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From: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
To: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>, Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>,
	David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH 01/15] ovl: add permission hooks outside of do_splice_direct()
Date: Tue, 14 Nov 2023 17:33:07 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20231114153321.1716028-2-amir73il@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20231114153321.1716028-1-amir73il@gmail.com>

The main callers of do_splice_direct() also call rw_verify_area() for
the entire range that is being copied, e.g. by vfs_copy_file_range()
or do_sendfile() before calling do_splice_direct().

The only caller that does not have those checks for entire range is
ovl_copy_up_file().  In preparation for removing the checks inside
do_splice_direct(), add rw_verify_area() call in ovl_copy_up_file().

For extra safety, perform minimal sanity checks from rw_verify_area()
for non negative offsets also in the copy up do_splice_direct() loop
without calling the file permission hooks.

This is needed for fanotify "pre content" events.

Signed-off-by: Amir Goldstein <amir73il@gmail.com>
---
 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c | 26 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
index 4382881b0709..106f8643af3b 100644
--- a/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
+++ b/fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c
@@ -230,6 +230,19 @@ static int ovl_copy_fileattr(struct inode *inode, const struct path *old,
 	return ovl_real_fileattr_set(new, &newfa);
 }
 
+static int ovl_verify_area(loff_t pos, loff_t pos2, loff_t len, loff_t totlen)
+{
+	loff_t tmp;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pos != pos2))
+		return -EIO;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(pos < 0 || len < 0 || totlen < 0))
+		return -EIO;
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(check_add_overflow(pos, len, &tmp)))
+		return -EIO;
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static int ovl_copy_up_file(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 			    struct file *new_file, loff_t len)
 {
@@ -244,13 +257,20 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_file(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 	int error = 0;
 
 	ovl_path_lowerdata(dentry, &datapath);
-	if (WARN_ON(datapath.dentry == NULL))
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(datapath.dentry == NULL) ||
+	    WARN_ON_ONCE(len < 0))
 		return -EIO;
 
 	old_file = ovl_path_open(&datapath, O_LARGEFILE | O_RDONLY);
 	if (IS_ERR(old_file))
 		return PTR_ERR(old_file);
 
+	error = rw_verify_area(READ, old_file, &old_pos, len);
+	if (!error)
+		error = rw_verify_area(WRITE, new_file, &new_pos, len);
+	if (error)
+		goto out_fput;
+
 	/* Try to use clone_file_range to clone up within the same fs */
 	ovl_start_write(dentry);
 	cloned = do_clone_file_range(old_file, 0, new_file, 0, len, 0);
@@ -309,6 +329,10 @@ static int ovl_copy_up_file(struct ovl_fs *ofs, struct dentry *dentry,
 			}
 		}
 
+		error = ovl_verify_area(old_pos, new_pos, this_len, len);
+		if (error)
+			break;
+
 		ovl_start_write(dentry);
 		bytes = do_splice_direct(old_file, &old_pos,
 					 new_file, &new_pos,
-- 
2.34.1


  reply	other threads:[~2023-11-14 15:33 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 26+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-11-14 15:33 [PATCH 00/15] Tidy up file permission hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` Amir Goldstein [this message]
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 02/15] splice: remove permission hook from do_splice_direct() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 03/15] splice: move permission hook out of splice_direct_to_actor() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 04/15] splice: move permission hook out of splice_file_to_pipe() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 05/15] splice: remove permission hook from iter_file_splice_write() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-21 14:56   ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-21 15:18     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 06/15] remap_range: move permission hooks out of do_clone_file_range() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 07/15] remap_range: move file_start_write() to after permission hook Amir Goldstein
2023-11-21 15:10   ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-21 15:47     ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-21 18:39     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 08/15] btrfs: " Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 09/15] fs: move file_start_write() into vfs_iter_write() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 10/15] fs: move permission hook out of do_iter_write() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-21 15:34   ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 11/15] fs: move permission hook out of do_iter_read() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-21 15:28   ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-21 17:46     ` Amir Goldstein
2023-11-21 15:35   ` Christian Brauner
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 12/15] fs: move kiocb_start_write() into vfs_iocb_iter_write() Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 13/15] fs: create __sb_write_started() helper Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 14/15] fs: create file_write_started() helper Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:33 ` [PATCH 15/15] fs: create {sb,file}_write_not_started() helpers Amir Goldstein
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2023-11-14 15:32 [PATCH 00/15] Tidy up file permission hooks Amir Goldstein
2023-11-14 15:32 ` [PATCH 01/15] ovl: add permission hooks outside of do_splice_direct() Amir Goldstein

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