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From: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>
To: xen-devel@lists.xenproject.org
Cc: "Jan Beulich" <jbeulich@suse.com>,
	"Andrew Cooper" <andrew.cooper3@citrix.com>,
	"Roger Pau Monné" <roger.pau@citrix.com>, "Wei Liu" <wl@xen.org>
Subject: [PATCH 2/4] x86/svm: split svm_intercept_msr() into svm_{set,clear}_msr_intercept()
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 09:56:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230227075652.3782973-3-burzalodowa@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230227075652.3782973-1-burzalodowa@gmail.com>

This change aims to render the control interface of MSR intercepts identical
between SVM and VMX code, so that the control of the MSR intercept in common
code can be done through an hvm_funcs callback.

Create two new functions:
- svm_set_msr_intercept(), enables interception of read/write accesses to the
  corresponding MSR, by setting the corresponding read/write bits in the MSRPM
  based on the flags
- svm_clear_msr_intercept(), disables interception of read/write accesses to
  the corresponding MSR, by clearing the corresponding read/write bits in the
  MSRPM based on the flags

More specifically:
- if flag is MSR_R, the functions {set,clear} the MSRPM bit that controls read
  access to the MSR
- if flag is MSR_W, the functions {set,clear} the MSRPM bit that controls write
  access to the MSR
- if flag is MSR_RW, the functions {set,clear} both MSRPM bits

Place the definitions of the flags in asm/hvm/hvm.h because there is the
intention to be used by VMX code as well.

Remove svm_intercept_msr() and MSR_INTERCEPT_* definitions, and use the new
functions and flags instead.

No functional change intended.

Signed-off-by: Xenia Ragiadakou <burzalodowa@gmail.com>
---
 xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_amd.c             |  9 +--
 xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c              | 80 ++++++++++++++++---------
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/hvm.h      |  4 ++
 xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h | 13 ++--
 4 files changed, 66 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-)

diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_amd.c b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_amd.c
index 9df739aa3f..ed6706959e 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_amd.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/cpu/vpmu_amd.c
@@ -165,8 +165,9 @@ static void amd_vpmu_set_msr_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
 
     for ( i = 0; i < num_counters; i++ )
     {
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, counters[i], MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, ctrls[i], MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, counters[i], MSR_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, ctrls[i], MSR_W);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, ctrls[i], MSR_R);
     }
 
     msr_bitmap_on(vpmu);
@@ -179,8 +180,8 @@ static void amd_vpmu_unset_msr_bitmap(struct vcpu *v)
 
     for ( i = 0; i < num_counters; i++ )
     {
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, counters[i], MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, ctrls[i], MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, counters[i], MSR_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, ctrls[i], MSR_RW);
     }
 
     msr_bitmap_off(vpmu);
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
index a43bcf2e92..eb144272f4 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/hvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -288,23 +288,34 @@ svm_msrbit(unsigned long *msr_bitmap, uint32_t msr)
     return msr_bit;
 }
 
-void svm_intercept_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int flags)
+void svm_set_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int flags)
 {
-    unsigned long *msr_bit;
-    const struct domain *d = v->domain;
+    unsigned long *msr_bit = svm_msrbit(v->arch.hvm.svm.msrpm, msr);
+
+    if ( msr_bit == NULL )
+        return;
 
-    msr_bit = svm_msrbit(v->arch.hvm.svm.msrpm, msr);
-    BUG_ON(msr_bit == NULL);
     msr &= 0x1fff;
 
-    if ( flags & MSR_INTERCEPT_READ )
+    if ( flags & MSR_R )
          __set_bit(msr * 2, msr_bit);
-    else if ( !monitored_msr(d, msr) )
-         __clear_bit(msr * 2, msr_bit);
-
-    if ( flags & MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE )
+    if ( flags & MSR_W )
         __set_bit(msr * 2 + 1, msr_bit);
-    else if ( !monitored_msr(d, msr) )
+}
+
+void svm_clear_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int flags)
+{
+    unsigned long *msr_bit = svm_msrbit(v->arch.hvm.svm.msrpm, msr);
+
+    if ( msr_bit == NULL )
+        return;
+
+    if ( monitored_msr(v->domain, msr) )
+        return;
+
+    if ( flags & MSR_R )
+        __clear_bit(msr * 2, msr_bit);
+    if ( flags & MSR_W )
         __clear_bit(msr * 2 + 1, msr_bit);
 }
 
@@ -312,8 +323,10 @@ static void cf_check svm_enable_msr_interception(struct domain *d, uint32_t msr)
 {
     struct vcpu *v;
 
-    for_each_vcpu ( d, v )
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, msr, MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE);
+    for_each_vcpu ( d, v ) {
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, msr, MSR_W);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, msr, MSR_R);
+    }
 }
 
 static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
@@ -330,10 +343,10 @@ static void svm_save_dr(struct vcpu *v)
 
     if ( v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.dbext )
     {
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
 
         rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[0]);
         rdmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[1]);
@@ -361,10 +374,10 @@ static void __restore_debug_registers(struct vmcb_struct *vmcb, struct vcpu *v)
 
     if ( v->domain->arch.cpuid->extd.dbext )
     {
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
-        svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR2_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_AMD64_DR3_ADDRESS_MASK, MSR_RW);
 
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR0_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[0]);
         wrmsrl(MSR_AMD64_DR1_ADDRESS_MASK, v->arch.msrs->dr_mask[1]);
@@ -595,22 +608,31 @@ static void cf_check svm_cpuid_policy_changed(struct vcpu *v)
     vmcb_set_exception_intercepts(vmcb, bitmap);
 
     /* Give access to MSR_SPEC_CTRL if the guest has been told about it. */
-    svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL,
-                      cp->extd.ibrs ? MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+    if ( cp->extd.ibrs )
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_RW);
+    else
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_RW);
 
     /*
      * Always trap write accesses to VIRT_SPEC_CTRL in order to cache the guest
      * setting and avoid having to perform a rdmsr on vmexit to get the guest
      * setting even if VIRT_SSBD is offered to Xen itself.
      */
-    svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL,
-                      cp->extd.virt_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd &&
-                      !cpu_has_amd_ssbd ?
-                      MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+    if ( cp->extd.virt_ssbd && cpu_has_virt_ssbd && !cpu_has_amd_ssbd )
+    {
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_W);
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_R);
+    }
+    else
+    {
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_RW);
+    }
 
     /* Give access to MSR_PRED_CMD if the guest has been told about it. */
-    svm_intercept_msr(v, MSR_PRED_CMD,
-                      cp->extd.ibpb ? MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE : MSR_INTERCEPT_RW);
+    if ( cp->extd.ibpb )
+        svm_clear_msr_intercept(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_RW);
+    else
+        svm_set_msr_intercept(v, MSR_VIRT_SPEC_CTRL, MSR_RW);
 }
 
 void svm_sync_vmcb(struct vcpu *v, enum vmcb_sync_state new_state)
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/hvm.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/hvm.h
index 43d3fc2498..f853e2f3e8 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/hvm.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/hvm.h
@@ -261,6 +261,10 @@ extern struct hvm_function_table hvm_funcs;
 extern bool_t hvm_enabled;
 extern s8 hvm_port80_allowed;
 
+#define MSR_R       BIT(0, U)
+#define MSR_W       BIT(1, U)
+#define MSR_RW      (MSR_W | MSR_R)
+
 extern const struct hvm_function_table *start_svm(void);
 extern const struct hvm_function_table *start_vmx(void);
 
diff --git a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h
index e87728fa81..ed2e55e5cf 100644
--- a/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h
+++ b/xen/arch/x86/include/asm/hvm/svm/vmcb.h
@@ -585,13 +585,12 @@ void svm_destroy_vmcb(struct vcpu *v);
 
 void setup_vmcb_dump(void);
 
-#define MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE    0
-#define MSR_INTERCEPT_READ    1
-#define MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE   2
-#define MSR_INTERCEPT_RW      (MSR_INTERCEPT_WRITE | MSR_INTERCEPT_READ)
-void svm_intercept_msr(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int enable);
-#define svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr) svm_intercept_msr((v), (msr), MSR_INTERCEPT_NONE)
-#define svm_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr) svm_intercept_msr((v), (msr), MSR_INTERCEPT_RW)
+void svm_set_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int flags);
+void svm_clear_msr_intercept(struct vcpu *v, uint32_t msr, int flags);
+#define svm_disable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr) \
+    svm_clear_msr_intercept((v), (msr), MSR_RW)
+#define svm_enable_intercept_for_msr(v, msr) \
+    svm_set_intercept_msr((v), (msr), MSR_RW)
 
 /*
  * VMCB accessor functions.
-- 
2.37.2



  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-02-27  7:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 17+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-02-27  7:56 [PATCH 0/4] hvm: add hvm_funcs hooks for msr intercept handling Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-27  7:56 ` [PATCH 1/4] x86/vpmu: rename {svm,vmx}_vpmu_initialise to {amd,core2}_vpmu_initialise Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-28 13:54   ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-27  7:56 ` Xenia Ragiadakou [this message]
2023-02-28 14:20   ` [PATCH 2/4] x86/svm: split svm_intercept_msr() into svm_{set,clear}_msr_intercept() Jan Beulich
2023-02-28 15:05     ` Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-28 15:10       ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-28 15:17         ` Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-28 16:14           ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-27  7:56 ` [PATCH 3/4] x86/vmx: replace enum vmx_msr_intercept_type with the msr access flags Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-28 14:31   ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-28 14:34     ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-28 15:07       ` Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-27  7:56 ` [PATCH 4/4] x86/hvm: create hvm_funcs for {svm,vmx}_{set,clear}_msr_intercept() Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-02-28 14:58   ` Jan Beulich
2023-02-28 20:14     ` Xenia Ragiadakou
2023-03-01  9:14       ` Jan Beulich

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