From: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
To: "Kirill A. Shutemov" <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
x86@kernel.org, Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
"H. Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@intel.com>,
Kai Huang <kai.huang@linux.intel.com>,
Jacob Pan <jacob.jun.pan@linux.intel.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-mm@kvack.org
Subject: Re: [PATCHv4 18/18] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 16:48:37 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <3a284a7a-821e-f539-0fe8-90f35cd8ff08@infradead.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20180627215726.l5syzdcc26hgihtt@black.fi.intel.com>
On 06/27/2018 02:57 PM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
> On Tue, Jun 26, 2018 at 05:30:12PM +0000, Randy Dunlap wrote:
>> On 06/26/2018 07:22 AM, Kirill A. Shutemov wrote:
>>> Add new config option to enabled/disable Multi-Key Total Memory
>>> Encryption support.
>>>
>>> MKTME uses MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING to reserve enough space in per-KeyID
>>> direct mappings for memory hotplug.
>>>
>>> Signed-off-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
>>> ---
>>> arch/x86/Kconfig | 19 ++++++++++++++++++-
>>> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
>>>
>>> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> index fa5e1ec09247..9a843bd63108 100644
>>> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
>>> @@ -1523,6 +1523,23 @@ config ARCH_USE_MEMREMAP_PROT
>>> def_bool y
>>> depends on AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT
>>>
>>> +config X86_INTEL_MKTME
>>> + bool "Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption"
>>> + select DYNAMIC_PHYSICAL_MASK
>>> + select PAGE_EXTENSION
>>> + depends on X86_64 && CPU_SUP_INTEL
>>> + ---help---
>>> + Say yes to enable support for Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption.
>>> + This requires an Intel processor that has support of the feature.
>>> +
>>> + Multikey Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) is a technology that allows
>>> + transparent memory encryption in and upcoming Intel platforms.
>>
>> huh? Maybe drop the "and"?
>
> Ugh.. It has to be "an".
an ... platform.
or
in upcoming Intel platforms.
--
~Randy
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2018-06-27 23:48 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 36+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2018-06-26 14:22 [PATCHv4 00/18] MKTME enabling Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 01/18] mm: Do no merge VMAs with different encryption KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 02/18] mm/ksm: Do not merge pages with different KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:03 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 03/18] mm/page_alloc: Unify alloc_hugepage_vma() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 04/18] mm/page_alloc: Handle allocation for encrypted memory Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 05/18] mm/khugepaged: Handle encrypted pages Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 06/18] x86/mm: Mask out KeyID bits from page table entry pfn Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 07/18] x86/mm: Introduce variables to store number, shift and mask of KeyIDs Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:09 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-10 10:48 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 08/18] x86/mm: Preserve KeyID on pte_modify() and pgprot_modify() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 09/18] x86/mm: Implement page_keyid() using page_ext Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 10/18] x86/mm: Implement vma_keyid() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 11/18] x86/mm: Implement prep_encrypted_page() and arch_free_page() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 12/18] x86/mm: Rename CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY_PHYSICAL_PADDING Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 13/18] x86/mm: Allow to disable MKTME after enumeration Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:20 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-10 10:49 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-10 11:21 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 14/18] x86/mm: Detect MKTME early Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 15/18] x86/mm: Calculate direct mapping size Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-07-09 18:32 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 16/18] x86/mm: Implement sync_direct_mapping() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 17/18] x86/mm: Handle encrypted memory in page_to_virt() and __pa() Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 16:38 ` Dave Hansen
2018-06-27 21:56 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 14:22 ` [PATCHv4 18/18] x86: Introduce CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MKTME Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-26 17:30 ` Randy Dunlap
2018-06-27 21:57 ` Kirill A. Shutemov
2018-06-27 23:48 ` Randy Dunlap [this message]
2018-07-09 18:36 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-09 18:44 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-09 18:52 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-07-09 18:59 ` Dave Hansen
2018-07-09 20:29 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
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