[PATCH 0/5] evm: Support signatures on stacked filesystem

From: Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
To: linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-unionfs@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, paul@paul-moore.com,
	jmorris@namei.org, serge@hallyn.com, zohar@linux.ibm.com,
	roberto.sassu@huawei.com, amir73il@gmail.com, miklos@szeredi.hu,
	Stefan Berger <stefanb@linux.ibm.com>
Subject: [PATCH 0/5] evm: Support signatures on stacked filesystem
Date: Tue, 30 Jan 2024 16:46:15 -0500	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20240130214620.3155380-1-stefanb@linux.ibm.com> (raw)

EVM has recently been completely disabled on unsupported (e.g.,
overlayfs). This series now enables copy-up of "portable and immutable"
signatures on those filesystems and enables the enforcement of
"portable and immutable" as well as the "original" signatures on
previously unsupported filesystem when EVM is enabled with EVM_INIT_X509.
HMAC verification and generation remains disabled on those filesystems.

Regards,
   Stefan

Stefan Berger (5):
  security: allow finer granularity in permitting copy-up of security
    xattrs
  evm: Implement per signature type decision in
    security_inode_copy_up_xattr
  ima: Reset EVM status upon detecting changes to overlay backing file
  evm: Use the real inode's metadata to calculate metadata hash
  evm: Enforce signatures on unsupported filesystem for EVM_INIT_X509

 fs/overlayfs/copy_up.c              |  2 +-
 include/linux/evm.h                 | 10 +++++-
 include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h       |  3 +-
 include/linux/security.h            |  4 +--
 security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c |  2 +-
 security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c   | 48 +++++++++++++++++++++++------
 security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c   |  2 ++
 security/security.c                 |  7 +++--
 security/selinux/hooks.c            |  2 +-
 security/smack/smack_lsm.c          |  2 +-
 10 files changed, 62 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)

-- 
2.43.0