to other architectures, but this will likely result in some overlap of
mmap()/mprotect().

The introduction of PROT_SHADOW_STACK to mmap()/mprotect() takes advantage
of existing APIs.  The x86-specific PROT_SHADOW_STACK is translated to
VM_SHADOW_STACK and a shadow stack mapping is created without reinventing
the wheel.  There are potential pitfalls though.  The most obvious one
would be using this as a bypass to shadow stack protection.  However, the
attacker would have to get to the syscall first.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20200828121624.108243-1-hjl.tools@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Yu-cheng Yu <yu-cheng.yu@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h      | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h |  2 ++
 include/linux/mm.h               |  1 +
 3 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
index 629f6c81263a..b77933923b9a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mman.h
@@ -20,11 +20,69 @@
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT2 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |	\
 		((vm_flags) & VM_PKEY_BIT3 ? _PAGE_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
 
-#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (		\
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (			\
 		((key) & 0x1 ? VM_PKEY_BIT0 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x2 ? VM_PKEY_BIT1 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x4 ? VM_PKEY_BIT2 : 0) |      \
 		((key) & 0x8 ? VM_PKEY_BIT3 : 0))
+#else
+#define pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, key) (0)
 #endif
 
+static inline unsigned long arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(unsigned long prot,
+						   unsigned long pkey)
+{
+	unsigned long vm_prot_bits = pkey_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey);
+
+	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK)
+		vm_prot_bits |= VM_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+	return vm_prot_bits;
+}
+
+#define arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey) arch_calc_vm_prot_bits(prot, pkey)
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK
+static inline bool arch_validate_prot(unsigned long prot, unsigned long addr)
+{
+	unsigned long valid = PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE | PROT_EXEC | PROT_SEM |
+			      PROT_SHADOW_STACK;
+
+	if (prot & ~valid)
+		return false;
+
+	if (prot & PROT_SHADOW_STACK) {
+		if (!current->thread.shstk.size)
+			return false;
+
+		/*
+		 * A shadow stack mapping is indirectly writable by only
+		 * the CALL and WRUSS instructions, but not other write
+		 * instructions).  PROT_SHADOW_STACK and PROT_WRITE are
+		 * mutually exclusive.
+		 */
+		if (prot & PROT_WRITE)
+			return false;
+	}
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_prot arch_validate_prot
+
+static inline bool arch_validate_flags(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long vm_flags)
+{
+	/*
+	 * Shadow stack must be anonymous and not shared.
+	 */
+	if ((vm_flags & VM_SHADOW_STACK) && !vma_is_anonymous(vma))
+		return false;
+
+	return true;
+}
+
+#define arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags) arch_validate_flags(vma, vm_flags)
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_X86_SHADOW_STACK */
+
 #endif /* _ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
index f28fa4acaeaf..4c36b263cf0a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/mman.h
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
 
 #define MAP_32BIT	0x40		/* only give out 32bit addresses */
 
+#define PROT_SHADOW_STACK	0x10	/* shadow stack pages */
+
 #include <asm-generic/mman.h>
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_ASM_X86_MMAN_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/mm.h b/include/linux/mm.h
index 07e642af59d3..041e7e8ff702 100644
--- a/include/linux/mm.h
+++ b/include/linux/mm.h
@@ -349,6 +349,7 @@ extern unsigned int kobjsize(const void *objp);
 
 #if defined(CONFIG_X86)
 # define VM_PAT		VM_ARCH_1	/* PAT reserves whole VMA at once (x86) */
+# define VM_ARCH_CLEAR	VM_SHADOW_STACK
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PPC)
 # define VM_SAO		VM_ARCH_1	/* Strong Access Ordering (powerpc) */
 #elif defined(CONFIG_PARISC)
-- 
2.21.0

