From: "Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>
To: Lukas Wunner <lukas@wunner.de>
Cc: Samuel Ortiz <sameo@rivosinc.com>,
"Dr. David Alan Gilbert" <dgilbert@redhat.com>,
Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>,
"Reshetova, Elena" <elena.reshetova@intel.com>,
"Shishkin, Alexander" <alexander.shishkin@intel.com>,
"Shutemov, Kirill" <kirill.shutemov@intel.com>,
"Kuppuswamy,
Sathyanarayanan" <sathyanarayanan.kuppuswamy@intel.com>,
"Kleen, Andi" <andi.kleen@intel.com>,
"Hansen, Dave" <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Mika Westerberg <mika.westerberg@linux.intel.com>,
Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>,
"Poimboe, Josh" <jpoimboe@redhat.com>,
"aarcange@redhat.com" <aarcange@redhat.com>,
Cfir Cohen <cfir@google.com>, Marc Orr <marcorr@google.com>,
"jbachmann@google.com" <jbachmann@google.com>,
"pgonda@google.com" <pgonda@google.com>,
"keescook@chromium.org" <keescook@chromium.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
Michael Kelley <mikelley@microsoft.com>,
"Lange, Jon" <jlange@microsoft.com>,
"linux-coco@lists.linux.dev" <linux-coco@lists.linux.dev>,
Linux Kernel Mailing List <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>,
Jonathan Cameron <Jonathan.Cameron@huawei.com>,
linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing
Date: Thu, 26 Jan 2023 11:25:21 -0500 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230126112058-mutt-send-email-mst@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230126154449.GB4188@wunner.de>
On Thu, Jan 26, 2023 at 04:44:49PM +0100, Lukas Wunner wrote:
> Obviously the host can DoS guest access to the device by modifying
> exchanged messages, but there are much simpler ways for it to
> do that, say, by clearing Bus Master Enable or Memory Space Enable
> bits in the Command Register.
There's a single key per guest though, isn't it? Also used
for regular memory?
--
MST
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2023-01-26 16:25 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 102+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2023-01-25 12:28 Linux guest kernel threat model for Confidential Computing Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 12:43 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 13:42 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 14:13 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-25 15:29 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 14:23 ` Richard Weinberger
2023-01-26 14:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 15:13 ` Richard Weinberger
2023-01-26 15:22 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 15:55 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-27 9:02 ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-26 15:43 ` Daniel P. Berrangé
2023-01-27 11:23 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-30 11:30 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-25 14:22 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 14:30 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-25 14:57 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 15:16 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-01-25 15:45 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-25 16:02 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-25 17:47 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-25 15:50 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-25 18:47 ` Jiri Kosina
2023-01-26 9:19 ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-25 21:53 ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-26 10:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 11:24 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-26 13:32 ` Samuel Ortiz
[not found] ` <CAGXJix9-cXNW7EwJf0PVzj_Qmt5fmQvBX1KvXfRX5NAeEpnMvw@mail.gmail.com>
2023-01-26 10:58 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-26 13:15 ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-26 16:07 ` Jonathan Cameron
2023-01-27 7:02 ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-26 15:44 ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-26 16:25 ` Michael S. Tsirkin [this message]
2023-01-26 21:41 ` Lukas Wunner
2023-01-27 7:17 ` Samuel Ortiz
2023-01-25 20:13 ` Jiri Kosina
2023-01-26 13:13 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 15:29 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-25 16:40 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-01-26 8:08 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 11:19 ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 11:29 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 12:30 ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 13:28 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 13:50 ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 20:54 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-01-27 19:24 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-30 7:42 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-30 12:40 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-31 11:31 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 13:28 ` James Bottomley
2023-01-31 15:14 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-31 17:39 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 10:52 ` Christophe de Dinechin Dupont de Dinechin
2023-02-01 11:01 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 13:15 ` Christophe de Dinechin Dupont de Dinechin
2023-02-01 16:02 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-01 17:13 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-06 18:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-02 3:24 ` Jason Wang
2023-02-01 10:24 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-31 16:34 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 17:49 ` James Bottomley
2023-02-02 14:51 ` Jeremi Piotrowski
2023-02-03 14:05 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27 9:32 ` Jörg Rödel
2023-01-26 13:58 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 17:48 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-26 18:06 ` Leon Romanovsky
2023-01-26 18:14 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-01-26 16:29 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27 8:52 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27 10:04 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27 12:25 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-27 14:32 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-27 20:51 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-01-30 11:36 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-01-30 12:00 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2023-01-30 15:14 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-01-31 10:06 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-01-31 16:52 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-02 11:31 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-07 0:27 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-02-07 6:03 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-07 19:53 ` Carlos Bilbao
2023-02-07 21:55 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 1:51 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-02-08 9:31 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 10:44 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-08 10:58 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 16:19 ` Christophe de Dinechin
2023-02-08 17:29 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 18:02 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-08 18:58 ` Thomas Gleixner
2023-02-09 19:48 ` Dr. David Alan Gilbert
2023-02-08 13:00 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-08 13:42 ` Theodore Ts'o
2023-02-08 7:19 ` Greg Kroah-Hartman
2023-02-08 10:16 ` Reshetova, Elena
2023-02-08 13:15 ` Michael S. Tsirkin
2023-02-09 14:30 ` Reshetova, Elena
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