From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
To: Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
Cc: keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
zohar@linux.ibm.com, dhowells@redhat.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net,
jarkko@kernel.org, jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com,
keescook@chromium.org, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org,
torvalds@linux-foundation.org, scott.branden@broadcom.com,
weiyongjun1@huawei.com, nayna@linux.ibm.com, ebiggers@google.com,
ardb@kernel.org, nramas@linux.microsoft.com, lszubowi@redhat.com,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com, konrad.wilk@oracle.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2021 18:19:22 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20210916221922.xjplaobua2iss2bn@redhat.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20210914211416.34096-13-eric.snowberg@oracle.com>
On Tue, Sep 14, 2021 at 05:14:15PM -0400, Eric Snowberg wrote:
> +/*
> + * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT UEFI variable to see if we should trust
> + * the mok keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable
> + * does not exist. If it does not exist, mok keys should not be trusted
> + * within the machine keyring.
> + */
> +static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
> +{
> + efi_status_t status;
> + unsigned int mtrust = 0;
> + unsigned long size = sizeof(mtrust);
> + efi_guid_t guid = EFI_SHIM_LOCK_GUID;
> + u32 attr;
> +
> + status = efi.get_variable(L"MokListTrustedRT", &guid, &attr, &size, &mtrust);
This should use efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT") instead,
similar to how load_moklist_certs() does. It's a *much* more reliable
mechanism. We don't even need to fall back to checking for the
variable, as any version of shim that populates this supports the config
table method.
--
Peter
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2021-09-16 22:19 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 34+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2021-09-14 21:14 [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 01/13] integrity: Introduce a Linux keyring called machine Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 02/13] integrity: Do not allow machine keyring updates following init Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 03/13] KEYS: CA link restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 4:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 4:21 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 5:46 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 5:46 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 20:05 ` Nayna
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 04/13] integrity: restrict INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE to restrict_link_by_ca Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 05/13] integrity: add new keyring handler for mok keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 3:16 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-16 3:16 ` kernel test robot
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 06/13] KEYS: Rename get_builtin_and_secondary_restriction Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 07/13] KEYS: add a reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 08/13] KEYS: Introduce link restriction for machine keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 09/13] KEYS: integrity: change link restriction to trust the machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 10/13] KEYS: link secondary_trusted_keys to machine trusted keys Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 11/13] integrity: store reference to machine keyring Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 12/13] integrity: Trust MOK keys if MokListTrustedRT found Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 22:19 ` Peter Jones [this message]
2021-09-17 2:00 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 15:03 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 16:06 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-14 21:14 ` [PATCH v6 13/13] integrity: Only use machine keyring when uefi_check_trust_mok_keys is true Eric Snowberg
2021-09-15 17:57 ` [PATCH v6 00/13] Enroll kernel keys thru MOK Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-15 21:28 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-16 15:15 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 22:14 ` Peter Jones
2021-09-17 1:58 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-21 21:03 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2021-09-16 20:03 ` Nayna
2021-09-17 1:55 ` Eric Snowberg
2021-09-17 18:02 ` Mimi Zohar
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