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From: Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>
To: <zohar@linux.ibm.com>, <dmitry.kasatkin@huawei.com>, <mjg59@google.com>
Cc: <linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-doc@vger.kernel.org>, <stable@vger.kernel.org>,
	<linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <silviu.vlasceanu@huawei.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2
Date: Thu, 6 Jun 2019 13:43:58 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <3711f387-3aef-9fbb-1bb4-dded6807b033@huawei.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20190606112620.26488-1-roberto.sassu@huawei.com>

On 6/6/2019 1:26 PM, Roberto Sassu wrote:
> Previous versions included the patch 'ima: don't ignore INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN
> EVM status'. However, I realized that this patch cannot be accepted alone
> because IMA-Appraisal would deny access to new files created during the
> boot. With the current behavior, those files are accessible because they
> have a valid security.ima (not protected by EVM) created after the first
> write.
> 
> A solution for this problem is to initialize EVM very early with a random
> key. Access to created files will be granted, even with the strict
> appraisal, because after the first write those files will have both
> security.ima and security.evm (HMAC calculated with the random key).
> 
> Strict appraisal will work only if it is done with signatures until the
> persistent HMAC key is loaded.

Changelog

v2:
- remove patch 1/3 (evm: check hash algorithm passed to init_desc());
   already accepted
- remove patch 3/3 (ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly);
   already accepted
- add new patch (evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot)
- patch 2/3: modify patch description

v1:
- remove patch 2/4 (evm: reset status in evm_inode_post_setattr()); file
   attributes cannot be set if the signature is portable and immutable
- patch 3/4: add __ro_after_init to ima_appraise_req_evm variable
   declaration
- patch 3/4: remove ima_appraise_req_evm kernel option and introduce
   'enforce-evm' and 'log-evm' as possible values for ima_appraise=
- remove patch 4/4 (ima: only audit failed appraisal verifications)
- add new patch (ima: show rules with IMA_INMASK correctly)


> Roberto Sassu (2):
>    evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot
>    ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status
> 
>   .../admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt         | 11 ++--
>   security/integrity/evm/evm.h                  | 10 +++-
>   security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c           | 57 ++++++++++++++++---
>   security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c             | 41 ++++++++++---
>   security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c         |  8 +++
>   security/integrity/integrity.h                |  1 +
>   6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
> 

-- 
HUAWEI TECHNOLOGIES Duesseldorf GmbH, HRB 56063
Managing Director: Bo PENG, Jian LI, Yanli SHI

  parent reply	other threads:[~2019-06-06 11:44 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 21+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2019-06-06 11:26 [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2 Roberto Sassu
2019-06-06 11:26 ` [PATCH v3 1/2] evm: add option to set a random HMAC key at early boot Roberto Sassu
2019-06-06 11:26 ` [PATCH v3 2/2] ima: add enforce-evm and log-evm modes to strictly check EVM status Roberto Sassu
2019-06-07 14:24   ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-07 14:40     ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-07 15:08       ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-07 15:14         ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-07 15:25           ` Mimi Zohar
2019-06-06 11:43 ` Roberto Sassu [this message]
2019-06-06 14:49   ` [PATCH v3 0/2] ima/evm fixes for v5.2 Mimi Zohar
2019-06-06 15:22     ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-12 11:28 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-06-12 13:11   ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-12 13:38     ` Janne Karhunen
2019-06-12 16:33       ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-13  6:01         ` Janne Karhunen
2019-06-13  6:57           ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-13  7:39             ` Janne Karhunen
2019-06-13  7:50               ` Roberto Sassu
2019-06-13  8:04                 ` Janne Karhunen
2019-06-13  8:51                   ` Roberto Sassu

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