All of lore.kernel.org
 help / color / mirror / Atom feed
From: Ashish Kalra <Ashish.Kalra@amd.com>
To: pbonzini@redhat.com
Cc: tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	joro@8bytes.org, bp@suse.de, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, srutherford@google.com,
	seanjc@google.com, venu.busireddy@oracle.com,
	brijesh.singh@amd.com
Subject: [PATCH v12 01/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV SEND_START command
Date: Mon, 12 Apr 2021 19:43:22 +0000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618254007.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <cover.1618254007.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com>

From: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>

The command is used to create an outgoing SEV guest encryption context.

Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>
Cc: "H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Cc: Joerg Roedel <joro@8bytes.org>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de>
Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
Cc: x86@kernel.org
Cc: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Steve Rutherford <srutherford@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Venu Busireddy <venu.busireddy@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com>
Signed-off-by: Ashish Kalra <ashish.kalra@amd.com>
---
 .../virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst        |  27 ++++
 arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c                        | 125 ++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/psp-sev.h                       |   8 +-
 include/uapi/linux/kvm.h                      |  12 ++
 4 files changed, 168 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
index 469a6308765b..ac799dd7a618 100644
--- a/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
+++ b/Documentation/virt/kvm/amd-memory-encryption.rst
@@ -284,6 +284,33 @@ Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
                 __u32 len;
         };
 
+10. KVM_SEV_SEND_START
+----------------------
+
+The KVM_SEV_SEND_START command can be used by the hypervisor to create an
+outgoing guest encryption context.
+
+Parameters (in): struct kvm_sev_send_start
+
+Returns: 0 on success, -negative on error
+
+::
+        struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+                __u32 policy;                 /* guest policy */
+
+                __u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;         /* platform Diffie-Hellman certificate */
+                __u32 pdh_cert_len;
+
+                __u64 plat_certs_uaddr;        /* platform certificate chain */
+                __u32 plat_certs_len;
+
+                __u64 amd_certs_uaddr;        /* AMD certificate */
+                __u32 amd_certs_len;
+
+                __u64 session_uaddr;          /* Guest session information */
+                __u32 session_len;
+        };
+
 References
 ==========
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index 874ea309279f..2b65900c05d6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1110,6 +1110,128 @@ static int sev_get_attestation_report(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
 	return ret;
 }
 
+/* Userspace wants to query session length. */
+static int
+__sev_send_start_query_session_length(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp,
+				      struct kvm_sev_send_start *params)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start *data;
+	int ret;
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (data == NULL)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
+
+	params->session_len = data->session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+	kfree(data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
+static int sev_send_start(struct kvm *kvm, struct kvm_sev_cmd *argp)
+{
+	struct kvm_sev_info *sev = &to_kvm_svm(kvm)->sev_info;
+	struct sev_data_send_start *data;
+	struct kvm_sev_send_start params;
+	void *amd_certs, *session_data;
+	void *pdh_cert, *plat_certs;
+	int ret;
+
+	if (!sev_guest(kvm))
+		return -ENOTTY;
+
+	if (copy_from_user(&params, (void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		return -EFAULT;
+
+	/* if session_len is zero, userspace wants to query the session length */
+	if (!params.session_len)
+		return __sev_send_start_query_session_length(kvm, argp,
+				&params);
+
+	/* some sanity checks */
+	if (!params.pdh_cert_uaddr || !params.pdh_cert_len ||
+	    !params.session_uaddr || params.session_len > SEV_FW_BLOB_MAX_SIZE)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* allocate the memory to hold the session data blob */
+	session_data = kmalloc(params.session_len, GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (!session_data)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	/* copy the certificate blobs from userspace */
+	pdh_cert = psp_copy_user_blob(params.pdh_cert_uaddr,
+				params.pdh_cert_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(pdh_cert)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(pdh_cert);
+		goto e_free_session;
+	}
+
+	plat_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.plat_certs_uaddr,
+				params.plat_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(plat_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(plat_certs);
+		goto e_free_pdh;
+	}
+
+	amd_certs = psp_copy_user_blob(params.amd_certs_uaddr,
+				params.amd_certs_len);
+	if (IS_ERR(amd_certs)) {
+		ret = PTR_ERR(amd_certs);
+		goto e_free_plat_cert;
+	}
+
+	data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT);
+	if (data == NULL) {
+		ret = -ENOMEM;
+		goto e_free_amd_cert;
+	}
+
+	/* populate the FW SEND_START field with system physical address */
+	data->pdh_cert_address = __psp_pa(pdh_cert);
+	data->pdh_cert_len = params.pdh_cert_len;
+	data->plat_certs_address = __psp_pa(plat_certs);
+	data->plat_certs_len = params.plat_certs_len;
+	data->amd_certs_address = __psp_pa(amd_certs);
+	data->amd_certs_len = params.amd_certs_len;
+	data->session_address = __psp_pa(session_data);
+	data->session_len = params.session_len;
+	data->handle = sev->handle;
+
+	ret = sev_issue_cmd(kvm, SEV_CMD_SEND_START, data, &argp->error);
+
+	if (!ret && copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)params.session_uaddr,
+			session_data, params.session_len)) {
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+		goto e_free;
+	}
+
+	params.policy = data->policy;
+	params.session_len = data->session_len;
+	if (copy_to_user((void __user *)(uintptr_t)argp->data, &params,
+				sizeof(struct kvm_sev_send_start)))
+		ret = -EFAULT;
+
+e_free:
+	kfree(data);
+e_free_amd_cert:
+	kfree(amd_certs);
+e_free_plat_cert:
+	kfree(plat_certs);
+e_free_pdh:
+	kfree(pdh_cert);
+e_free_session:
+	kfree(session_data);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 {
 	struct kvm_sev_cmd sev_cmd;
@@ -1163,6 +1285,9 @@ int svm_mem_enc_op(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *argp)
 	case KVM_SEV_GET_ATTESTATION_REPORT:
 		r = sev_get_attestation_report(kvm, &sev_cmd);
 		break;
+	case KVM_SEV_SEND_START:
+		r = sev_send_start(kvm, &sev_cmd);
+		break;
 	default:
 		r = -EINVAL;
 		goto out;
diff --git a/include/linux/psp-sev.h b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
index b801ead1e2bb..73da511b9423 100644
--- a/include/linux/psp-sev.h
+++ b/include/linux/psp-sev.h
@@ -326,11 +326,11 @@ struct sev_data_send_start {
 	u64 pdh_cert_address;			/* In */
 	u32 pdh_cert_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved1;
-	u64 plat_cert_address;			/* In */
-	u32 plat_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u64 plat_certs_address;			/* In */
+	u32 plat_certs_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved2;
-	u64 amd_cert_address;			/* In */
-	u32 amd_cert_len;			/* In */
+	u64 amd_certs_address;			/* In */
+	u32 amd_certs_len;			/* In */
 	u32 reserved3;
 	u64 session_address;			/* In */
 	u32 session_len;			/* In/Out */
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
index f6afee209620..ac53ad2e7271 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm.h
@@ -1729,6 +1729,18 @@ struct kvm_sev_attestation_report {
 	__u32 len;
 };
 
+struct kvm_sev_send_start {
+	__u32 policy;
+	__u64 pdh_cert_uaddr;
+	__u32 pdh_cert_len;
+	__u64 plat_certs_uaddr;
+	__u32 plat_certs_len;
+	__u64 amd_certs_uaddr;
+	__u32 amd_certs_len;
+	__u64 session_uaddr;
+	__u32 session_len;
+};
+
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_ENABLE_IOMMU	(1 << 0)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_PCI_2_3		(1 << 1)
 #define KVM_DEV_ASSIGN_MASK_INTX	(1 << 2)
-- 
2.17.1


  reply	other threads:[~2021-04-12 19:43 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 37+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2021-04-12 19:42 [PATCH v12 00/13] Add AMD SEV guest live migration support Ashish Kalra
2021-04-12 19:43 ` Ashish Kalra [this message]
2021-04-12 19:43 ` [PATCH v12 02/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEND_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-12 19:43 ` [PATCH v12 03/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_SEND_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:03   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:44 ` [PATCH v12 04/13] KVM: SVM: Add support for KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_START command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:03   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:44 ` [PATCH v12 05/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_UPDATE_DATA command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:04   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:44 ` [PATCH v12 06/13] KVM: SVM: Add KVM_SEV_RECEIVE_FINISH command Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:04   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:45 ` [PATCH v12 07/13] KVM: x86: Add AMD SEV specific Hypercall3 Ashish Kalra
2021-04-12 19:45 ` [PATCH v12 08/13] KVM: X86: Introduce KVM_HC_PAGE_ENC_STATUS hypercall Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:04   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:45 ` [PATCH v12 09/13] mm: x86: Invoke hypercall when page encryption status is changed Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:06   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:45 ` [PATCH v12 10/13] KVM: x86: Introduce new KVM_FEATURE_SEV_LIVE_MIGRATION feature & Custom MSR Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:04   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:46 ` [PATCH v12 11/13] EFI: Introduce the new AMD Memory Encryption GUID Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:05   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-12 19:46 ` [PATCH v12 12/13] x86/kvm: Add guest support for detecting and enabling SEV Live Migration feature Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:25   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  1:01     ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-12 19:47 ` [PATCH v12 13/13] x86/kvm: Add kexec support for SEV Live Migration Ashish Kalra
2021-04-12 19:47   ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  0:22   ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  0:22     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  1:23     ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  1:23       ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  1:48       ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  1:48         ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13  2:25         ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13  2:25           ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13 11:47           ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13 11:47             ` Ashish Kalra
2021-04-13 19:19             ` Steve Rutherford
2021-04-13 19:19               ` Steve Rutherford

Reply instructions:

You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:

* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
  and reply-to-all from there: mbox

  Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style

* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
  switches of git-send-email(1):

  git send-email \
    --in-reply-to=2f1686d0164e0f1b3d6a41d620408393e0a48376.1618254007.git.ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --to=ashish.kalra@amd.com \
    --cc=bp@suse.de \
    --cc=brijesh.singh@amd.com \
    --cc=hpa@zytor.com \
    --cc=joro@8bytes.org \
    --cc=kvm@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org \
    --cc=mingo@redhat.com \
    --cc=pbonzini@redhat.com \
    --cc=seanjc@google.com \
    --cc=srutherford@google.com \
    --cc=tglx@linutronix.de \
    --cc=thomas.lendacky@amd.com \
    --cc=venu.busireddy@oracle.com \
    --cc=x86@kernel.org \
    /path/to/YOUR_REPLY

  https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html

* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
  via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line before the message body.
This is an external index of several public inboxes,
see mirroring instructions on how to clone and mirror
all data and code used by this external index.