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From: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
To: netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: davem@davemloft.net, netdev@vger.kernel.org, kuba@kernel.org,
	pabeni@redhat.com, edumazet@google.com
Subject: [PATCH net 3/5] netfilter: xt_u32: validate user space input
Date: Thu, 31 Aug 2023 01:59:33 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230830235935.465690-4-pablo@netfilter.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230830235935.465690-1-pablo@netfilter.org>

From: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>

The xt_u32 module doesn't validate the fields in the xt_u32 structure.
An attacker may take advantage of this to trigger an OOB read by setting
the size fields with a value beyond the arrays boundaries.

Add a checkentry function to validate the structure.

This was originally reported by the ZDI project (ZDI-CAN-18408).

Fixes: 1b50b8a371e9 ("[NETFILTER]: Add u32 match")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Wander Lairson Costa <wander@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Pablo Neira Ayuso <pablo@netfilter.org>
---
 net/netfilter/xt_u32.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
index 177b40d08098..117d4615d668 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/xt_u32.c
@@ -96,11 +96,32 @@ static bool u32_mt(const struct sk_buff *skb, struct xt_action_param *par)
 	return ret ^ data->invert;
 }
 
+static int u32_mt_checkentry(const struct xt_mtchk_param *par)
+{
+	const struct xt_u32 *data = par->matchinfo;
+	const struct xt_u32_test *ct;
+	unsigned int i;
+
+	if (data->ntests > ARRAY_SIZE(data->tests))
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < data->ntests; ++i) {
+		ct = &data->tests[i];
+
+		if (ct->nnums > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->location) ||
+		    ct->nvalues > ARRAY_SIZE(ct->value))
+			return -EINVAL;
+	}
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static struct xt_match xt_u32_mt_reg __read_mostly = {
 	.name       = "u32",
 	.revision   = 0,
 	.family     = NFPROTO_UNSPEC,
 	.match      = u32_mt,
+	.checkentry = u32_mt_checkentry,
 	.matchsize  = sizeof(struct xt_u32),
 	.me         = THIS_MODULE,
 };
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-30 23:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-30 23:59 [PATCH net 0/5] Netfilter fixes for net Pablo Neira Ayuso
2023-08-30 23:59 ` [PATCH net 1/5] netfilter: nft_exthdr: Fix non-linear header modification Pablo Neira Ayuso
2023-08-31  1:40   ` patchwork-bot+netdevbpf
2023-08-30 23:59 ` [PATCH net 2/5] netfilter: xt_sctp: validate the flag_info count Pablo Neira Ayuso
2023-08-30 23:59 ` Pablo Neira Ayuso [this message]
2023-08-30 23:59 ` [PATCH net 4/5] netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log setelem reset Pablo Neira Ayuso
2023-08-30 23:59 ` [PATCH net 5/5] netfilter: nf_tables: Audit log rule reset Pablo Neira Ayuso

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