From: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: "Mimi Zohar" <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
"John Johansen" <john.johansen@canonical.com>,
"Paul Moore" <paul@paul-moore.com>,
"James Morris" <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
"Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>,
"KP Singh" <kpsingh@kernel.org>,
"Casey Schaufler" <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
linux-hardening@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 6/9] fs: Introduce file_to_perms() helper
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 11:25:02 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <202210181124.73B5B7ECCE@keescook> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20221018141037.zzpfjzutqbutbpiy@wittgenstein>
On Tue, Oct 18, 2022 at 04:10:37PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 13, 2022 at 03:36:51PM -0700, Kees Cook wrote:
> > Extract the logic used by LSM file hooks to be able to reconstruct the
> > access mode permissions from an open.
> >
> > Cc: John Johansen <john.johansen@canonical.com>
> > Cc: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
> > Cc: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
> > Cc: "Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>
> > Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
> > ---
> > include/linux/fs.h | 22 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> > security/apparmor/include/file.h | 18 ++++--------------
> > 2 files changed, 26 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/include/linux/fs.h b/include/linux/fs.h
> > index 9eced4cc286e..814f10d4132e 100644
> > --- a/include/linux/fs.h
> > +++ b/include/linux/fs.h
> > @@ -993,6 +993,28 @@ static inline struct file *get_file(struct file *f)
> > #define get_file_rcu(x) atomic_long_inc_not_zero(&(x)->f_count)
> > #define file_count(x) atomic_long_read(&(x)->f_count)
> >
> > +/* Calculate the basic MAY_* flags needed for a given file. */
> > +static inline u8 file_to_perms(struct file *file)
>
> As long as there aren't multiple users of this and especially none in
> the vfs proper please don't move this into fs.h. It's overloaded enough
> as it is and we have vague plans on splitting it further in the future.
Sure -- this can live in a security .h file somewhere.
--
Kees Cook
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2022-10-18 18:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 46+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2022-10-13 22:36 [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 1/9] integrity: Prepare for having "ima" and "evm" available in "integrity" LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-14 14:40 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-14 17:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-17 9:26 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-17 18:11 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 18:33 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 19:13 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 22:37 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:28 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 2/9] security: Move trivial IMA hooks into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-19 14:34 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 18:59 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 20:45 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-19 23:41 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 12:17 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-21 14:53 ` Dr. Greg
2022-10-21 15:09 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 3/9] ima: Move xattr " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:07 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-19 13:24 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 4/9] ima: Move ima_file_free() " Kees Cook
2022-10-18 15:02 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 15:32 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:29 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-19 6:55 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-20 15:47 ` Paul Moore
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 5/9] LSM: Introduce inode_post_setattr hook Kees Cook
2022-10-17 10:16 ` kernel test robot
2022-10-17 11:27 ` kernel test robot
2022-10-18 14:50 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 6/9] fs: Introduce file_to_perms() helper Kees Cook
2022-10-18 14:10 ` Christian Brauner
2022-10-18 18:25 ` Kees Cook [this message]
2022-10-20 17:29 ` Casey Schaufler
2022-10-20 23:04 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 7/9] ima: Move ima_file_check() into LSM Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 8/9] integrity: Move trivial hooks " Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:36 ` [PATCH 9/9] integrity: Move integrity_inode_get() out of global header Kees Cook
2022-10-13 22:47 ` [PATCH 0/9] integrity: Move hooks into LSM Paul Moore
2022-10-14 1:16 ` Mimi Zohar
2022-10-18 15:31 ` Mickaël Salaün
2022-10-18 15:38 ` Roberto Sassu
2022-10-18 18:31 ` Kees Cook
2022-10-20 17:36 ` Casey Schaufler
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